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Abstract
In recent years, international relations scholarship has begun to take seriously the
role that hierarchy plays in shaping international order. The conclusion of this re-
search program is that hierarchical ordering principles primarily work to structure
relations among states in the international system.
This dissertation offers an alternative view of international hierarchy. More
specifically, this project explores the implications that international hierarchy has
for political developments within – rather than between – states. I first argue
that international hierarchy is oriented around the securing of favorable leader-
ship within other states. I find that “dominant states” can alter the willingness
of groups within “subordinate states” to compete for domestic political power by
shaping the value these groups place on holding office. This argument has three
empirical implications.
First, I show that by conditionally promising resources like foreign aid to groups
within subordinate states, dominant states can bring new, friendly leaders to power,
in effect “purchasing” regime change. Second, I find that dominant states are able
to deter challenges to their preferred regimes within subordinate states by pro-
viding foreign aid and by threatening unfriendly groups with coercion. Finally,
I show that the disappearance of hierarchy – and its attendant regime security –
generate incentives for civil conflict.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“If it is our business to see that [they] are not destroyed by any foreign
power, is it not our duty to see that they are not destroyed by them-
selves?”
Albert Beveridge, United States Senator (Indiana)
In terms of grand strategy, the United States’ relationship with the Philippines
marks one of the great successes of U.S. foreign policy. After wresting control of
the archipelago from Spain at the turn of the twentieth century, the United States
proceeded to establish a wide-ranging program of societal and political restructur-
ing. Notably, this program included the establishment of educational programs
in a largely rural country, which met with success such that even in the twenty-
first century English remains an official language of the island nation. Politically,
the United States pushed for democratic elections, and in unprecedented fashion
unilaterally granted Manila independence in 1946. Even post-independence, the
Philippines remained a linchpin of U.S. strategic operations for nearly half a cen-
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tury, providing basing rights at Clark Air Base and more than 10,000 troops during
the Vietnam War.
Yet this apparent placidity was superficial. When control of the islands passed
from the Spanish, the United States inherited a semi-feudal economic structure,
which in many ways Washington saw fit to perpetuate. Collaboration with the
same elites who had enabled Spanish rule – Western-educated doctors and lawyers
along with large landowners – was key to winning a brutal war against a Philip-
pine independence movement headed by Emilio Aguinaldo, with whom the U.S.
had previously cooperated with in an effort to oust the Spanish. And following
the establishment of U.S. control over the islands, these elites (known as ilustra-
dos) provided the new U.S.-run government with a group to which the franchise
could be comfortably restricted. When the ilustrados were defeated in the first full
legislative elections of 1907, Cameron Forbes, the deputy governor of the islands,
ensured that the majority leader of the winning party passed as the legislature’s
first act a resolution pledging the body to recognize the supremacy of U.S. law
(Karnow 2010, p. 239). After independence, the United States supported dictator
Ferdinand Marcos, who subverted foreign assistance for personal gain and vio-
lently put down democratic activists. Time and again, as Beveridge notes in the
quote from the epigraph, the United States sought to protect the Philippines and
other allied regimes not from threats emanating from the international system,
but from threats within their own borders.
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Interstate relationships like the one between the United States and the Philip-
pines are characterized by hierarchy, a type of asymmetric relationship between
relatively strong and relatively weak states in the interstate system. Hierarchical
relationships have long been ignored by international relations scholars, who as-
sume that relations between states proceed on constitutionally equal terms. This
assumption – that states are formally equal, and that no legal power compels re-
lations between them – is what scholars refer to as “anarchy.” I argue that this
assumption has obscured our ability as a field to understand domestic political
development within states, and consequently our ability to understand how do-
mestic politics shape relations between them.
Before proceeding, a brief note on terminology is necessary. This dissertation
examines international relationships that are hierarchical. By this I mean that the
dissertation looks at relationships in which one powerful state or political unit
exercises influence over another weaker state or political unit. I refer to these
strong and weak actors, respectively, as “dominant” and “subordinate” states. An
examination of hierarchy also inevitably requires engaging with a vast historical
literature on empire, which is a subset of hierarchy in which control between dom-
inant and subordinate states is legally institutionalized.1 The imperial historiog-
raphy often refers to actors in terms of the “home” state and its “colonies” or the
“metropole” and “periphery.” I switch between these terminologies at times, but
the core references will retain the dominant/subordinate language.
1I provide a deeper look at definitional issues in the following chapter.
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In this dissertation, I ask two main questions. First, what are the implications
of hierarchy for politics within subordinate states? Previous treatments of hierar-
chy have tended to focus on the international implications of and justifications for
these arrangements. The reason for this focus is that scholars have almost univer-
sally assumed that hierarchical arrangements provide public goods for subordi-
nate states. For instance, Lake (2009) defines international hierarchy as the extent
of authority exercised by dominant states over subordinate states. Crucially, in this
formulation authority is surrendered willingly by subordinate states in exchange
for political goods such as the ability to reduce military spending and secure open
trade relationships. Conversely, I argue that hierarchy only rarely provides ben-
efits that redound to the benefit of all those within subordinate states. The indi-
cators often pointed to as components of hierarchical bargains – free trade, stable
and set monetary arrangements, and even extended deterrence – all have redis-
tributive implications for the politics on which they are imposed.
Recognizing the redistributive implications of hierarchy opens the door to a
substantial revision to the logic of hierarchy. For dominant states, the fact that
the goals of their political order reallocate resources and political power within
subordinate states means that constructing a hierarchical relationship will be fun-
damentally contentious. As I argue in Chapters 2 and 3, the redistributive nature
of hierarchical goals ultimately implies that dominant states will seek to control
which groups hold power within subordinate states. How the construction of hi-
4
erarchy affects groups within subordinate states obviously depends on their orien-
tation towards a potential dominant state. For groups that have overlapping pref-
erences with a potential dominant state, the construction of hierarchy presents an
opportunity for them to solidify their political security, marginalize their oppo-
nents, and generally shape political outcomes to their liking, often with the ex-
plicit backing of a powerful external patron. The converse, then, is true for their
domestic political opponents.
Consider a later example from Southeast Asia: by the mid-1970s the United
States sent more than $40 million annually in military aid to Indonesia, making
it effectively the only external source of arms to Jakarta. When Indonesian mili-
tary officials made a push to allow collaborative defense policies through the As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – policies that would be de facto
Indonesian-dominated – this dependence provided the civilian government lever-
age against the military such that foreign minister Adam Malik was able to scuttle
the plans out of concern for how such a move would be viewed by “aid donors,
especially sections of the American Congress” (Crouch 2007, pp. 338-340). While
a public goods view of hieararchy would point to a reduction in military spend-
ing as a benefit of hierarchy, in fact surrendering control over budgetary decisions
generated a shift in the domestic distribution of power, here away from the group
nominally benefiting from the relationship, i.e. the military. That Malik and other
civilian administrators had actively solicited and nurtured a relationship that ul-
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timately resulted in their domination of rogue military interests is not surprising.
The second question I seek to answer in this project is why subordinate states
enter into hierarchical relationships. The traditional answer is that they trade
some level of policy autonomy in exchange for a good otherwise unavailable to
weaker states, namely interstate security (Morrow 1991). But one need look no
further than the destruction of Manila in 1946 following Japanese occupation to
observe that international security relationships are not an unalloyed good. In con-
trast to much existing work, I argue that the willingness of subordinate states to
strike bargains with dominant states is nested in a logic of domestic, rather than in-
ternational, political competition. In this work, I find evidence that leaders within
subordinate states are able to leverage hierarchy to their domestic political advan-
tage. I argue that because dominant states exert control over political competition
within subordinate states, many countries within the interstate system cannot be
analyzed as self-contained units, as they often are in both international relations
and comparative politics. This argument is consistent with a growing literature
in political science that sees the institutional makeup of states as the endogenous
outcome of interstate bargaining rather than a sui generis phenomenon (Wagner
2007).
Given the voluminous literature on hierarchy, why is a study focusing on sub-
ordinate states warranted? First, the implications of viewing states as endogenized
objects of bargaining rather than self-contained analytical units are wide-ranging.
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In this work, via an in-depth case study of the development of the United States’
hierarchical arrangements across the latter half of the twentieth century, I present
two specific mechanisms by which dominant states shape political competition
within subordinate states.
The first mechanism of dominant-state control links the availability of exter-
nal resources to incentives for political competition within subordinate states. I
argue that dominant states often condition the provision of foreign aid and other
resources on the identity of governments within subordinate states. This resource
conditionality has both pacifying and agitating effects on subordinate state politi-
cal competition. When dominant states are politically friendly with subordinate-
state governments, resource conditionality pacifies domestic politics. The resources
provided by dominant states to friendly governments can be used both to repress
and to buy off groups that would otherwise challenge for office. This finding ac-
cords with a large body of literature on foreign aid that finds states strategically
provide aid in order to bolster the fortunes of their preferred groups within recip-
ient states (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009, Morrison 2009).
But I find that resource conditionality can also agitate and exacerbate domestic
political divisions within subordinate states. When dominant states would pre-
fer to see a different group come to power within subordinate states, the promise
of resources can generate incentives for domestic conflict where there otherwise
would be none. When groups know that acceding to office means receiving free
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resources from a generous patron, nothing the current rulers can offer will deter
conflict. Crucially, I find that the ability of dominant states to incentivize this
foreign-induced regime change depends on subordinate-state institutions not be-
ing too inclusive. If prospective rulers anticipate having to share their newly-
gotten external resources with their domestic opponents, buying regime change
is impossible. The overall implication of this argument is that while dominant
states can “purchase” regime change, this strategy is likely to be successful only in
relatively autocratic states. The argument thus provides one explanation for the
impressive network of anti-democratic alliances the U.S. established throughout
the Cold War.
The second mechanism dominant states use to shape subordinate state polit-
ical competition is coercion. While some of the more memorable examples of
hierarchy construction and defense involve the explicit use of violence, I argue
that coercion hangs over hierarchical bargaining even when it is not actively de-
ployed. I demonstrate that one of the key findings of bargaining models – that
in full-information, non-dynamic games, war does not occur – implies that inter-
state coercion works to deter domestic challenges within other states. Disfavored
groups within subordinate states are deterred from taking office not because they
fear conflict with dominant states, but because of the bargain they anticipate hav-
ing to strike to avoid conflict. When negotiating with a powerful adversary means
the abdication of important policy goals, groups are often unwilling to pay the
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price of office-seeking in the first place. In other words, by preventing disfavored
groups from pursuing their policy goals while in office, interstate coercion works
to reduce the value these groups place on holding office in the first place. In Chap-
ter 5, I present empirical evidence consistent with this finding. Through the use of
a formal model in Chapter 3, I link theoretically the effect of interstate coercion to
equilibrium aid levels, demonstrating the deterrent effect of coercion on domestic
politics. I find that when the United States holds a greater coercive advantage over
a state, it provides less aid than it otherwise would have.
Empirically, these two mechanisms – resource conditionality and coercive de-
terrence – suggest that treating states as independent observations, as many cross-
national studies do, is unjustified. While political scientists are increasingly ac-
knowledging the challenge posed by the possibility that domestic politics are struc-
tured by international actors (Boix 2011, Gunitsky 2014), this finding has not trick-
led down to the way scholars structure their empirical tests.
The second rationale behind studying the domestic effects of hierarchy is that
doing so uncovers constraints on hierarchy construction that have helped deter-
mine the expansion of international order. While extensive treatments of hierar-
chical expansion exist at both the systemic and the metropolitan level, the question
of why hierarchies expand where they do is relatively ignored in the literature.
The exception to this more general rule are works that examine hierarchical ex-
pansion in terms of great power competition, as in Westad (2005) and Blanken
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(2012). Even here, the constraints and opportunities posed by the targeted polities
are glossed over in favor of explanations that privilege systemic variables such as
changes in the global distribution of power. But great variation exists in hierarchi-
cal expansion, both between different dominant states within system “polarities”
(distributions of power) and across time. I briefly discuss both of these in turn.
Hierarchies led by different states often expand differently, even under the
same international distribution of power. For example, the United States- and
Soviet-led hierarchies operated differently despite the fact that both were con-
structed under a bipolar international system. The argument I present in Chapter
3 substantially accounts for this variation. First, the ability of the Soviet Union
to peacefully extend its hierarchy was greatly compromised by how domestically
contentious its goals were. The divisiveness of its goals – for example, imposing
communist economic institutions in states that had no local history of communist
support – required the establishment of highly exclusive domestic political institu-
tions within subordinate states, which greatly compromised its ability to purchase
peace through resource transfers that would be shared with opposition groups.
Especially in Europe, the U.S. sought to build democratic institutions that amelio-
rated domestic tensions: for example, many groups – not just the government –
were able to benefit from Marshall Plan aid. Second, the combination of the So-
viet Union’s divisive goals and exclusionary hierarchical institutions meant that it
had to rely, to a much greater extent than its Western counterpart, on interstate
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coercion to underwrite its hierarchy. In turn, this reliance made the continuation
of its hierarchy uniquely dependent on the viability of its coercive threat, which
spectacularly fell apart at the end of the 1980s.
The second source of intra-system variation is across time. The United States
engaged in a spree of state building immediately following World War II that con-
tinued generally unabated until the early 1970s. Many scholars point to the U.S.’
defeat in the Vietnam War as a catalyzing event that produced a reluctance to
engage in further hierarchy construction. More broadly, Suri (2003) argues that
détente was a response on the part of the great powers to social revolutions at
home. By this estimation, decreased belligerence abroad was a mechanism to dele-
gitimate protesters who were militating for change. Scholars have captured a do-
mestic political logic when describing why dominant states engage in hierarchy
building. While not explicitly about international order, both Snyder (1991) and
Trubowitz (1998) argue that coalitional battles within great powers drive changes
in foreign policy orientation. But subordinate state politics played a crucial role,
as well.
Most proximately, developments within subordinate states are often respon-
sible for the timing of hierarchy construction (or attempts at hierarchy construc-
tion). The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was in response to an internal People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan dispute that had recently seen Mohammed Taraki
replaced by Hafizullah Amin. Likewise U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) op-
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erations in Guatemala and Iran were in response to the deposition of preferred
leaders in those states. In these cases, the availability of friendly domestic groups
led to operations to restore them to power. The unavailability of domestic inter-
locutors can also lead to hierarchy construction. These cases are among the most
violent examples – witness Germany in 1940-1945, in both the U.S. and Soviet
cases – but their results are also likely to be the most long-lasting (Lo, Hashimoto
and Reiter 2008).
The final benefit to a work on hierarchy that incorporates subordinate state do-
mestic politics is that the primary political legacy of hierarchy is contained within
these states’ polities. From a Western viewpoint, foreign policy narratives often re-
volve around experiences like the Vietnam War or the Sepoy Rebellion. Tellingly,
the United States’ “Vietnam Syndrome” refers to the effect that one attempt to im-
pose hierarchy had on subsequent efforts to do so. But these events were at least
equally formative for the polities in which they took place. Estimates place the
civilian dead in both the U.S.-Vietnam and Soviet-Afghan wars at over one million
each.
Even in countries where the construction of hierarchy took a less directly co-
ercive nature, the ramifications of these interstate relationships are far-reaching.
Large-scale armed conflict in Western Europe has not returned since World War
II. Both this and the relative absence of interstate conflict in Latin America can
plausibly be attributed to the hierarchical relationships established since 1945.
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Despite never engaging in military hostilities with Egypt, the United States was a
key factor in underwriting the stability of the military regime there for approxi-
mately forty years (Brownlee 2012) – a role it appears poised to reprise following
the Muslim Brotherhood’s short-lived democratic interregnum. Similarly, Jamal
(2012) argues that persistent anti-Americanism among democratic activists in the
Middle East coupled with the U.S. insistence that these groups not come to power
has prevented democratization in states where economic conditions might other-
wise portend a shift away from authoritarianism. Thus a final goal of this project
is to provide an explicit and generalizable theoretical linkage between interna-
tional political bargaining and the domestic dynamics that many comparativists
have argued are key to shaping political outcomes within states. Before moving to
an outline of the remainder of this dissertation, I first provide an overview of the
argument from the theoretical chapter.
The core argument put forth in this dissertation is that through the use of both
coercion and resource transfers, dominant states shift the value of holding office
for different leaders or groups within subordinate states. First, in the next chapter
I justify the dissertation’s focus on “leadership outcomes” through an historio-
graphical argument linking the development of the state system to strategies of
leader replacement on the part of dominant states. Through this I establish that
the central logic of hierarchy is in incentivizing favorable leadership outcomes
– that is, installing leaders that dominant states prefer to their potential replace-
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ments – within subordinate states. While this point may seem obvious, I show that
in fact an explicit focus on securing favorable leadership is a relatively recent his-
torical development that marks a shift between formal imperial arrangements and
informal hierarchical ones. Second, I present a theoretical model that illustrates
the constraints faced by dominant states attempting to construct a hierarchical re-
lationship with another state. This model, presented in Chapter 3, represents the
core of the argument put forth in this dissertation, which I briefly preview here.
When deciding whether or not to compete for political office, leaders or groups
weigh a calculus. On the one hand, being in government can be incredibly ben-
eficial: governments control patronage networks, tax revenue, and often both the
military and police apparatuses. Perhaps most importantly, controlling the gov-
ernment means controlling the levers that produce policies that leaders care about.
On the other hand, competing for office is difficult and expensive, even in an ideal,
democratic system. In an authoritarian system, competing for office is tantamount
to revolt, and carries with it both a higher cost and a greater penalty should the
attempt to seize power prove unsuccessful. Leaders out of office must trade off the
benefits of holding office with the costs of attempting to seize it, through whatever
means available to them. Only if the benefits of securing control of office – along
with the ability to set policy that a leader cares about – outweigh the costs paid for
securing it, are leaders willing to compete for control of the government. It stands
to reason, then, that any factors making office-holding more or less valuable for a
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leader can shape incentives for political competition within a state.
International actors – in this dissertation, dominant states – can shift this calcu-
lus appreciably. One way is by providing resources that make the already substan-
tial perquisites of office even more appealing. For example, great powers often
send foreign aid to leaders with whom they are friendly, negotiate preferential
trade agreements, or secure favorable loans from international financial institu-
tions. Through providing “free resources,” dominant states can make competing
for office an even more appealing prospect for leaders within other states that they
would like to see come to office. But the reverse is also true.
Even as dominant states can make office-holding appealing to leaders that they
favor, they lower the value of office for those leaders they would prefer to see out
of government. These two mechanisms are logically interrelated. Domestic policy
is produced by governments in negotiation with groups out of office: if govern-
ments make policies that opposition leaders too strongly dislike, the latter may
try to overthrow the government. Because opposition groups are more willing
to overthrow the government when doing so gains them access to free resources
from the dominant state, they force a harder bargain against their domestic foes.
The fact that a leader’s opponents receive access to free resources upon control-
ling the government means this leader is unable to pass the types of policies he or
she might like. Moreover, the free international resources can benefit even those
groups disliked by dominant states: some types of aid are spent on public goods
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which benefit all those within a polity. Therefore, if receiving these resources re-
quires a particular leader to step down, doing so may be to his advantage even if he
must give up the benefits of holding office. Finally, dominant states can threaten
leaders they do not like. As I explain more in Chapter 3, leaders do not necessarily
fear fighting a war with dominant states upon coming to office. Rather they fear
that in order to avoid a war they will have to sacrifice the policy goals that drove
them to compete for office in the first place. This inability to pass the sorts of
policies that drove the leader to compete for office in the first place makes holding
office a less desirable proposition. Both by strategically withholding resources and
by forcing disfavored groups to abdicate their policy goals, dominant states can
powerfully shape political competition within subordinate states.
Before turning to a more formal description of the theoretical logic, in the next
chapter I present a review of the literature examining both hierarchy and its more
formalized counterpart, empire. I do this for two reasons. First, the literature re-
view works to contextualize this study in terms of previous ones that have exam-
ined the effect of great power politics on institutional outcomes in smaller states.
Second, I use the literature review to make an argument that motivates later theo-
retical choices. As I explore in greater detail in the next chapter, one key difference
between mechanisms of hierarchical control during and then after colonialism is
the development of the state system. Colonial states were often able to relieve pres-
sure on their strategies of empire building by allowing disaffected groups to escape
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the reach of the imperial apparatus. This flexibility led to a particular strategy of
institutional extension I term selective institutionalization. When states become
internationally codified entities in the wake of World War II, would-be hierarchs
were forced to bargain with centralized loci of authority. This development meant
that hierarchy in the post-war world focused on regime building and leader pro-
motion rather than territorial division.
Following the literature review, in Chapter 3 I present a formal statement of
my theory. My theoretical approach can be described as “rationalist.” What this
means is fairly straightforward. First, I assume that actors can perceive their own
goals and have preferences over potential outcomes of interactions with other ac-
tors. Second, I assume that actors understand how different actions they and oth-
ers might take will translate into outcomes. Based on the discussion from Chap-
ter 2, I analyze a formal model in which an actor – a dominant state – attempts
to shape political outcomes in a subordinate state. Within the subordinate state,
two leaders (or factions) compete for power while simultaneously bargaining with
both each other and the dominant state. After describing the model in more de-
tail, I briefly outline two broad types of equilibria: those that explain hierarchy
construction, and those that explain hierarchy maintenance.
The following three empirical chapters utilize the formal theoretical logic de-
veloped in Chapter 3 to answer three important questions. In Chapter 4, I ask why
the United States often allies with autocratic regimes. In this chapter I present ev-
17
idence that subordinate state domestic institutions strongly condition the ability
of dominant states to “purchase” favorable leadership transitions. When domes-
tic institutions are too inclusive, dominant states are unable to convince groups
to seize control of them. In these states, the private gains accruing from a fa-
vorable interstate relationship are too broadly-shared within dominant states to
offset the costs of competing for office. Empirically, I show that the expectation of
foreign aid from the United States is associated with a dramatically increased like-
lihood of leadership turnover, but only in those states with relatively exclusionary
institutions. The United States is forced to ally primarily with autocratic regimes
precisely because these are the only states where externally-induced political com-
petition is feasible. In other words, great power relationships with autocracies are
an irreducible feature of hierarchical relations.
While Chapter 4 explores patterns of hierarchical construction, Chapter 5 turns
to variation in hierarchical maintenance. In this chapter, I ask why hierarchical
relationships are sometimes underwritten by interstate coercion. Building from
the logic presented in Chapter 3, I argue that hierarchical relationships rely on
coercion when a dominant state’s preferred negotiating partner within a subordi-
nate state is relatively weak. In these cases, subordinate state regimes rely on the
threat of external intervention to bolster their rule. When the U.S.’ preferred ne-
gotiating partners are weak, it relies on the threat of coercion to underwrite their
rule. Through the estimation of a two-stage model, I also show that this coercive
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threat combines with aid to dramatically increase leader security within subordi-
nate states.
Finally, Chapter 6 completes the empirical arc by illustrating the end of hi-
erarchy. Chapters 4 and 5 present a strong base of evidence demonstrating the
reliance of subordinate-state domestic institutions on hierarchical partners. The
final empirical chapter asks what the end of these relationships implies. I argue
that subordinate state regimes facing the loss of an external patron are trapped in
a commitment problem: having relied on external resources to perpetuate their
rule, these regimes anticipate becoming much weaker in the near future. Con-
sequently, they have an incentive to repress their domestic opponents while they
still can. The end of international hierarchies, therefore, are accompanied by the
widespread onset of civil conflict. This chapter demonstrates empirically that the
waves of civil war following the military occupations of the 1940s, the decolo-
nization of the 1960s, and the breakup of the Soviet Union in the 1990s are all
inextricably linked to international hierarchy.
The body of evidence presented in these pages points to the need for inter-
national relations scholars to fundamentally rethink core assumptions about the
structure of international politics. I demonstrate that international hierarchy is a
determining factor in several important empirical patterns: the turnover of leader-
ship and establishment of peace within states, as well as the onset of civil conflict.
Because these patterns arise as a function of a few important global actors, they
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also help account for the temporal and spatial correlations between the incidence
of these phenomena.
Theoretically, this work also urges a rethinking of what systemic properties of
the international system actually mean. Traditionally, scholars assume the dis-
tribution of international military power primarily operates to structure behavior
between the “great powers" (see e.g., Waltz (1979)).This dissertation suggests that
the relationship is not so simple. Political behavior in the international system is
also crucially determined by the presence or absence of states with enough power
to establish hierarchical relationships with many other, weaker states. The dis-
tribution of power, therefore, is important not for its role in determining system
“polarity," but rather in the ability it confers on several of its members to establish
hierarchical networks of political dependence. I return to these themes in more
detail in the conclusion. First, however, I turn to an historical description of hier-
archical relations, and an explanation for the role of the state system in structuring
their development.
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Chapter 2
Leaders and Hierarchy
While the primary focus of the Geneva Conference of 1954 was the cessation of
hostilities in Korea, delegates also gathered to discuss the independence of French
Indochina. Through a process of negotiation and conquest that stretched from
the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries, France had gradually brought most of
modern-day Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos under control of the Quai d’Orsay.
Imperial institutions throughout what would become Vietnam varied greatly by
location. Indochina itself was divided into three regions: Cochin China, contain-
ing Saigon, was the only formal colony. Annam, a region stretching along the Gulf
of Tonkin and the South China Sea, and Tonkin, a northern region containing the
city of Hanoi, were only protectorates. The earliest location of French control, in
Saigon, was seized by the colonizers as a “consolation prize” in 1859 after Admiral
Charles Rigault de Genouilly was prevented from taking the Vietnamese capital at
Hue (Quinn 2000, pp. 138-139). The establishment of French control over the rest
of the region took nearly half a century, and was never fully achieved, politically or
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administratively. Territorial boundaries were only clearly demarcated where they
might prevent Chinese interference from the north; outside of Cochin China, the
French preserved existing local political structures through bargains with tribal
leaders and potentates (Dommen 2002, p. 25).
This strategic political fragmentation was complicated in the wake of national-
ism, which itself was fueled by the French mission civilisatrice and the conscription
of hundreds of thousands of colonial solders into the Western Front of the First
World War. The nationalists were given a further catalyst when most of France’s
Asian colonial possessions, including Indochina, were occupied by the Japanese
Empire during the second world war. After the war, a group of Vietnamese led by
Ho Chi Minh – a communist – took advantage of the unsettled political situation to
push for independence, which the French resisted. Nearly ten years of additional
violence culminating in the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu had led to the global
diplomatic summit in 1954.
Surprisingly, given its later involvement, the United States was relatively unin-
volved with the Vietnamese question at Geneva. Much to the chagrin of his Euro-
pean interlocutors, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles did not attend, and
only at a late date relented in sending his deputy, Undersecretary Walter Bedell
Smith. What explains the apparent lack of interest on the part of the Eisenhower
administration? Logevall (2012) argues that the United States’ goal in the nego-
tiations was essentially to sabotage them. The U.S. wanted first and foremost an
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independent, non-communist Vietnam. Problematically, Ho Chi Minh was virtu-
ally assured of victory in a free election – by Eisenhower’s estimation “possibly 80
percent” would vote for the communist party (p. 610). Thus while Anthony Eden,
the British delegate at Geneva, worked on negotiating a provisional agreement,
Dulles cabled French Prime Minister Joseph Laniel conditions for an internation-
alization of France’s colonial war and then proceeded to leak them to the press.
The Americans took a similarly intransigent line on the question of when elections
would be held. While the Vietnamese representative Pham Van Dong wanted elec-
tions within six months, Smith preferred them to be indefinitely far in the future.
The agreement finally set them for two years hence, in 1956, though they would
ultimately never be held. When the accords were finally signed, Eisenhower reit-
erated that the United States would not be bound by them. The need to negotiate
the establishment of a government that could govern an entire country with an
adversary who was sure to control it left the United States in a precarious posi-
tion. While its military advantage was pronounced, its political situation was to
deteriorate appreciably in the wake of independence.
While the French had successfully constructed a patchwork of imperial insti-
tutions throughout Indochina, the United States – despite being much more pow-
erful – was never able to exert control over a unified Vietnam. What accounts
for the difference between mechanisms of imperial and hierarchical control? The
transition from formal empire to an attempt at hierarchy provides a laboratory in
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which to examine the mechanisms dominant states use to bring territories under
their control. In this section, I argue that the Indochina example is illustrative of
a great many cases of post-imperial hierarchy. The political fragmentation that
exemplified French Indochina was a common mechanism of imperial control. Na-
tionalism, and the consequent extension of independence to former colonies, com-
plicated the (re)construction of hierarchy in two ways. First, dominant states could
no longer divide and rule states in a manner convenient to them. While France es-
tablished formal colonial control only over Cochin China, the United States was
forced to bargain with a representative from a much larger area, eventually all of
Vietnam. Second, as a result of the inability to divide and rule, policies that earlier
could be imposed only on a select group now had to be ratified by an entire polity.
This process often included incorporating groups which earlier would have been
left outside the bounds of imperial institutions. In this new strategic milieu, domi-
nant states found that securing favorable leadership outcomes became the sine qua
non of hierarchy.
I make two claims in this chapter. First, imperial relationships – before, roughly,
the wave of decolonization following World War II – were characterized by incom-
plete territorial control on the part of the colonizing state. I present evidence from
the secondary literature arguing that imperial states were able to establish wide-
ranging trading empires by building defensible enclaves within peripheral states
and striking bargains primarily with the groups most willing to cooperate. This
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strategy led to an outcome of selective institutionalization in which metropolitan
institutions were extended only to those areas covered under these piecemeal bar-
gains.
Second, decolonization and the partition of the globe into territorially exhaus-
tive units implied a shift from selective institutionalization to a strategy of hier-
archical control that focused on controlling the identity of the leadership within
a state. This shift in strategy was a result of how local politics within subordi-
nate states shaped the costliness of building hierarchy. During the colonial period,
dominant states struck bargains with those groups and in those areas in which it
was easiest to do so. This does not mean that empire-building was always consen-
sual or even peaceful. Rather, the ability of colonizers to strategically partition the
territories in which they operated meant that empire-building was more peaceful
than it would have been otherwise.
The development of the state system meant that strategic partitioning within
subordinate states was no longer possible. Instead, dominant states were forced
to grapple with the implications their desired policies held for an entire polity.
Specifically, dominant states were increasingly constrained by the consequences
their policy goals had for the domestic viability of leaders with whom they could
negotiate. As I show in the following chapter, concern for these domestic conse-
quences inevitably led to dominant states engaging in strategic actions that were
directly aimed at bolstering the political fortunes of specific groups within sub-
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ordinate states. The reduced viability of selective institutionalization means that
modern-day hierarchies are forced to take subordinate states as a whole, leading to
a strategy of hierarchy construction that keys on total institutionalization, wherein
dominant states implement recognizably Western political institutions that seek
to govern an entire state, or internationally-recognized sovereign territory. This
process has at times led to strategies of ethnic repopulation (or in extreme cases,
depopulation). Where colonial powers were able to shape the identity of their
subjects by territorial partition, contemporary hierarchs have instead resorted to a
forcible reconstruction of the groups over which they seek to exert control.
This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I provide an overview of defini-
tional issues that will guide the remainder of the dissertation. Second, I analyze
the historical literature on empire, arguing that strategies of imperial expansion
were defined by incomplete territorial control and the concomitant expansion of
metropole institutions. Finally, I show that strategies of hierarchical control in
a post-colonial world turn on control of subordinate state central regimes rather
than influence over localized centers of authority.
Definitions and Concepts
The goals of this chapter are two-fold. First, I provide an overview of the litera-
tures that touch on debates over international hierarchy. In particular, I engage
scholarship on formal (imperial) and informal (hierarchical) asymmetric relation-
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ships. Second, I do so in order to make a particular claim about the development
of hierarchy in the modern state system: hierarchy in the post-colonial world is
primarily a regime-oriented endeavor. By this, I mean that states attempting to
build hierarchical relationships in the modern world have as their main goal in-
stalling favorable leadership within subordinate states. The goal of leadership
manipulation is in contrast to – but is also a consequence of – strategies of colonial
development that ended with the comprehensive division of the world into states
following decolonization.
Including a discussion of empire in a study of international hierarchy is not
an obvious choice. After all, while hierarchical relationships are pervasive, in-
clusive of the present day, as Blanken (2012) notes formal empires have entirely
disappeared from the international scene. But the close conceptual match between
hierarchy and empire means that many of the same mechanisms of control have
been used across the two types of relationships. Doyle (1986) defines an empire as
a “relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective polit-
ical sovereignty of another political society (p. 45).” In order to create conceptual
distance between the two, Lake argues that the difference between empire and hi-
erarchy is that in the latter, subordinate polities retain both an international legal
personality and nominally independent governments (pp. 57-58). The definitional
issue is not a trivial one: given Lake’s delineation, one would be forced to conclude
that the United States established an empire in Iraq from April 2003 to June 2004
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under the Coalition Provisional Authority, which exercised full executive, legal,
and judicial authority over the country.
What is at least clear is that imperial relationships are a subset of hierarchical
ones, and that the dividing line between the two is closely linked to the develop-
ment of institutionalized inter-polity legal mechanisms in imperial relationships
that are absent in their non-imperial counterparts. In turn, both hierarchical and
imperial relationships are subsets of asymmetric relationships, in which one actor
is much more powerful than the other. For example, while the United States and
the Philippines in 1903 shared an imperial relationship, by the 1950s it had be-
come hierarchical (following independence), and by the 2000s it could more prop-
erly be characterized by asymmetry (following the withdrawal of U.S. troops). The
distinction between the final two categories is not a clear one, however: while em-
pire is defined by formal political-institutional ties between two entities, as Lake
notes hierarchy exists on a continuum and can be present to a greater or lesser
degree within a relationship.
In this work, I define hierarchy between two political units as the extent to which
subordinate state policy would change in the absence of the dominant state. This is an
explicitly counterfactual definition, a construction that presents both advantages
and disadvantages. The advantage to defining hierarchy in this way is that a coun-
terfactual definition avoids the epiphenomenalism that plagues other types of def-
initions. By establishing theoretically when a given policy would change in the
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absence of a dominant state, this definition avoids attributing policies that would
be produced naturally as a result of subordinate state politics to the influence of
an external actor. For example, later in this chapter I discuss the effect of Marshall
Plan aid in postwar France, which operated to advantage liberals and moderates
domestically against their Communist opponents. Due to the strong labor union
presence in France, absent this aid Communists posed a real risk to taking power.
The willingness of France to integrate itself into European continental institutions
was highly dependent on both the U.S. security commitment as well as the exclu-
sion of Communists from power.
This was in stark contrast to the U.S.-British relationship. While London and
Washington did not agree on all aspects of the postwar order – John Maynard
Keynes registered early discontent with U.S. plans to dismantle the British system
of imperial trade preferences (Ikenberry 2001, p. 188) – British domestic politics
were never in real danger of falling into the hands of the Communists. In fact his-
torians have characterized British domestic politics from the end of World War II
until Thatcher’s election in 1979 as proceeding on the basis of a “Post-war consen-
sus” centered around a mixed economy and a welfare state. Observationally, dur-
ing this time period Britain would appear to have existed under a greater degree
of U.S. hierarchy: certainly it remained within the bounds of the NATO alliance.
However the definition presented here suggests that this is incorrect. Absent direct
U.S. influence, one can imagine Britain’s political development proceeding more or
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less as it did, with a longer period allowed for economic reconstruction. France,
however, is a different story. Remove the United States from French politics in
the late 1940s and it appeared quite likely that the Communist party would be
competitive for many years, providing the Soviet Union a foothold in the heart of
Western Europe.
The disadvantage to a counterfactual definition, as demonstrated by the com-
plexity of the previous paragraph, is that it does not lend itself to easy empirical
identification. However, the particular theoretical project outlined in this chapter
and the next provides one way around this observational dilemma. The explicit
linkage of the logic of hierarchy to subordinate state leadership outcomes pro-
vides a key empirical referent for the theory. I argue in the next chapter that the
policies that dominant states care about redistribute resources within subordinate
states. Because of this redistributive nature of hierarchy, dominant states can more
easily secure favorable political outcomes by shaping incentives for political com-
petition within subordinate states. Consequently, hierarchy is easiest to achieve
when dominant states can secure the tenure of a favorable leader in subordinate
states. Put simply, when the policy goals of dominant states are coincident with
the policy goals of subordinate state governments, they are likely to be achieved.
The proposed definition differs in two crucial ways from previous approaches,
most directly in its attention to politics within subordinate states. First, early the-
oretical work on international relations theory gave precedence to microeconomic
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conceptualizations of structure. Waltz (1979) writes that hierarchic realms – which
he argues are primarily the province of domestic politics – tend to be populated
by differentiated units. In turn, these units are incentivized to become closely in-
terdependent in order to offset the (mostly security) losses implied by functional
differentiation (pp. 103-104). However, Waltz’s definition dramatically overstates
the divide between interstate and domestic politics, and in particular the relative
threat posed to states by groups internal and external to their territory. Rather
than suffering unhindered predation from the anarchic realm of interstate poli-
tics, the vast majority of threats to state leadership has been domestic: according
to Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza (2009), of non-institutionalized leadership
turnovers just over three quarters (2174 out of 2783) come from domestic rather
than international sources.
The converse of this is true, as well. The main violent threat to citizens comes
not from international actors, but from their own governments and other domes-
tic actors. Therefore when Waltz writes that a dividing line between international
and domestic politics is that “[c]itizens [in contrast to states] need not prepare to
defend themselves,” he privileges a particular conception of what being a state
means (p. 104). Indeed if one allows political structure to be an outcome – as it
must be, since we observe variation in (hierarchical) state formation – Waltz’s logic
begins to fall apart. To the extent that hierarchy is protective of individual actors’
rights in domestic politics but not in international politics, this is only because the
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process of state formation works to eliminate domestic actors that would be dis-
advantaged by giving up to the state their right to violence. Unless one is willing
to accept the inability of interstate actors to engage in similarly eliminationalist
programs, the division between domestic and international hierarchy is blurrier
than is generally supposed.
Deudney places the problem of nested hierarchies in a broader context by ex-
amining the development of different types of political order as a function of how
well they protect individuals from violence. He argues that three basic principles
determine whether actors push towards anarchic or hierarchic organization. First,
geographical fragmentation augurs for anarchic relations, as political groups can
construct defensible institutional structures. Second, balanced power shackles the
drive to construct vertical organization through counterbalancing. And finally, the
presence of different types of material power – e.g., land and naval capabilities –
can lead to fragmented political organization. However, all of these can be over-
ridden in a push towards hierarchy by what he calls “violence interdependence,”
or the “capacity of actors to do violent harm to each other” (Deudney 2007, pp. 35,
42-43). As the cases below illustrate, the ability of some actors to asymmetrically
engage with others in violent interactions is a key component of the construction
of international hierarchy. Developments in the ability of actors to do so on an
unprecedented scale was without question one of the defining characteristics of
political development in the twentieth century.
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The second approach to defining hierarchy comes from Lake, who takes a so-
cial contract view of hierarchy. He argues that hierarchy is the “extent of the au-
thority [i.e., ‘rightful rule’] exercised by the ruler over the ruled” (p. 9), which in
the interstate system means dominant and subordinate states, respectively. Here
again, abstracting away from subordinate state domestic politics muddies the con-
ceptual waters. While Lake notes that authority relationships may contain coer-
cive episodes, he suggests that in order for the hierarchical relationship to remain
within the social contract framework the coercion must be “legitimate.” In turn,
legitimacy accrues to the hierarch by virtue of having the consent of “the collection
of individuals who compose the subordinate state” (p. 8).
Lake’s definition of legitimacy, and thus his conception of hierarchy, is prob-
lematic for two reasons. First, the specific collection of individuals within subor-
dinate states who have the ability to confer authority is left unspecified, except to
say that it must have some legitimate claim to regulate domestic politics. Lake at
one point seems to imply that authoritarian states may be unable to establish hier-
archies when he writes that “[t]otalitarian and liberal democratic states differ pro-
foundly in their authority or the extent to which they can legitimately regulate the
possible actions of their citizens” (p. 9). But if hierarchy is simply a collection of
individuals in the form of a state voting to undertake policy actions in accordance
with an external actor’s wishes, then the effect of the international relationship is
not truly clear. This final point leads to the second problem with Lake’s defini-
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tion of hierarchy, which is that it tends to conflate process with outcome. Many
ruling groups are willing to go along with powerful states’ international agendas
because doing so comports with their domestic political incentives – think here
of an export-oriented faction supporting the expansion of international free-trade
schemes. The assignation of this behavior to hierarchy unduly privileges inter-
state explanatory variables at the expense of domestic ones. In the next two sec-
tions, I explore how conceptions of hierarchy evolved throughout the imperial and
post-war periods, arguing that an emphasis on self-determination and territorial
sovereignty have implied a focus on leadership outcomes for hierarchical manage-
ment.
A Chain of Mundane Activities: Empire & Selective Institutionalization
In many ways it is not surprising that an enterprise John Robert Seeley famously
described as having been undertaken in a “fit of absence of mind” begat an in-
complete institutional legacy. Darwin (2012) put it slightly less pithily when he
wrote that the British empire, rather than being an “act of will,” was the product
of a “long chain of mundane activities” with “no single vision” (pp. xi-xii). In this
section I argue that this mundane chain led to a particular strategy of institutional
expansion; namely, that imperial planners only infrequently sought complete ter-
ritorial control over the “states” we now retroactively assign to them. The conse-
quence of this was the partial and incomplete expansion of metropolitan institu-
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tions. In this section I make two related arguments. First, the strategy of selective
institutionalization meant that colonizers were not forced to secure cooperation
from all potential subjects within a territory. The lack of agreed-upon territorial
boundaries acted as a release valve for the most truculent. Second, inevitably this
meant that where possible, colonizers would negotiate with those groups most nat-
urally inclined to cooperate with them. The combination of the less-than-complete
institutionalization and the ability to weed out those wholly unwilling to cooperate
marks a stark difference between empire and post-statehood strategies of hierar-
chy.
A view of empire as an incomplete solution to the problem of political control is
congruent with a burgeoning literature that views native groups within colonized
lands as legally sophisticated and politically active. Saliha Belmessous argues that
the extent to which empire was constructed via treaty is dramatically overlooked
in the imperial historiography. Though these treaties were based on a knotty and
shifting definition of political consent and backed by the implicit threat of coer-
cion, these conditions differentiate European negotiations with indigenous peoples
from those with their continental neighbors to a much smaller degree than is gen-
erally appreciated (Belmessous 2015, pp. 5-14). In European minds, these treaties
made legible both the groups with which they negotiated – the most recent Spanish
interlocutor in Río de la Plata was legally the “head” of the “new republic” – and
the territory over which they exerted control (Herzog 2015, p. 88). On the latter
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point, Benton writes that early explorers were successful in constructing for their
superiors an image of potentially rebellious spaces – those containing groups with
whom treating might be difficult – as treacherous and ungovernable. The result
was to geographically constrain the colonizing impulse and render imperial space
“politically fragmented; legally differentiated; and encased in irregular, porous,
and sometimes undefined borders” (2009, p. 2). This fragmented, irregular, and
porous political structure is what I refer to as “selective institutionalization.”
Far from being an ad hoc response to the exigencies of imperial expansion,
selective institutionalization was deeply rooted in both Anglo and continental po-
litical philosophy. In his review of the writings of Hugo Grotius – a Dutch lawyer
writing shortly before the Treaty of Westphalia – Keene (2002) locates two key
propositions underscoring the justifications for imperial expansion. First, that “the
sovereign prerogatives of public authorities are divisible from one another”; and
second, that at times “individuals have a right in the law of nations to appropri-
ate unoccupied lands” (p. 3). The latter of these flows straightforwardly from the
Lockean conception of property rights that had underwritten early English terri-
torial claims in North America. The former, however, seems to be an original con-
tribution, one that was increasingly used to legitimate imperial expansion as well
as constrain its specific forms. Crucially, early imperialists – often traders – had
no incentive to control more land than what was necessary to establish commercial
relations. This placed an instrumentalist boundary on the territorial expansion of
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metropolitan institutions, one that accorded with Grotius’ conception of divisible
sovereignty.
The partial institutionalization of colonial possessions has long been explained
as a reaction to the inhospitable conditions of many targets of colonial possessions.
Most notably, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000) argue that the lack of colo-
nial institutions – and consequent lackluster economic growth – can be explained
by variation in early mortality rates among colonizers from the 17th, 18th, and
19th centuries. In reality, the spread of institutions ebbed and flowed according a
fairly basic military and political logic that captured both colonizers’ goals and the
local balance of power. For example, the early Portuguese acquisition of Angola
ended with Portugal having conquered approximately half of the Ndongo king-
dom, which equated to a small piece of coastline and two rivers. As Thornton
(2011) writes, “[t]o the degree that Portugal could expand its coercive authority
through space, it was required to. . . accept alliances that had a high cost in regard
to Portuguese control” (p. 168).
Just as the costs of imposing direct governance shaped the spatial extent of
colonial control, geographic realities operated to constrain the choice of poten-
tial allies for European powers. In British West Africa, the primary “commodity”
sought by London was slaves captured from the interior, which was controlled by
the Asante kingdom. After the British had established a series of coastal forts from
which to conduct trade with the interior, keeping the Asante from dominating the
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coastline – and by extension monopolizing political power throughout the region
– became the lodestar of British policy. To this end they constructed a series of
alliances with the Fante, a coastal group that sought political isolation from the
Asante. Here the geographic isolation of the British operational base, and the need
to maintain said base’s independence, worked to demarcate both the geographi-
cal extent of British rule as well as its local character. Such was the British need
to maintain the Fante as a balance against the Asante that effective “governance”
became impossible: an 1852 tax to cover British administration in the region was
scuppered amidst vehement Fante protest (Shumway 2015, pp. 180-182).
In both Angola and what would become Ghana, colonial powers made clear
tradeoffs between geographical expansion and governability. This logic was re-
peated across imperial peripheries. The permeability of administrative borders
was crucial in allowing for a flexible definition of colonial subjects. In the Niger
Delta, the British-educated King George of Bonny had agreed to cooperate with
London in establishing a monopoly on the sale of palm oil. He was opposed, how-
ever, by a local ruler JaJa who was at the time in command of the Anna Pepple
trading house. When the two could not agree to a division of palm oil sales, JaJa
retreated to the city of Obapo, taking his business with him and even continuing
trade with Britain on his own terms. The British government, and its puppet in
Bonny, were content to let him go (Doyle 1986, p. 183-188). French strategies of
control were often similar. Lewis (2013) argues in her aptly-tited “Divided Rule,”
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that French rule in Tunisia was split between not only France and the Tunisian
bey, but between the bey and other European powers that France was careful not
to upset. This fragmentation was manifest in the preservation of the Tunisian court
system, army, and revenue collection arrangements. In other words, empire was a
much less encompassing proposition than is generally thought.
The drive towards selective institutionalization won out even in those geo-
graphic contexts which might have augured for its abandonment. Benton argues
that the natural boundaries of islands rendered claims of sovereignty closer to in-
divisible and jurisdictional claims more straightforward (Benton 2009, p. 35). Yet
even here institutional variability reigned. Keene’s account of Dutch expansion in
Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) is instructive on this point. In 1638, the Dutch East India
Company (VOC) struck a bargain with the local ruler, Raja Sinha, to provide the
latter with protection against the Portuguese in exchange for cinnamon. When the
VOC concluded a separate treaty with Portugal six years later, Raja Sinha withdrew
to the interior of the island, leaving the coastal trading properties to the VOC at
which point the Dutch claimed the coastal lands for themselves (pp. 79-82). While
the Dutch controlled the regions they had sought, they did not exercise sovereignty
over the island in a manner that would be recognized by modern observers, as the
interior was still governed by a matrix of local rulers and customs.
Even British India, often pointed to as an example of persistent institution-
building (Kumarasingham 2013), exhibited characteristics of selective institution-
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alization. Within what would become India proper, the British were able to co-opt
vestigial institutional mechanisms from the Mughal empire, which aided in partic-
ular in schemes of revenue collection. But the fringes of India were another story
altogether. Darwin (2012) writes that the British approach to the armed tribal
groups along the border with what is now Afghanistan was to leverage a “rough
border diplomacy” in successive attempts to exert control (p. 205). The reality was
more complicated. In fact, the lack of political control over rural Afghanistan was
a strategic decision on the part of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID). While
Frederick Roberts and Herbert Kitchener did in fact push for the pacification of the
tribal communities, George Clarke, secretary of the CID, took a different approach.
Clarke argued that not only were military operations to pacify the tribes certain to
fail, the tribes were likely to operate as a stopgap against Russian incursions and
thus were best left to govern themselves (Wyatt 2011, pp. 86-91). Therefore, even
in the colony held up as the paragon of British institutionalization, regions thought
to be difficult to persuade of the benefits of empire were left to themselves.
The implication of the foregoing is that one key characteristic of imperial con-
trol – later seen to be absent in hierarchy – is that the lack of institutionalized
boundaries (in the form of state territory) provided a release valve of sorts for dis-
affected local rulers. When Raja Sinha felt betrayed by the Dutch repudiation of
their bargain, he was able to disengage to the interior, an area over which the Dutch
never attempted to claim sovereignty. Similarly, the ability of empire builders
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to divide control over the subject area as they saw fit allowed for more flexible
mechanisms of rule. For example, the Japanese strategy of control in occupied
Manchuria was to divide the region’s diverse population into “culturally appro-
priate legal regimes” (Paine 2012, p. 31). While the Han population lived under
a resurrected baojia system emphasizing communal responsibility, the Japanese
elsewhere integrated the local populations – primarily Manchus – into the gov-
ernment bureaucracy and still elsewhere established strategic hamlet programs in
order to prevent anti-government coordination.
Finally, the lack of a strong imperial conception of their territories as “states”
in the post-war sense of the word was to complicate the process of decolonization
in two ways. First, it led colonial powers to maintain certain assumptions about
the boundaries of politics within colonial regions. This is one of the main theses
put forward by Husain (2014). Specifically, Husain argues that Britain continued
to view the fate of its former colonies in distinctly regional terms divorced from
the emergent state system that was to be the foundation of the newly-established
United Nations. With respect to Kashmir, Britain viewed the fractious territory as
key to preventing encroachment of the subcontinent from various sources – par-
ticularly the Soviet Union, Iran, and Afghanistan (Husain 2014, p. 12). Similarly,
Chafer (2002) argues that the segmentation of colonial rule in French West Africa
created a kaleidoscopic melange of competing interests that ultimately helped
block the creation of unified nationalist movements in the area.
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Second, and more importantly, the incomplete territorialization of empire worked
to create both the groups and grievances that catalyzed independence movements.
The early decision to leave the interior of the South African veld to the Boers – so
great their disapprobation for “fixed boundaries that they treated mapmakers as
spies” – allowed the development of the trekker republics that would eventually
prove the undoing of the South African commonwealth (Darwin 2009, p. 52).
In India, two developments forced the British to rely increasingly on the sup-
port of Muslims to retain influence on the subcontinent, with dramatic implica-
tions for the process of decolonization. First, the passage of the Montagu-Chelmsford
reforms left Muslim League support – itself weakened by the dismemberment
of the Ottoman Empire – as the only cudgel against the unity of the Indian Na-
tional Congress. Second, mobilization in both manpower and industrial capacity
for the second war against Germany required the support of two Muslim majority
provinces, Bengal and the Punjab (Darwin 2009, p. 506). To secure this support
required the promise of an effective League veto in matters of decolonization – a
dangerous step towards the 1947 partition. These territorial decisions arose out
of the desire to reduce the costs of institutionalization by either ceding the inte-
rior (in South Africa) or by grafting on to pre-existing institutional structures (in
India). In both cases, selective institutionalization lowered the costs of building
empire but dramatically complicated its undoing.
The great exception to the logic of selective institutionalization, which I have
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argued was linked to the permeability of pre-state system borders, was of course
the United States. While the U.S. did not establish formal colonies, it did carve
out for itself a range of polities, primarily in Latin America, the Caribbean, and
the Pacific, over which it exhibited varying degrees of political control. Contrary
to the European examples sketched above, the U.S. concerned itself explicitly very
early on with what types of groups held power in those territories they sought to
rule.
In many cases, the logic of U.S. regime change was shaped by the incomplete
institutional framework left behind by former colonial powers. British rule in
Nicaragua followed the pattern outlined above, establishing an autonomous re-
gion along the Miskito Coast on the Caribbean. After the British withdrawal from
Central America in the late 1890s, José Santos Zelaya worked to unify Nicaragua
politically, and in fact pushed for greater political integration among Nicaragua’s
neighbors as well. Among Zelaya’s political goals were the building of a trans-
continental railroad – which he pointedly financed with European, not American,
money – and the seizure of U.S. property in Nicaragua. He also engaged in discus-
sions to build a canal that would compete with the U.S.-built canal in Panama. The
political unification of Nicaragua meant that, in contrast to the piecemeal British
approach to securing plantation territory, the U.S. was left with no option but to
remove Zelaya. Following a note from Secretary of State Philander Knox which
made clear U.S. intent, Zelaya resigned and removed himself into exile (Kinzer
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2007, 62-70).
The link between territory, hierarchy, and the quality of subordinate state lead-
ership was key to pre-war American political thought, particularly in the mind of
America’s foremost international relations theorist of the period, Woodrow Wil-
son. For Wilson, the drive to ensure “self-determination” for nations of people sat
uneasily with his impulse to bend the notion of “self” to its breaking point. Iken-
berry (2009) writes that Wilson contained in his thinking both a “liberal interna-
tionalist” and a “liberal imperialist,” the former in his writing and the latter in
his military interventions in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, and
Mexico (pp. 13-14). Crucially, it was the ever-increasing character of the political
relationships between the U.S. and its smaller neighbors that drove Wilson to these
interventions. According to a British emissary, Sir W. Tyrrell, Wilson believed it
“important the the Government of the Central American Republics should im-
prove [as] bad government may lead to friction. The President is very anxious to
provide against such contingencies by insisting that those Republics should have
fairly decent rulers.” The inevitable conclusion to this line of thinking was the
establishment of a “ ‘de facto’ American protectorate over the Central American
Republics” (LaFeber 1993, p. 53).
The link for Wilson between legal sovereignty and interventions to install fa-
vorable leaders in these nominally independent states was what differentiated pre-
war American and European hierarchical relationships. Tooze (2014) argues that
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for Wilson, sovereignty solved the puzzle of how to reconcile hierarchical rela-
tionships with his desire for a more peaceful international system. Wilson, though
often read to be an early proponent of the equal rights of nations, was instead
concerned with the great power competition induced by the struggle for terri-
torial concessions. A clearly defined international territorial settlement, rather
than paving the way for democracy within the weaker nations, would delineate
spheres of influence within which the great powers could provide “friendly influ-
ence” aimed to “guarantee. . . not ‘self-determination’ but ‘security of life”’ (Tooze
2014, pp.120-121). The end of formal empire, in other words, was not a call for the
end of hierarchical relationships as such. It was a mechanism to force conflict over
these relationships from the center of the international system to the periphery.
Hierarchy
The shift from territorially incomplete empires to an exhaustive state system began
with the Versailles settlement, but accelerated after World War II. Keene attributes
this periodization to the character of the second world war, arguing that a system
built on denying civilized status to non-European states could no longer support
itself in the wake of the horrors of Nazism (2002, chapter 5). My interest is less in
explaining the establishment of the state system and more in exploring its impli-
cations for the development of hierarchy, which I nest in the post-war increase in
the number of independent states (see Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1: Number of States in International System by Year
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The link between the establishment of states and a focus on leadership out-
comes within hierarchy construction was the idea of self-determination, or the
principle that states should be able to decide their own form of government. Self-
determination implied two things for states attempting to shape political out-
comes within other polities. First, dominant states could no longer utilize strate-
gies of negotiating with multiple interlocutors within a given territory. The de-
velopment of states meant that any political unit could have no more than one
government.
Second, the policies implemented by the new national institutions had impli-
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cations for all those within their territories – there were no more spaces beyond the
reach of the state to whence the postwar JaJas could escape – and thus had to be
acceptable to some minimal coalition or risk triggering conflict. In the remainder
of this chapter I trace the logic of this process as it was realized in postwar Europe.
Specifically, I show how Soviet and U.S. hierarchies were constructed in Eastern
and Western Europe, respectively, focusing on how a concern for leadership out-
comes manifested within differing institutional contexts.
From the very beginning, the link between international hierarchy and inter-
state politics was an explicit feature of the settlement that ended World War II.
Ikenberry (2001) argues that this process was not unique to 1945: in his telling, the
victors of great power wars often attempt to impose a particular vision of interna-
tional order in the aftermath of conflict. What was different about the post-WWII
order was its persistence, which Ikenberry locates in the United States’ democratic
institutions, which allowed it to credibly promise not to exploit its power. But as
Simpson (2004) argues, what was truly novel about the character of the postwar
institutions erected after 1945 was the tortured balance they struck between the
sovereign legal equality of all states and the legalized hegemony of the most pow-
erful ones (see chapter 6). Simpson notes that one way the victors squared this
circle was by resorting to institutionalized hegemony as a mechanism for preserv-
ing sovereign equality – in other words, the new state system would have to be
underwritten by a series of guarantees on the part of great powers that they would
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defend it.
As it turned out, allowing great powers untrammeled legal justification for
guarding the legal sovereignty of weaker states was rather like putting the wolves
in charge of determining the boundaries of the sheep pastures. In order for the
great powers to be willing to protect the sovereignty of smaller states, these states
would have to be constructed, constituted, and ruled according to the principles
agreed to in the larger great power bargain. In the late 1940s, this meant that
domestic institutions, particularly in Europe, had to be made to lie in the twin
Procrustean beds of liberalism in the west and communism in the east.
The German case was but the best-known example of this process. The ques-
tion of how German institutions would be reconstructed – or whether German in-
stitutions would be reconstructed, given the consideration of Henry Morgenthau’s
plan of permanent pastoralization – was a point of contentious debate that was
not settled, as Trachtenberg (1999) argues, until the early 1960s. The territorial
partition of Germany solved the Soviet Union’s primary post-war concern, which
was the pacification of the neighbor it had fought two wars against in less than
thirty years. Because the Soviets’ main fear was of renewed interstate war, and
because the division of Germany was accomplished by way of an interstate bar-
gain, it is easy to assume that the primary implications of Germany’s division were
international. But this was not the case. The division of Germany and Europe
more broadly was inextricably linked to the rearrangement – and if necessary, the
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forcible imposition – of domestic political structures within the newly conquered
territory. In the following two sections, I explore the differences between hierarchy
construction in Eastern and Western Europe, before then turning to a discussion of
how post-war hierarchy was constructed outside of Europe, especially in the wake
of imperial arrangements. In each section, I argue that the territorial solidification
implied by the recognition of state sovereignty meant that hierarchs were forced to
pay close attention to what group ruled the subordinate state in question; partial
bargains dividing territorial units were no longer enforceable.
Soviet Hierarchy
In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union was faced with the task of constructing or-
der across a wide swathe of territory emerging from six years of terrible conflict.
As I argued earlier, the linchpin of this domestic order was to be the installation
of communist leadership institutions throughout Eastern Europe. However, fash-
ioning Communist regimes from a political cloth that, outside of Czechoslovakia,
had virtually no local communist infrastructure was no simple task. The postwar
Soviet strategy built on the logic that had been imposed on the region during the
war. In particular, the Soviets were concerned with rearranging the population
they now governed to match the territorial reality bequeathed by the peace set-
tlement that ended World War II. In many cases, this meant a continuation of the
strategies that had helped them win the war in the first place.
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First, the Soviets set out to remove those groups likely to resist. One crucial
facet of this strategy was a campaign that rewrote, through both large-scale depor-
tation and murder, the ethnic makeup of the Central and Eastern European polities
that would be granted statehood after the war. Lowe (2012) writes that this pop-
ulation rearrangement was the logical complement to the aftermath of World War
I: where in 1919 borders had been moved to suit the demands of groups within a
given region, in the mid to late 1940s the groups were moved to fit the borders (p.
247).
The logic behind these campaigns was to create ethnically homogeneous poli-
ties. The earliest instantiation of this logic was the post-war transfer to Germany
of ethnically German citizens from Poland and other Eastern European states. The
scale of these engineered transfers is probably without precedent: 7 million Polish
Germans, 3 million Czechoslovak Germans, and nearly 2 million Germans from
other territories, for a total of nearly 12 million (Lowe 2012, p. 243). These indi-
viduals were shipped in railroad cars to the shelled husk of their homeland where
many would live in refugee camps for close to ten years. Unsurprisingly, there
were limits to the numbers of destitute refugees the military administrations in
the various Eastern European countries were willing to accept, which led to alter-
native strategies of population control. One was internal resettlement. In Poland,
authorities executed Operation Vistula in April 1947. Vistula was designed to
destroy ethnic Ukrainian resistance to the new Communist regime by internal re-
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arrangement of the Ukrainian population: Ukrainians were uprooted with several
hours notice, shipped to northwestern Poland, and resettled as sparsely as possi-
ble. Crucially, because the operation sought to demobilize the population as much
as possible, families from the same communities were prevented from living in the
same region – though generally nuclear families were kept intact (Lowe 2012, p.
227).
The other crucial method of population rearrangement was murder. Stalin was
quite content to do so – over 400,000 Polish citizens (Roberts 2014, p. 235). One
region which experienced the full range of cleansing was the Volhynia region of
Ukraine: during the first Soviet occupation, Germans were moved out of Volhy-
nia to Greater Germany while Poles were moved east to Siberia and Kazakhstan.
Those Poles that remained were executed by Ukrainian nationalists less than a year
later (Snyder 2003). By restricting the types of groups within a given territory,
genocide and deportation reduced the number of salient political cleavages and
consequently the range of institutional outcomes a dominant state could expect to
be produced there. The strategy was remarkably successful: Lowe (2012) writes
that within two years of the end of the war, the proportion of national minorities
in Eastern Europe had more than halved (p. 248).
The depopulation of Eastern Europe accomplished several Soviet goals in ad-
dition to its preclusion of pluralism. The first of these requires little discussion:
depopulation made the eventual collectivization of agriculture simpler by remov-
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ing a large contingent of landowners that might otherwise have pushed back on
Soviet plans. The post-war Polish population, for instance, was fully a quarter
less than it was before the war, and Prazmowska (2011) writes that both Nazi and
Soviet occupation administrations had targeted in particular national elites, in-
cluding members of the Catholic hierarchy (p. 160). These individuals’ property
fell in many cases to the occupiers.
The second way that depopulation benefited Soviet establishment of hierarchy
was by driving a wedge between subordinate state populations and other potential
sources of political succor. In Poland, the Catholic Church held a strong claim on
individuals’ political allegiances, which made subordination to an internationalist
ideology such as communism a difficult sell. The transformation of Poland into an
ethnically homogeneous state premised on the elimination of other groups – espe-
cially Germans – was popular in the twice-occupied territory but put its occupants
at odds with the Church. In a March 1948 letter, Pope Pius XII supported the claim
of German refugees that they should be returned to their historical homes east of
the Oder-Neisse line that demarcated Polish gains in the war. The Polish laity was
incensed, and began to circulate a prayer that “the martyred blood of centuries of
Poles” would convince the Pope of his error (Curp 2006, pp. 90-91).1 Construc-
tion of an ethno-nationalist state helped the Soviet Union not only winnow down
alternative pillars of domestic power, but served to peel away potent international
1In acute anticipation of the email chains of the twenty-first century the prayer closed by stating that
“[h]e who does not pass on or destroys this prayer commits a sin against Divine Providence.”
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allegiances as well.
Finally, the population transfers, in conjunction with the territorial rearrange-
ment negotiated at the end of the war, weakened the bargaining position of pop-
ulations that might have otherwise been resistant to Soviet attempts at regime
control. In Poland, the extension of Polish territorial boundaries westward to the
Oder-Neisse line was inextricably linked to the domination of communist parties
at home, and by extension subordination to Soviet goals abroad. As Snyder (2012)
put it, “[w]ho but the Red Army could be counted upon to defend such a westerly
Polish border from a resurgent Germany at some later point?” (p. 324). The stabil-
ity of this territorial resettlement, in turn, dependend on the removal of German
populations that might have been targets of revanchism on the part of Berlin. By
purposefully creating an otherwise-unsustainable international settlement and by
eliminating potential domestic sources of dissatisfaction, Stalin underwrote Polish
institutions with the military reality of Soviet domination.
The ethnic homogenization of Eastern European states set the stage for the sec-
ond strategy of Soviet hierarchy construction. This step undertook to convince
non-communist groups that holding office was not worth the trouble. In contrast
to the United States’ strategy, which I explore in the next section, the Soviet at-
tempts to secure favorable leadership outcomes along its western border relied
explicitly on international coercion. Not long after the Yalta Conference, at which
Stalin had agreed free elections would be held in Eastern Europe, a referendum in
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Poland and an election in Hungary convinced him of the poverty of this strategy.
In response to the latter, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov informed
Zoltán Tildy and Ferenc Nagy of the victorious Smallholders’ Party that, rather
than receiving a share of parliamentary seats commensurate to their vote share
(57%), Hungary had instead been granted “the opportunity to rapidly rejuvenate
itself on a democratic basis.” This opportunity was to require the dissolution of
the Smallholders’ Party. Across Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union imported mem-
bers of the secret police, dismantled civil society groups, and deported, murdered,
or arrested political activists who otherwise would oppose the process of “rapid
rejuvenation” (Applebaum 2012, p. 219-224).
Coercion was deployed westward from Moscow in inverse proportion to the
degree of local communist strength. While I explain why this was the case in the
following chapter, I provide an example here. In Czechoslovakia, a large working
class existed that was by and large dissatisfied with capitalism: to wit, the ROH (a
Czechoslovak trade union) represented nearly 3 million workers by 1947. Its exec-
utive was dominated by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz). Despite
these strong foundations, however, Communists did not formally take unified con-
trol of the Czechoslovak government until February 1948 – three years after the
Polish referendum and the Smallholders’ “victory” in Hungary – and unlike their
neighbors, were under no foreign pressure to do so (Fowkes 1993, pp. 14-23). The
reason for the delay was that Stalin viewed the local strength of communism as a
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mechanism for taking power in a (reasonably) legitimate fashion, perhaps as a way
to set an example for communists in France and Italy.
If he had ever actually taken the possibility seriously, the disbursal and politi-
cization of Marshall Plan aid in 1947 convinced Stalin that domestic ideological
rapprochement was not in the offing. Czechoslovakia, along with other Eastern
European countries, were unsurprisingly ordered not to participate in the Mar-
shall Plan. The reaction of the non-communists to this order is telling, and an-
ticipates the argument put forward later in this dissertation. Acquiescence to the
Soviet dictate was couched in an argument that a move to rectify the situation –
necessarily by forging closer ties to the West – would have to be moderated to an
extent as to render it worthless. Petr Zenkl, Chairman of the Czechoslovak Na-
tional Socialist Party put it thusly:
We know that the freedom of action of every small country is nowadays
to a certain extent limited, and we know that this is doubly true about a
country in our geographical position. Accepting this limitation, we do
so. . . in the interest of international understanding which, as is known,
demands a certain limitation of sovereignty from every state (quoted in
Kusin (1977, p. 81)).
The distribution of Marshall Plan aid therefore played a key role in solidifying
the last remaining non-communist government in Eastern Europe. It is to the
distribution of that aid, and its implications for politics within Western Europe,
that I now turn.
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U.S. Hierarchy
The pattern of hierarchy construction in Western Europe was different in form –
the United States undertook far fewer programs of population transfer – but sim-
ilar in outcome. Here, the United States used the promise of reconstruction aid to
shift the value different groups placed on holding office. Specifically, Washington
used this aid to convince communist groups to stay out of power. This had been
the goal for some time. MacDonogh (2009) argues that as early as the Potsdam
Conference in 1945, the United States was determined to prevent the emergence
of competitive communist parties in Germany (p. 481). President Truman stated
that should “the freedom and independence of Italy” be threatened, the U.S. would
take “measures. . . appropriate for the maintenance of peace and security” (Gaddis
2011, p. 295). Shortly the communists were defeated in Italian elections, a de-
feat that provided a fillip to non-communist groups within France as well. More
directly, the United States proceeded to intervene in the Greek civil war against
the communists under what became known as the Truman Doctrine. Perhaps the
most famous instantiation of Truman’s European anti-communism was the Mar-
shall Plan, which provided nearly $20 billion in aid to Western European coun-
tries.
Marshall Plan aid represented an explicit American attempt to shape leader-
ship outcomes within Western Europe. In the wake of wartime devastation, eco-
nomic reconstruction and political stability were inextricably linked. While West-
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ern European countries required often painful measures to put their economies on
track for long-term growth, American officials feared short-run pain would clear
the way for the emergence of Communist governments. How immediately vulner-
able Western and Central European democracies – particularly France and Italy –
were to communist takeovers in 1947 and 1948 was a point of some contention.
Mee (1984) notes that many within the State Department privately believed that
European governments were actively exaggerating the threat in order to convince
Washington of the necessity of aid (pp. 233-234). But by May of 1947 many in
Washington had come to believe that regardless of the current situation George
Kennan had diagnosed the problem correctly: the Soviet Union, knowing that a
comprehensive political settlement dividing Europe would lead to U.S.-backed
economic reconstruction, preferred to stall until economic turmoil led to an in-
digenous communist resurgence (Hogan 1989, pp. 44-45). The ability of Stalin
to stall until he had the upper hand – at which point Washington’s move might
be rendered obsolete – meant that the United States had no choice but to move
forward with Marshall’s proposal.
The middle months of 1947 were clearly a flux point for moderate European
governments. A memorandum to President Truman noted that France and Italy
would be out of dollars by mid-October, at which point both would need a solution
to their nearly $100 million of monthly imports. Moreover, Maurice Thorez had
recently returned from Moscow with a promise of wheat should he win office – a
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sensitive nerve given the 40% reduction in French wheat yields since the previous
year (Mee 1984, pp. 231, 233).
The Marshall Plan was thus clearly designed and timed to influence leadership
outcomes within Western Europe. By conditioning aid on the character of recipi-
ent regimes – and as we have seen, this conditionality was binding both by U.S. and
by Soviet decree – the United States provided a boost to non-communist govern-
ments willing to undertake economic reform along western lines. Esposito (1994)
presents the influence of Marshall Plan aid in France and Italy in a counterfactual
framework:
Without American aid it would have been far more difficult to carry
out the modernization plans and to make the fiscal and wage con-
cessions necessary for continued Third Force tenure during the 1948-
1950 period. Had the Third Force fallen, alternative cabinets would
have had to include either the Gaullists or the Communists. But nei-
ther alternative was viable if France was to remain solidly anchored to
the United States. [In Italy c]ounterpart funds were used for political
purposes, for instance to relieve mass unemployment that led to up-
heaval. . . Counterpart funds also made loans available to a financially
strapped private sector that favored Italy’s pro-American posture (pp.
200-201).
Evidence exists that support for the aid plan also broke along political lines, at
least within French society. Polling data from the Institut française d’opinion publique
in 1947 found that while 64% of the French public supported their government’s
participation in the Marshall Plan talks, only 30% of French communists did (to
45% against). Similarly, in the aggregate only 23% of French citizens believed the
Marshall Plan would harm French independence, a number that rose to 69% of
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Communists (Cayrol 2001, pp. 254-255, 259). Clearly the aid package – nomi-
nally intended to boost aggregate economic growth – directly implicated domestic
cleavages over what types of groups could hold office.
Moreover, the Marshall Plan operated precisely as intended, by driving a wedge
between Socialists, with whom the United States could work, and Communists,
with whom it could (or would) not. Eichengreen (2008) writes that the announce-
ment of the Marshall Plan led to the dismissal of Communist ministers from gov-
ernments in Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy. Across Western Europe, centrist
governments warned that a key cost of opposing their programs would be the loss
of U.S. grants (p. 67).
Hierarchy In Transition: Past Colonization
The concern over the leadership structures of states existed outside of Europe,
as well. Here it linked up with the territorial exigencies implied by decoloniza-
tion. One early example of the implications of fully territorialized modern, post-
colonial states was the concern of the former imperial powers with which colonial
holdings would be annexed or federated, and by whom. In British Africa, Britain
first supported the confederation of Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia, and North-
ern Rhodesia, before abandoning the plan after realizing that its implementation
would generate incentives for the black majority to overthrow the minority of
white settlers still living there. Instead, the territories were granted independence
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separately, becoming Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, respectively. Likewise fur-
ther south, the decision to extend formal independence to Botswana, Lesotho, and
Swaziland was driven by an alignment between British goals and those of the in-
digenous leadership in the soon-to-be states, namely a desire to avoid annexation
by South Africa (Krasner 1999, pp. 191-192).
More generally, the degree to which the political goals of the former colonizer
and indigenous elites aligned determined how independence proceeded. Cru-
cially, policy decisions by the latter were driven by the need to game recently es-
tablished institutions in an effort to stay in power. Therefore as Krasner (1999)
argues, colonial rulers were able to directly shape policies only “where the local
elite needed and would not be delegitimated by support from the former colonial
master (p. 187).” This process was complicated by the fact that decolonization in
practice coincided with the establishment of U.S. hierarchy throughout much of
the world. In Singapore, despite British assurances that he would deploy “public
security ordinance against PAP leftists. . . ‘when not if’ he [became] the first Sin-
gapore Prime Minister,” U.S. doubts about Lee Kuan Yew’s anti-communist bona
fides led them to support Lim Yew Hock’s Singapore Labor Front in the 1959 par-
liamentary elections. The perception of being a U.S. puppet doomed Lim at the
polls, and Lee was elected – only to subsequently become a key ally in the U.S.’
anti-communist strategies throughout Southeast Asia (Long 2011, pp. 159-164).
The fact that the goals of dominant states never aligned perfectly with domestic
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politics within subordinate states meant that the ability of the latter to impose po-
litical decisions on their populace became a key component for striking hierarchi-
cal bargains. Cooley and Spruyt (2009) put this in terms of credible commitments.
For example, they argue that the Evian Accords, which ended the French-Algerian
conflict in 1962, was struck only after the National Liberation Front (FLN) elim-
inated its domestic political opposition and consequently provided Algeria with
a single, unified government that could enforce bargains over time. Ahmed Ben
Bella, who was elected in 1961 on a program of socialism and land reform, was
content to allow French control over its army bases and oil production in southern
Algeria (p. 63).
Changes in leadership, and by extension the competitive incentives which drove
policy within subordinate states, began to shape dominant state behavior in a post-
colonial world. The Evian Accords fell apart after a 1965 coup put Houari Boume-
dine in power in Algeria. Boumediene abandoned Ben Bella’s focus on rural devel-
opment for one of state-led industrialization – a strategy that inevitably required
control of the state’s oil and gas industry and thus a reduction in French influence
(Cooley and Spruyt 2009, pp. 63-65).
A similar pattern emerged across Latin America. Upon election in 1954 on
the back of a support coalition consisting of urbanites and small rural farmers,
Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz passed a land reform bill, reapportioning
property rights away from the corporate landowners that had previously run much
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of the country. He also moved to end several foreign monopolies: one previously
held by the United Fruit Company over internal transportation infrastructure, and
one over electric utilities controlled by a U.S.-owned power plant (Blasier 1985, p.
151-177). The fact of domestic accountability drove some leaders to push back
against hierarchical bargains that had been taken for granted under leaders whose
domestic competitive incentives were coincident with dominant state wishes. Of-
ten this process of pushing back met with violence.
The need for dominant states to secure favorable leadership outcomes within
subordinate states led to a spate of foreign-imposed regime changes throughout
peripheral states shortly after World War II. Famously, the CIA assisted Carlos
Castillo Armas to power in Guatemala shortly after Arbenz’s land reforms and
monopoly-busting in 1954. This action, codenamed Operation PBSUCCESS, fol-
lowed by one year a similar operation in Iran, AJAX, which had reinstalled Mo-
hammad Reza Shah. The Soviet Union was to exercise an even heavier hand in
its near-abroad, crushing leadership changes in Hungary and Prague in 1956 and
1968, respectively. More broadly, the threat of Soviet – and to a lesser extent U.S.
– coercion was to dramatically shape political competition across the so-called
“Third World” throughout the Cold War, a point to which I return at length in
Chapter 5.
In sum, a comparison of mechanisms of imperial and hierarchical domestic
control presents a paradox. While the imperial relationship between center and
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periphery was often legally institutionalized, the reach of this control within sub-
ordinate territories was subject to a calculated hedge in which metropolitan insti-
tutions were extended only as far as was politically expedient. Conversely, hierar-
chical relationships are rarely characterized by formal linkages between dominant
and subordinate states. However, the domestic scope of subordinate state institu-
tionalization under hierarchy is very nearly total.
Conclusion
This chapter began with a puzzle. Why did France and the United States pursue
such different systems of political control in Vietnam? More broadly, why has hi-
erarchy looked different after World War II than before it? I have argued that the
extension of the state system to non-European countries incentivized dominant
states to shift from a strategy of selective institutionalization to one of total insti-
tutionalization. This shift was marked by a move away from piecemeal bargains
with localized centers of influence to a system in which dominant states sought to
control leaders rather than territory.
Building from this argument, a theory of hierarchy should therefore account for
the constraints dominant states face in attempting to control leadership outcomes
within subordinate states. In the following chapter, I build and analyze a formal
model that allows me to explore how the interaction of international coercion,
interstate economic relations, and domestic bargaining shape hierarchy creation.
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Before turning to this model, however, I preview several of the questions raised in
this chapter that the following theoretical exercise will help answer.
First, while the historical account in this chapter provides a structural expla-
nation for hierarchical change over time, it does not explain why different hierar-
chies within the same time period look so different. For example, the discussion
of U.S. and Soviet hierarchical construction in Europe reveals that these two pro-
cesses looked quite different, with the U.S. relying primarily on foreign aid and
the Soviet Union on coercion. Why do dominant states approach hierarchical con-
struction differently even within a similar structural system (and indeed on the
same continent)? In the following chapter, I argue that the domestic strength of a
dominant state’s preferred leader strongly conditions the mix of aid and coercion
deployed in the construction of hierarchy.
Second, a historical approach cannot explain why the same dominant state pur-
sues different institutional structures within the same hierarchy. While the United
States sought to bolster inclusive political structures in Western Europe, in Latin
America many of the U.S.’ closest allies were highly exclusive regimes. Even the
Soviet Union displayed variation on this front: Czechoslovak politics were much
less contentious than were, for example, Hungarian or Bulgarian politics. I show
that dominant states are highly constrained by domestic institutions in subordi-
nate states. While exclusive or autocratic institutions make hierarchy easier to
construct, inclusive or democratic institutions make hierarchy easier to maintain.
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Variation in these institutions can also help account for the relative stability of
different hierarchical relationships.
In the next chapter, I begin by outlining verbally a theory that builds on the
insights from this chapter. I explain why the goals of hierarchy can be plausibly
conceived of as redistributive within subordinate states. I then formally analyze a
model of politics in which a dominant state seeks to implement a policy within a
subordinate state. Actors within the subordinate state have opposing preferences
over this policy. I show logically that this process leads to a pattern in which
dominant states seek to secure the tenure of specific leaders within subordinate
states, and I show how their ability to do so varies with both the domestic and
interstate distribution of power.
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Chapter 3
Modeling Hierarchy
The so-called “Khrushchev Thaw” following Josef Stalin’s death in 1953 was a
shock to Eastern European politics. The large-scale population transfers and di-
rect coercion described in the previous chapter gave way to something more un-
certain: what were the acceptable parameters of Communism in the post-Stalin
era? The answer came quickly. When Reform Communist Imre Nagy announced
that Hungary would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union responded
with an injection of over 30,000 soldiers, arresting Nagy and restoring commu-
nist orthodoxy under János Kádar. Until 1989, direct challenges to Soviet rule in
Eastern Europe were rare. Attempts at liberalization would be met by the hammer
of Soviet military power, and this belief on the part of Eastern European political
leaders sufficed to underwrite the stability of Warsaw Pact regimes.
In this chapter I elaborate on the argument briefly presented in the introduc-
tion. I seek to answer the question that began this study – what are the implica-
tions of hierarchy for subordinate states? – through the presentation and analysis
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of a formal model. In order to do this, I also offer an explanation of how hierar-
chy is constructed and maintained. Throughout, I use the logic of the theory to
return to the story of Soviet hierarchy in Hungary. After his removal from office in
1956, Nagy was buried in the corner of a military prison, the public barred from
his grave. The disinterment of his remains and his official funeral following liber-
alization in 1989 provides a bookend to the coercive episode of Soviet hierarchy.
Understanding the steps between Nagy’s execution and reburial requires an un-
derstanding of the mechanisms of hierarchical control. It is to an explication of
these mechanisms that I now turn.
The basic logic of the argument is simple. In this chapter, I argue that dominant
states establish and maintain hierarchy in two ways. First, by providing interstate
resource transfers to favored leaders within subordinate states, dominant states
increase the value of holding office to these leaders. When the provision of foreign
aid, trade agreements, loans, or foreign direct investment depend on which leader
holds office, those leaders who would receive them are more willing to fight to
gain control of the government within their state. Crucially, it is not necessary
that everyone within a subordinate state benefits equally from these transfers. The
second mechanism dominant states use to construct hierarchical relationships is
coercion. Here, I argue that because leaders care about policy outcomes as well as
holding office, having to bargain with powerful international actors who oppose
their tenure can make life in government a miserable proposition. The point is not
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that dominant states are always willing to fight to remove these leaders – war is a
very rare event. Rather, the policy bargains that leaders are forced to agree to in
order to avoid war means that staying in office is often not worth it for them.
The formal model I analyze in this chapter represents a simplified version of
hierarchical bargaining, in which a dominant state attempts to secure some type of
policy outcome within a subordinate state. This policy outcome might range from
a general political alignment, as in the Cold War, or a more concrete policy deci-
sion, such as the ratification of a trade agreement or a monetary arrangement. The
most important criterion for these policy outcomes to satisfy is that they are an
issue of distributive competition within subordinate states. As I argue in more de-
tail below, this criterion is very easily satisfied – which is precisely why accounting
for the domestic constraints on hierarchy construction is so crucial.
The previous chapter demonstrated that in the wake of decolonization, dom-
inant states seeking to construct hierarchical relationships are pressed to ensure
favorable leadership outcomes within targeted subordinate states. Accordingly, I
choose to represent negotiations over hierarchical policy bargains as taking place
between a dominant state and two potential leaders within a subordinate state.
This decision necessarily abstracts from the complications introduced by consid-
ering the possibility of multiple leaders or the process by which political groups
are formed. However, as I argued in the previous chapter, hierarchy is often con-
tingent on this codification of political groups within subordinate states – recall
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France’s inability to strike a bargain with the Tunisian government until the Na-
tional Liberation Front had eliminated its key domestic rivals. Inevitably, theoriz-
ing about complex social processes involves tradeoffs and simplifications. Through
the use of a mathematical model, I hope to make the decisions leading to these
tradeoffs very clear. Later in this chapter, I provide a formal specification of the
model. First, however, I outline in general terms the key components of the model.
I then discuss the distributive nature of hierarchy in order to further motivate spe-
cific modeling choices.
An Informal Model of Hierarchy Construction
In the model, a dominant state negotiates with the government of a subordinate
state, which is composed of one of two potential leaders. Whichever leader con-
trols the government also controls a policy that all three actors – the dominant
state and both leaders within the subordinate state – care about. In order to influ-
ence political competition between the two leaders within the subordinate state,
the dominant state can take one of two actions. First, it can provide resources to
the government of the subordinate state. Second, it can fight a war in order to
install a different leader. The leader that is out of office also has the ability to
try to oust the government by competing for office. The model captures a series
of repeated interactions between the three actors, broken down into discrete time
periods called rounds. Every round consists of the same pattern of choices for
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each actor. Therefore, the entire game consists of a potentially infinite number of
rounds, and in every round
1. The dominant state provides some level of resource transfers;
2. The subordinate state government proposes a policy or fights a war;
3. The dominant state fights a war or accepts the government’s policy; and
4. The subordinate state opposition challenges the government or accepts the
policy.
Earlier, I outlined the “resource transfer” and “coercive” mechanisms that domi-
nant states use to create hierarchy by way of shaping leadership outcomes within
subordinate states. The common thread linking these two mechanisms is how they
allow dominant states to shape the value of holding office for leaders within sub-
ordinate states. Dominant states are able to boost the value of holding office for
leaders that they prefer to see in office by providing them free resources like aid,
preferential loans, and access to trading markets. Conversely, dominant states are
able to devalue office for leaders they would rather see booted into the opposition
in two ways. First, they can withhold the resources that would go to another leader.
Second, dominant states can force disfavored leaders to set policies the latter do
not like by making belligerent coercive demands – that is, threatening to fight a
war – when the latter are in office.
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Figure 3.1 outlines the argument graphically. The ultimate political outcome
that dominant states care about – the extent and valence of political competition
within subordinate states – is fundamentally mediated by the value of holding
office. If groups within the subordinate state place a high value on controlling their
government, they will attempt to do so. I argue that the value domestic groups
place on holding office is driven by three key dimensions. First, these groups care
about policy, and would like to be able to set favorable types of policy if they
are in the government. Second, they care about external resources. These can be
conceptualized very broadly. While in the present work I focus on foreign aid (for
reasons I explain in the next chapter), these resources might also include trading
agreements, loan guarantees, debt forgiveness, and many others. Finally, domestic
groups care about the private value of government itself, which may be higher in
wealthy states, in highly corrupt states, or in states with large amounts of natural
resources.
As Figure 3.1 illustrates, dominant states have direct control over one of these
dimensions, and indirect control over another. Dominant states can directly ma-
nipulate the level of external resources they provide to different leaders or groups
within subordinate states. By providing more resources to leaders they prefer to
see in office, dominant states increase the stakes of holding power for their allies
within other states, and decrease the stakes for groups they prefer to see out of
power. Indirectly, dominant states can shape the level of policy set by different
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Figure 3.1: Dominant State Influence on Subordinate State Political Competition
dominant state
policy
external resources
value of government
value of holding office
domestic political competition
leaders by making coercive demands. By threatening to fight leaders they do not
like, dominant states prevent from achieving their policy goals while in office. In
turn, these leaders are less likely to compete for office in the first place as they
place a lower value on holding office given their expected policy frustration.
The implication of this argument for domestic political competition within
subordinate states is powerful. Leaders who are favored by dominant states are
hugely advantaged in negotiations with their opponents. I focus on two general
types of strategies that dominant states use to secure favorable leadership out-
comes in subordinate states.
First, I establish a mechanism of hierarchy creation, in which dominant states
incentivize the removal of disfavored leaders from power. Because competing for
office is costly – and is especially so in the types of autocratic states in which dom-
inant states might like to seek new leadership – governments can often deter their
domestic opponents from challenging them. The key strategic problem for domi-
nant states, then, is convincing friendly groups within other states to bear the costs
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of seizing power within their state. I show that one way dominant states are able
to accomplish this is by conditioning the provision of interstate resources on the
character of the regime within subordinate states. When a group currently out of
government anticipates being able to secure large amounts of external resources
upon coming to office, they may be willing to challenge the current government
under conditions that would in the absence of these resources be unacceptable.
By promising favored groups a “free lunch” in exchange for replacing a hostile
government, dominant states use these interstate resource transfers to establish
favorable leadership outcomes.
Second, I describe how dominant states maintain hierarchy by helping to con-
solidate favorable leaders’ hold on power within subordinate states. This is ac-
complished in two ways. First, as described earlier, dominant states provide fa-
vored leaders with resource transfers. These transfers enable leaders’ job security
in several ways: they provide greater levels of public (and private) spending, while
decreasing the burden borne by subordinate states’ tax system. Furthermore, the
conditionality of these resources shifts the balance of political power within sub-
ordinate states. While some citizens might be willing to shift their support to a
different leader, the favored leader’s singular ability to deliver resources from the
dominant state advantages them relative to their opponents. The second mecha-
nism of hierarchy maintenance is coercion. Specifically, dominant states deter dis-
favored leaders from competing for office by promising to force them into painful
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concessions once they get there. The willingness of disfavored leaders to attempt
to take over the government is determined by their value of holding office if they
successfully come to power. But as described earlier, the presence of a hostile dom-
inant state means that holding office is not as attractive as it would otherwise be.
Undertaking the costly process of competing for office is a losing proposition if
government means an endless series of policy concessions.
Before turning to a mathematical description of the logic outlined above, I
spend some time discussing one of the key theoretical assumptions from the the-
ory. In contrast to many extant works on the topic, I assume that domestic actors
within subordinate states have opposing preferences over the policy desired by a
dominant state. In other words, the political goals of hierarchy are domestically
redistributive within subordinate states. The following section substantiates this
claim.
Distributive Politics and the Goals of Hierarchy
What are the international goals of hierarchy? Lake provides a reasonable intro-
duction to this question, arguing that hierarchy can be captured along two di-
mensions – security and economic. He provides two indicators of both of these.
For security, hierarchy is denoted by (a) the number of dominant state military
personnel in a subordinate state; and (b) the number of alliances possessed by a
subordinate state that are independent of a dominant state. The economic mea-
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sures Lake uses are (a) subordinate state monetary dependence; and (b) bilateral
trade dependence. The theory I present below turns on the critique that all of
these four of these dimensions of hierarchy – and in reality any other policy that
a dominant state might care about – redistribute resources and power within sub-
ordinate states. Before presenting the formal model in detail, I discuss why this is
the case.
Economically, it is easy to see how the goals of hierarchy are non-consensual.
Even goals that appear altruistic cannot escape their fundamentally political na-
ture. For example, economic growth can exacerbate domestic distributional strug-
gles (Alesina and Rodrik 1994) and thus groups may differ in their preferences
over what path growth takes. Bearce and Tirone (2010) present a model of aid-
enforced economic reform, which they describe as “policy change directed at cre-
ating and opening markets, including reduced barriers to international exchange,
decreased government intervention in and regulation of the national economy,
more secure private property rights, and improved ‘law and order’ ” (p. 839).
An enormous literature in economics points to the fallacy of assuming pol-
icy decisions like open markets, reduced barriers to international exchange, or
decreased government regulation are anything approaching public “goods.” The
Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner models of trade preferences argue that cit-
izens’ preferences over the openness of trade will split along factor and industry
lines, respectively. In an explicitly political context, Hiscox (2001) finds that which
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of these models “wins out” tends to depend on the level of inter-industry factor
mobility. In general, trade policy is highly contentious within countries.
Divisions over monetary policy shift according to a similar logic. Frieden (1991)
outlines a deductive model that traces how different groups within a polity gen-
erate preferences over both the level and the flexibility of exchange rate arrange-
ments according to their economic activities and levels of wealth. Crucially, a lack
of attention to domestic preferences over these policies impedes scholars’ ability
to make statements about their international prevalence: changes in the relative
power of domestic groups with competing preferences over monetary arrange-
ments can prevent cooperation on economic matters entirely (Simmons 1997).
International security relationships seem to present an easier case for the argu-
ment that hierarchy is a mutually beneficial enterprise. Yet even here, a closer look
reveals that the terms of the transaction are not so clear. The earlier anecdote link-
ing the diminished bargaining power of Indonesian military officials to aid from
the U.S. government is one example of even ostensibly privileged groups may lose
from closer security ties. More broadly, Morrow (1991) argues that while asym-
metric alliances can benefit weaker states, this nearly always comes at the cost of
decreased autonomy.
The persistent fear of “fifth columns” points towards another source of redis-
tribution implied by security ties: not all individuals within a state prefer their
own government to a potential invader: Karnow (2010) notes that the Japanese
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invasion of the Philippines was aided not only by ethnic Japanese living on the
islands, but by Filipino radicals attracted to ideals of pan-Asian nationalism (pp.
279-280). Even if individuals within a polity would not prefer to live under the
tutelage of invaders, they might view invasion as a useful mechanism to destroy
their own government so that they might benefit. The Chinese Communists’ Long
March saved them from elimination at the hands of the Nationalists, but it also
forced the Nationalists to fight the invading Japanese on their own; within five
years of the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Communists eliminated the
enemy that had earlier driven them to the brink of extinction.
The political goals of hierarchy, whether economic or security-oriented, are po-
litically divisive within subordinate states. Even security guarantees fit this crite-
rion. When actors have opposing preferences over a policy, a public goods frame-
work provides an insufficient treatment for analyzing when and where this policy
is provided. The following section provides a formal treatment of three actors
bargaining over a divisive policy, conceived of here as the political components of
hierarchical construction.
A Formal Model of Hierarchy
The foregoing examples point a way forward for constructing a theoretical model
of hierarchy. In the following section I synthesize these illustrative cases with the
argument from the previous chapter. I structure the inquiry around the follow-
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ing question: given that the development of the state system incentivized domi-
nant states to focus on securing favorable leadership outcomes within subordinate
states, how do these states achieve this goal? I identify several key parameters –
including the distribution of domestic power, the value of holding office, and in-
stitutional structures – that shape domestic competition within subordinate states,
and then link these to an international strategy of hierarchical construction and
management. The following paragraphs outline the fundamental assumptions of
the theoretical model.
Consider a game in which a foreign state F negotiates with the leader of another
state. This leader may be one of two individuals, A (he) or B (she). Whichever of
these two is not currently in the government is in the opposition.1 For now, I con-
ceive of the “opposition” broadly: this may be either an institutionalized opposi-
tion party, as in a democracy, or a looser coalition of dissidents, as in an autocracy.
The current leader of the government has access to the policy-making apparatus
of the state which allows them to set a policy x of interest to themselves, F , and the
opposition leader. As I describe below, this policy might reasonably capture some
dimension of negotiation associated with hierarchy. For now, all that is required is
that the two domestic groups have opposing preferences over what direction this
policy should move in.
In each round of the game, F sets a level of aid, a ≥ 0 at a marginal cost of τ ∈
1Which of A or B is in the government and opposition is determined by a state variable which is de-
scribed below.
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[0,1]. Following, whichever leader is in control of the government makes a policy
offer of x ∈ [0,1]. In order for the policy to be implemented, it must be accepted
by both F and the leader in opposition. Following the government’s policy offer,
F may then either accept this offer or fight a war. Finally, the leader in opposition
decides whether to reject the government’s offer or not. If the opposition leader
rejects the offer, a costly domestic competition for control of government in the
next round occurs. At the end of each round, all three actors receive their utilities
which are a function of the bargain that was set (if it was accepted) and whatever
aid was disbursed by F . In each stage game, F thus receives x − aτ. The game is
then repeated infinitely, with all players discounting future play at δ ∈ (0,1). To
reiterate from earlier, in each stage game:
1. F provides foreign aid (a > 0) or not (a = 0)
2. The leader in government makes an offer x ∈ [0,1] or fights a war
3. If the government makes an offer, F accepts or rejects
(a) If F rejects, a game-ending war occurs
4. If F accepts, the leader in opposition accepts or rejects.
I look for the set of Markov Perfect equilibria. Markov Perfection is a refinement of
the subgame perfect solution concept in which players condition their strategies
on the state of the game rather than a full set of histories. In this model, what
the refinement means is that players condition their play on which of A and B
hold office rather than the potentially infinite set of actions each actor may have
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undertaken in the past. An equilibrium then is a set of strategies si ∈ S for which
each si is a best response to each s−i .
Drawing from the discussion both in the previous chapter and earlier in this
one, what can we say about the two potential leaders of the state? First, I assume
that these leaders care about policy outcomes. As described above, these policies
might encompass international security arrangements, trade agreements, mone-
tary structures, or simply general foreign policy alignment. To the extent that
dominant states care about policy outcomes that are strictly internal to subordi-
nate states – like for example the economic organization of the latter – the policy
in question might be nominally unrelated to foreign policy. The key assumption I
make here is that leaders within a state have opposed preferences over the policy
in question. For instance, if one group prefers more trade with the United States,
its domestic opponent prefers less. These preferences might arise idiosyncratically,
but more likely they come about as a result of domestic political incentives: if one
leader’s base prefers more of a policy, that leader is more inclined to pursue it.
Formally, suppose that the range of policy outcomes the two leaders care about
can be arranged along the unit interval from 0 to 1. Broadly, this simply means
that the state can negotiate over the policy in a single dimension: closer or further
ties from the dominant state, more or less trade liberalization, etc. I assume that
when the policy is set at zero, A is most satisfied; conversely, when the policy is set
at 1, B is most satisfied. If the level of policy is denoted by x, the utility of A for a
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given level of policy is then 1− x, and the utility for B for a given level of policy is
x.
Second, in addition to policy outcomes, the two potential leaders care about
holding office. This is true for two reasons. The first reason leaders care about
holding office is that being in the government provides private resources to a given
leader and his or her coalition. Controlling the government often means control-
ling the police and potentially the military. Similarly, governments are often able
to squeeze private rents from the state. These rents can range from the relatively
banal – appointing friends to ambassadorial posts – to the extreme – sequester-
ing tax revenue into private offshore banking accounts. In the model I account
for these private rents through the inclusion of a multiplicative parameter γ that
amplifies the value of any given policy for the leader that is in office. Therefore,
leaders are happiest when they are in office and when policy is close to their ideal
point.
The second reason leaders care about being in office is that it gives them con-
trol over the policy that they care about. While groups out of office can have input
into the policy process, only the government retains the ability to actually set tax
or trade policy, and only the government can sign agreements that determine the
country’s exchange rate or security arrangements. As I show below, being in of-
fice is particularly valuable from a policy standpoint because it allows a leader to
capture the “surplus” from bargaining that accrues from the fact that domestic
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competition is costly. In the next section, I link the concepts presented above to
each other mathematically.
To denote which leader holds office in the model, I include a state variable σ
that takes on the value of either 0 or 1. When σ= 1, A is in office, and when σ= 0, B
is in office. Therefore, the utility to A and B for a given policy offer is determined
by the level of policy x, the private value of government γ, and which of the two
hold office.
uA(x|σ) = γσ(1−x) and (3.1)
uB (x|σ) = γ(1−σ)x. (3.2)
In order to model domestic competition between A and B , I assume that whichever
leader is in the opposition may challenge the leader in government for control of
office. If the leader in opposition challenges the government, each leader pays a
cost. In every round in which there is competition for office, A pays the cost kA.
Similarly, B pays kB , where ki∈{A,B} > 0. These costs reflect the fact that competition
is costly regardless of the institutional context in which it takes place. In demo-
cratic states, groups must pay costs in the form of campaign expenditures. They
may also be forced to make costly promises to secure support that they will then
feel obligated (to a greater or lesser extent) to pursue while in office. Yet overall,
costs in democratic states are likely to be smaller than in autocratic states. In these
latter states, costs may come in the form of torture, dispossession of property, or
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even death.
But competing for office is not only costly. It also brings with it the possibility
that the leader in opposition can take control of the government. Specifically, if B
rejects an offer, she takes office with probability q, and if A rejects an offer he takes
office with probability r . With complementary probabilities, each actor returns
to the opposition. A and B have differing probabilities of winning office to reflect
the fact that they may have differing levels of latent support in the population.
If one leader retains only a narrow support coalition, (s)he may be quite unlikely
to be able to take control of office. But these probabilities are also different to
account for the possibility that the two leaders may be differentially able to utilize
the levers of government to retain power. For example, if A is a military leader
and B is the leader of a socialist party, A may be better equipped to control the
repressive apparatus of the state in order to maintain office, while B is relatively
advantaged in being able to mobilize the poorer sections of society.
To combine both the costs of competition and the probability of success into
payoffs, let ui (σ,S) be the utility for actor i given both the state of the game σ and
a strategy profile S. Then the two actors’ respective utilities for challenging the
government are
v A =−kA +δ
(
r uA(σ= 1,S)+ (1− r )uA(σ= 0,S)
1−δ
)
and (3.3)
vB =−kB +δ
(
quB (σ= 0,S)+ (1−q)uB (σ= 1,S)
1−δ
)
. (3.4)
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In words, each actor’s willingness to challenge the other while in the opposition
depends on (1) the cost k of competing for office and (2) the utility of being in office
and in the opposition given the other actors’ equilibrium strategies, each weighted
by the probabilities that they occur. To illustrate, holding all else constant, when
B has a higher utility for being in office, uB (σ= 0,S), she is more likely to challenge
the government. To the extent that she values being in the government more than
she does being in the opposition, she is also more likely to challenge as she becomes
more likely to succeed – that is, as q increases. Finally, B is less likely to challenge
the government as her own costs to doing so, kB , increase. These simple insights
yield implications for the construction and maintenance of hierarchy that are not
immediately obvious, as I discuss in much greater detail below.
The discussion above outlines the two domestic actors’ utilities in terms of
strictly domestic processes. How can a dominant state influence these processes?
First, recall that in each stage game the dominant state begins by providing aid or
not. While in the empirical chapters I restrict my discussion primarily to economic
aid, in practice these interstate resource transfers could be conceptualized much
more broadly, including preferential trade agreements, below-market credit exten-
sions, and support in international organizations like the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) or World Trade Organization (WTO).
In the model, aid flows from the foreign state F to whichever leader is in gov-
ernment. The aid is then distributed between the government and the opposition
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according to a sharing rule θ ∈ [0,1]. When θ is smaller, the government retains
more of the foreign aid; conversely when θ is relatively large, the opposition shares
more of the aid. This parameter captures the fact that in some states – more of-
ten than not autocracies – governments spend the vast majority of foreign aid on
perks for themselves, their narrow coalition, and their families. In democracies,
governments are more likely to spend aid on public works or even on projects that
directly benefit opposition groups or individuals living in opposition-controlled
areas. Taking into account the effect of aid, the utilities for the leaders of accept-
ing the governments offer from earlier are altered:
uA(x|σ) = γσ(1−x)+a[θ(1−σ) + (1−θ)σ] and (3.5)
uB (x|σ) = γ(1−σ)x +a[θσ+ (1−θ)(1−σ)]. (3.6)
Aid then makes the leader in opposition weakly more likely to accept the govern-
ment’s offer. It “boosts” the valuation each actor places on the status quo. What
aid does not do in this model is decrease an actor’s utility for rejecting the gov-
ernment’s offer. In other words, governments cannot, in the model, use aid for
repressing their opponents. However, because of the way both leaders weigh the
costs and benefits of accepting or rejecting an offer, this simplification is not too
damning. Just as using aid for repression would decrease the likelihood of leader
in opposition rejecting the government’s offer, the fact that the opposition receives
positive utility for aid only if they accept the government’s offer means that aid
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has the same overall effect here.
The second way F can shape bargaining between A and B is by threatening to
fight a war. After the leader in government proposes some x, F decides whether to
fight a war or accept the government’s offer and send an aid package. I model war
as a game-ending costly lottery in which all players pay cost c > 0. Since F and B
have aligned preferences, B takes control of the government with probability p and
implements her preferred policy of x = 1. With probability 1−p, A takes control
and implements x = 0. Whichever of A and B takes office gets the government
payoff of γ. Therefore,
uA(war|·) = (1−p)γ− c
uB (war|·) = pγ− c
uD (war|·) = p − c.
One important point about the actors’ war payoffs is that they are independent
of the state of the game, σ. Put another way, there is some probability p that,
should an interstate war occur, F is successful at installing its preferred leader, B .
Because a war ends the game, the loser of the war is effectively eliminated: (s)he
can no longer press policy demands, and the winner of the war enjoys his or her
preferred policy in perpetuity.
The foregoing discussion outlined the utilities of all three actors. The remain-
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der of this chapter accomplishes two goals. First, I discuss the core strategic
dilemma faced by F . I show that because A and B are divided over the policy
in question, F ’s preference alignment with B implicitly defines preferences over
the leader who holds office. This section reiterates the logic put forward in Chap-
ter 2 which linked the goals of hierarchy as intertwined with leadership outcomes
in subordinate states. Second, I present the core theoretical mechanism that drives
the results from later chapters. Namely, I show that F exerts a level of control
over political competition between A and B by shaping the value that each of them
places on holding office. Because F prefers when B is in office, the former uses
coercion and strategically provides aid to advantage B in the latter’s domestic ne-
gotiations.
Distributional Policies and Leadership Preferences
Earlier in this chapter, I outlined a variety of policy goals that scholars often point
to as being key components of hierarchy. As the literature on these specific policies
indicates, trade policy, monetary arrangements, and even security agreements are
all fundamentally distributive, by which I mean that they reallocate resources and
power between actors. When analyzing negotiations over distributive policies, it
makes sense to assume that the actors on whom the policy will be imposed have
opposing preferences. Yet extant research either does not model these negotiations
explicitly, or assumes that actors’ utilities are insatiable with respect to the policy
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in question. The result of allowing actors within subordinate states to have op-
posed preferences over the construction of hierarchy implies that dominant states
have preferences over which of them controls power. By installing leaders with
similar political preferences to their own, dominant states promote conditions in
which their goals are realized as a result of domestic politics within subordinate
states. In short, if dominant states can install their preferred leaders within the
states they seek to control, the political goals of hierarchy will follow.
In the model, the value both leaders place on holding office – and consequently
their willingness to compete for office – depends on three parameters. First, the
leader in office receives the private valuation they place on being in the govern-
ment, γ > 1. Second, if F sends aid (a ≥ 0), both A and B receive utility from this
transfer, although it is split between them. Finally, the actors care about the policy
they are able to set while in control of the government, x.
These three parameters play differing strategic roles. They can also be broken
down along two dimensions. The private valuation for being in the government
is exogenous – that is, not strategically determined by any actor – and is valued
the same for both A and B . Conversely, the level of aid received by the leader in
government, a, is endogenous – set strategically by F – but, like γ, is valued the
same by both leaders. Specifically, both A and B prefer larger values of γ and larger
values of a, though they do not have control over either. Policy is different, both
because it is controlled by the leader in government, and because it is valued dif-
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ferently for A and B . Recall that while A prefers one value of the policy in question
(lower x), B prefers the opposite (greater x). For now, I denote the equilibrium pol-
icy set as x∗σ, so that x∗1 is set while A is in office, and x
∗
0 is set while B is in office.
Similarly, a∗1 is the aid provided while A holds power, and a
∗
0 is the aid provided
when B is in the government.
In order to capture how F shapes domestic bargaining between A and B , we
can describe how combinations of the other parameters in question – specifically
γ and a – shape the willingness of a leader to stay in the opposition. Put differ-
ently, F helps constrain domestic political outcomes between A and B by helping
determine which of these leaders is willing to compete for office in equilibrium.
A leader is competitive in equilibrium if (s)he rejects the government’s policy offer
according to the specified strategy profile. Conversely, a leader is uncompetitive in
an equilibrium if, according to his or her strategy profile, (s)he accepts the govern-
ment’s policy offer.
A full equilibrium requires a set of strategies si for each actor i in each state
of the game, σ ∈ {0,1}. In the first equilibrium, aid provision is uncoerced, and is
therefore unrelated to interstate military power. When kA < k̄A and p ≤ min{x∗1 +
c, x∗0 + c} the following strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium:2
Proposition 1. (Uncoerced Hierarchy) When A is in office, F never provides aid, and when
B is in office F provides an uncoerced level of aid. A offers x∗1 when he is in office, and B
2See appendix for full proofs.
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accepts. B offers x∗0 when she is in office, and A accepts.
First of all, F never provides aid when A is in office. The intuition behind
this result is straightforward: aid makes the leader in opposition more willing to
accept any given policy proposed by the leader in government. If B is in power, aid
makes A more willing to accept policies closer to F ’s ideal point. In this instance,
aid compensates A for his loss in utility for allowing a larger x. Similarly, if B is
in the opposition, she becomes more willing to accept lower values of x: just as
aid compensates A’s loss in utility for a larger x while he is in the opposition, aid
would compensate B for a smaller x while she is in the opposition. Since aid is
costly to F , and because F prefers x to be larger, it never sends aid to A when the
latter is in government.
Two constraints – on the costliness of political competition for A and the mil-
itary strength of F – operate to produce this equilibrium. I illustrate these two
constraints through an examination of the equilibrium offer set while B holds of-
fice. Note that x∗1 is the equilibrium policy when A holds office (i.e. when σ = 1),
and x∗0 is the equilibrium policy when B holds office (or σ= 0). Then when A is in
the opposition, he accepts any
x ≤ x∗0 ≡ 1+a0θ+
kA(1−δ)−δr [γ(1−x∗1 )+a1(1−θ)]
1−δ(1− r ) . (3.7)
First, the costliness of political competition implies that aid is not always necessary
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for F . Indeed, when
kA ≥ k̄A ≡
δγr (1−x∗1 )
1−δ , (3.8)
A’s reservation point is weakly greater than one. F never provides aid when this is
the case. Under these conditions, A is willing to accept F ’s most preferred policy
(x∗0 ≥ 1) even absent aid. Here, equilibrium behavior falls apart because domestic
political competition is too costly for groups that F prefers to keep out of office.
While F would provide aid in this case, aid is unnecessary.
The necessity of aid is also mediated by the private valuation the two potential
leaders place on holding office. Note that in order for the equilibrium to hold,
office cannot be “too valuable.” Formally, in order for there to exist an offer that A
will accept while he is in the opposition,
γ< γ̂A ≡ (1+a0θ)[1−δ(1− r )]+kA(1−δ)− rδa1(1−θ)
δr (1−x1)
. (3.9)
Given that kA < k̄A, Equation 3.9 points towards several mechanisms that F can use
to ensure that A is uncompetitive in equilibrium, which is true if γ < γ̂A. First, F
can directly manipulate two parameters in γ̂A, a0 and a1. From a visual inspection
of the constraint, A is uncompetitive for a larger range of γ as a0 increases, and for
a smaller range of γ as a1 increases. In other words, by providing aid conditionally
depending on which of A or B holds power, F can directly shape the likelihood
that A will attempt to take control of the government away from B .
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The second mechanism that F can use to cause A to be uncompetitive is by tak-
ing measures to directly shape x1, the level of policy that A expects to secure while
he is in office. Note that as x1 goes to 1 – that is, A’s least preferred level of policy –
the constraint on the private valuation of office for which A is uncompetitive goes
to infinity. If A is entirely unable to secure any of his policy goals while in office,
he is never willing to pay the costs of seizing control of the government in the first
place.
To reiterate, as described in the beginning of this chapter and the previous one,
a key logic of hierarchy relies on dominant states shaping leadership outcomes
within subordinate states. In the remainder of this chapter, I undertake two tasks.
First, I describe how resource transfers allow dominant states to create hierarchy
by incentivizing political competition within subordinate states. The promise of
external resources upon coming to office can convince leaders that would not oth-
erwise compete for control of their government to do so. Dominant states are able
to secure the ascendence of preferred leaders by promising them free resources
upon coming to office. Second, I outline how coercive interstate bargaining can
deter some leaders who would otherwise compete for office from doing so. Lead-
ers that dominant states prefer to see stay out of office are deterred from competing
because the bargain they will be forced to accept while in office is not worth paying
the costs of competition.
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Hierarchy Construction: Conditional Aid and Leader Competition
By the late 1980s, the Hungarian economy had not yet fully recovered from the oil
shocks of the previous decade. While Hungary and its Eastern European neigh-
bors had ostensibly been shielded from the worst direct effects of OPEC’s muscle-
flexing, access to subsidized Soviet oil was made contingent on construction of a
highly-inefficient gas pipeline that stripped both capital and workers away from
the domestic economy. Worse, Hungarian terms of trade continued to deteriorate
across the decade. By 1980, Hungarian external debt had reached $9.1 billion, an
increase of 900% percent from the decade prior. While halting economic reforms
across the 1980s slowly boosted competitiveness, the debt problem had continued
to worsen.
By 1988, the younger members of the ruling class decided that it was time for
a change at the top of the party. Consequently, Prime Minister János Kádár’s move
to the newly-created post of president in May 1988 was not a promotion. But the
new leaders, including newly-installed Prime Minister Károly Grósz, were wary of
assuming responsibility for the economic measures – later instituted ruthlessly in
Poland – that were required to bring the rising debt problem under control.
Access to West German markets played a significant role in solving this prob-
lem for the new leadership. Specifically, by alleviating some of the distributional
pressures implied by economic reforms, aid from the West made Grósz more will-
ing to accept the costs of leading the country through them. Even while negotia-
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tions to remove Kádár were underway, West German foreign policy advisor Horst
Teltschik approached the coup plotters, telling them that were they to be success-
ful “the West German government would support this programme [of economic
reform]. . . with financial credits.” Bonn kept its word to the tune of a billion
Deutschmark credit which was used directly to pay for interest on outstanding
foreign loans (Sebestyen 2009, p. 214).
In the Hungarian case, West Germany was able to leverage its control over fi-
nancing that Budapest needed in order to shape the willingness of Grósz to seize
office. This example maps well on to the first mechanism from the theoretical
model outlined above: F can help shape the incentives for A and B to compete for
office is through its aid provision strategies.
Earlier in this chapter, I explained why aid flows from F only while B is in office;
or, in terms of the example just outlined, why West Germany was willing to extend
a line of credit to Grósz but not Kádár. To reiterate why this is the case, remember
that aid makes the leader in opposition more willing to accept any given policy
proposed by the leader in government. Since F never wants to allow B to be more
satisfied with the policy proposed by A, F sends aid only while B is in office. This
result implies that, while in the opposition, B is faced with an opportunity that A
never has. When r > 1−δ(2−δ)
δ2
and a∗0 > ā, the following strategy profile constitutes
an equilibrium:
Proposition 2. (Hierarchy Construction) F only provides aid when B is in office. When
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the equilibrium level of aid is large enough, B always rejects when she is in the opposition.
When he is out of office, A accepts any x smaller than x∗0 .
When B is out of the government, neither A nor B has access to any resources
from F . Were B to come to power, however, F would be willing to begin send-
ing resources. When the expected amount of resources triggered by a change in
leadership is large enough, A may be unable to make policy concessions to B that
would convince the latter not to challenge for office. Formally, if
a∗0 > ā ≡
q(1−δγ)−δ+kB (1−δ)
δγq(1−θ) , (3.10)
B always rejects the government’s offer when she is in the opposition. In other
words, if the level of aid provided by F were B to assume office is large enough, B
always competes for office when she is in the opposition. Put differently, when F is
able to condition large enough resource transfers on the identity of governments in
other countries, it is able to “purchase” regime change – what I refer to as foreign-
induced regime change – in these countries. The availability of these resources
introduces an extra dimension of indivisibility into domestic bargaining.
It is easy to imagine how the availability of external resources might shape the
competitiveness of different groups in a wide range of institutional contexts. Con-
sider an example from Israeli-U.S. relationship. The 1992 election for the Knesset,
Israel’s legislature, returned a new prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin. Rabin, of the
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Labor Party, replaced at the head of the Knesset Yitzhak Shamir of Likud, a right-
wing party. One of the key issues leading up to the election had been Israel’s rela-
tionship with the Palestinian territories, and in particular the extent to which the
Israeli government should pursue peace with the occupied territories. Shamir had
met this process with antipathy, seeking to extend Israeli settlements in the West
Bank in order to house the influx of Jewish refugees fleeing the recently-dissolved
Soviet Union. This met with resistance from Israel’s closest international friend,
the United States. President Bush and his secretary of state James Baker were in-
tent on convincing the Israeli government to stop settlements.
At issue was a package of $10 billion in loan guarantees from the United States,
which the Bush administration feared would be used, if not directly to build settle-
ments, to free up resources that would allow Shamir to do so. Consequently, Baker
made clear to Shamir that the loans would be withheld until the conclusion of the
upcoming peace conference (Friedman 1991). Implicit in this was the threat that
the loans would be withheld entirely should the conference conclude without an
agreement. Yet Shamir had no intention of making concessions, and so the issue
of financing remained unresolved. The loan guarantees hung over Israeli politics
until the following year, when Rabin – who would eventually win a Nobel Peace
Prize for his work with the Palestinians – was elected. Rabin agreed almost im-
mediately to cease new settlements, the guarantees were made, and a senior State
Department official was quoted as being pleased that the arrangement “match[ed
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Israeli] needs as well as ours” (Friedman 1992). The anecdote from Israel earlier
is an example from a democratic context: because a Labor Party victory meant
access to loan guarantees, Rabin could simply promise more to potential swing
voters than could Shamir.
The Israeli example points to two important caveats for the foreign-induced
regime change argument. First, the United States has very obviously never prac-
ticed strict aid conditionality vis-a-vis Israeli politicians. In other words, money
from Washington flows to Tel Aviv in abundance regardless of what party prevails
in the Knesset. The “resources” that I am referring to here are those designed to
influence domestic political competition within the subordinate state. In many
cases, these resources may be sent on top of aid that flows to subordinate states for
other reasons. In the Israeli case, the United States sends large amounts of mili-
tary aid in order to bolster Israeli defenses against its hostile Arab neighbors. In
other cases, the United States might send humanitarian aid in response to a natural
disaster, despite its preference for regime replacement.
Second, domestic institutions play a crucial role in mediating the ability of
dominant states to purchase regime change. Recalling the constraint in Equation
3.10, it is easy to see that the level of aid necessary to purchase regime change is
increasing in the inclusiveness of domestic institutions, denoted by θ. In fact, as θ
increases to its maximum value of 1, the level of aid needed to purchase a regime
turnover increases to infinity. Put simply, if domestic institutions are too inclusive
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– that is, if they provide a robust mechanism for sharing the foreign resources – B
is not willing to reject A’s offer in an attempt to come to office.
Why do egalitarian institutional structures disadvantage dominant states at-
tempting to incite regime change? As described earlier, a leader contemplating a
governmental takeover must weigh the costs and benefits of coming to office. On
the positive side of the ledger are the private benefits of government added to the
expected resource transfer upon reaching government. But recall that institutions
crucially mediate how much of this transfer the leader will keep upon taking con-
trol of the government: formally, this leader keeps only a(1−θ). When θ is quite
large, the leader expects to spend nearly all these external resources on political
groups other than her own. Given this anticipated sharing, the level of resources
necessary to encourage her to pay the costs associated with competing for office
become larger and larger.
This institutional constraint on the ability of dominant states to purchase regime
change suggests that one of the most common critiques of hierarchy – its illiber-
alism – is pathological rather than idiosyncratic. One possible explanation for
why hierarchy often seems to co-opt undemocratic regimes rests on the possibility
that dominant states simply seek to institute policies that are unpopular within
subordinate states. By this reckoning, hierarchical relationships are undemocratic
because they seek to impose policies on states that would strongly prefer different
political outcomes.
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The argument presented here is slightly different. By explicitly building in the
fact that political negotiations are redistributive, the argument recognizes that all
policies have some level of support. A focus on the distributive politics of hierarchy
suggests that the key to establishing hierarchy lies in shaping the value groups
place on holding office, and that this is easier in institutional contexts that operate
to exclude opposition groups from power. Exclusive institutional contexts are key
not because they prevent some groups from coming to power – coercion and the
strategic provision of external resources suffice in that respect – but because they
convince the groups dominant states prefer to see in office that the costs of seizing
control of the government are worth paying.
Hierarchy Maintenance: Coercion, Aid, and Leader Deterrence
Several years before János Kádár’s “promotion,” Imre Pozsgay, the chairman of
Hungary’s Patriotic People’s Front (PPF, the ruling Communist party) published
a report entitled “Turning Point and Reform,” which called for economic liberal-
ization including the legalization of private property. This landmark missive was
followed the next year by the publication in Beszélő, a Hungarian opposition pub-
lication, of “A New Social Contract,” a letter calling for economic liberalization to
be accompanied by political concessions, including competitive elections. Despite
the apparent willingness of the Hungarian regime to negotiate – and despite the
fact that the regime appeared to be encouraged in this by the Soviet leader Mikhail
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Gorbachev – the Hungarian liberals were keen to moderate their purported revi-
sionism. Despite the call in “A New Social Contract” for competitive legislative
elections, János Kis and his co-authors reserved for the PPF in their proposal the
entirety of the executive branch, including control over foreign policy and the mil-
itary (Stokes 1993, pp. 91-92). Even during a time of Soviet weakness, opposition
leaders were certain that were they to take control of the government, their ulti-
mate policy goals would have to be substantially altered at least in the short term
to account for the reality of Soviet pressure. As I detail in this section, opposition
group calculations about how external relationships shape the value of holding
office loom large when these groups are considering whether to seek office in the
first place.
The second way, then, that F shapes the value that A and B place on holding
office is through the threat of war. Recall that in the model, after the leader in
government makes a policy proposal, F has the option to fight a war. Because war
is modeled as a costly lottery, the leader in government always prefers to make
an offer that is accepted rather than fight an interstate war. This “floor” on the
amount of policy provided has two implications, which I derive from a discus-
sion of Proposition 3. When kA < k̄A and p > x∗1 + c the following strategy profile
constitutes an equilibrium:
Proposition 3. (Uncoerced Hierarchy) When A is in office, F never provides aid, and when
B is in office F provides a coerced level of aid. A offers x∗1 when he is in office, and B
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accepts. B offers x∗0 when she is in office, and A accepts.
The first, obvious implication is that in any equilibrium, the policy x is never
set below F ’s reservation point for war. Formally, at a minimum x = p − c. Even
when A holds office, F never accepts a worse policy than it could expect to secure
by fighting a war. When F is a great power, this may be a relatively good deal of the
policy that it desires, although the costs to any state for fighting a war over an issue
of marginal importance – for example convincing another state to fix its exchange
rate – may overwhelm even certain victory. Ultimately, even when A holds power,
F is guaranteed some minimal level of the policy it seeks.
The second implication of F ’s reservation value for war is that powerful inter-
state actors can deter domestic leaders from competing for office. This draws from
the earlier discussion of how equilibrium levels of policy shape the valuation ac-
tors place on holding office, and in turn their willingness to engage in competition
to get there. In other words, when F is very strong – that is, very likely to win a war
– A is deterred from competing for office. He is deterred not by the expectation
that F will fight a war should he secure control of the government, but because he
knows that upon accession to office, he will be unable to secure his policy goals.
But the effect of interstate coercion is even more dramatic than this.
In addition to F ’s ability to deter political competition on the part of disfavored
domestic actors, F ’s military power allows it to secure policies closer to its ideal
point while its preferred domestic leader, B , holds power. Recall that while he is
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in the opposition, A will accept any x ≤ x∗0 . Substituting p−c for x∗1 (from Equation
3.7 above), it is easy to show that the maximal offer acceptable to A as a function
of the interstate distribution of power is increasing:
∂x∗0
∂p
= δγr
1−δ(1− r ) , (3.11)
which is strictly positive. Recall that this is in the best possible scenario for A, i.e.
the scenario in which he makes the smallest possible offer he can while in office. In
other words, because F ’s military power shapes the bargain A can secure while he
is in office, this military power also shapes the bargain that A accepts while he is
out of office. The interdependence of actors’ valuation for holding office and their
willingness to compete for that office interacts with interstate relationships to the
advantage of militarily powerful states.
The effect of interstate coercion on domestic political competition depends im-
portantly on the domestic distribution of power. When a dominant state’s pre-
ferred leader is quite strong relative to its domestic opponent – that is, if B is very
likely to survive a challenge from A while she is in office – interstate coercion has
no effect on the willingness of A to compete for office. In these cases, the likeli-
hood of success relative to the cost of challenging the government is so great that
A would never countenance doing so, regardless of the policy they might set while
in office. Recalling that r is the likelihood that A takes office following a rejection
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of the government’s offer, when
r < r̄ ≡
(
1−δ
δ
)
δγq[kA − (1+a∗0 )]+kB − [1−δ(1−q)]
δγq(1+a∗0 )+kB (1−δ)− [1−δ(1−q)]
, (3.12)
the effect of interstate coercion is swamped by the preponderance of domestic
power gathered in the hands of the dominant state’s preferred leader. In other
words, when A is relatively likely to win office domestically, he takes into account
how bargaining with F will affect his ability to achieve his policy goals. When A is
likely to lose a domestic competition for office, he is unconcerned with interstate
politics.
This caveat comports with an intuitive grasp of political bargaining. In those
states where a dominant state’s preferred leader is likely to win any political chal-
lenge she faces, it is unlikely that her domestic opponents would take into account
international politics when contemplating a governmental overthrow. Conversely,
weak domestic leaders facing a vibrant opposition can rely on these domestic op-
ponents to calculate how international relationships would affect their tenure in
office when debating whether to seize control.
The logical combination of the foregoing arguments is that dominant states
use a different mixture of resource transfers and coercion when they are bolstering
leaders that are domestically secure than they do when they are supporting those
that are not. In terms of the discussion from the previous chapter, the United
States was able to rely primarily on aid via the Marshall Plan to keep communists
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out of power in western Europe, while the Soviet Union was forced to deploy and
explicit coercive threat against democratic opposition groups in eastern Europe.
The argument presented in this chapter explains why this was the case. For the
Soviets, their preferred political interlocutors rested on tenuous ground. Only by
forcing democratic activists to reckon with Soviet military might was Moscow able
to cow them into submission. The United States, facing a communist opposition
that in general was relatively weak, was able to buy their quiescence through aid
designed to boost aggregate economic growth.
What this argument means is that dominant state approaches to hierarchy can
vary quite widely, both spatially and temporally. While the United States stood
ready to intervene militarily in Italy during the late 1940s, such a threat is incon-
ceivable today: the threat to domestic order is not of the same character, either
in political valence or in overall strength. Likewise, while U.S. hierarchy-building
exhibited a light hand throughout western Europe, the same cannot be said for
Latin America. Here, rightist elements friendly to U.S. political goals were not
as domestically secure, and thus their tenure rested on a mixture of aid but also
coercive threat, the latter not always held in abeyance.
Perhaps more importantly, the model demonstrates logically that patterns of
hierarchy building depend more on conditions within subordinate states than they
do on dominant state goals. In the next section I consider how one important
element from the model – domestic institutions that operate to share externally-
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provided resources – both enables and constrains dominant states in their struggle
to secure political security for friendly elements elsewhere.
Domestic Institutions and Hierarchy
Before turning to empirical tests of the theory’s propositions in the following two
chapters, I elaborate the role that domestic institutions play in the theory. Because
I am primarily interested in the effect that institutions play in mediating hierarchy
construction and maintenance, I assumed for them a very specific role: namely, in
the model domestic institutions allocate the resources sent from dominant states
between actors within subordinate states. In states with inclusive institutions – for
example, those states that seek to provide high levels of public goods – external
resource transfers are shared between the government and opposition. In these
states, opposition groups directly benefit from hierarchical relationships. In states
with exclusive institutions – for example, kleptocracies, personal dictatorships,
and perhaps autocracies more broadly – the government itself is able to keep most
of the spoils accruing from dominant-subordinate state relationships.
Empirically, the above role for institutions may correlate with other parame-
ters in the model to produce familiar configurations of governance. States with
inclusive institutions, low costs for political competition, and groups that are both
moderately likely to win office approximate mature democracies like those in the
United States and Western Europe. States with exclusive institutions, low costs of
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competition, and relatively balanced political groups are similar to unconsolidated
democracies. A combination of exclusive institutions, high costs of competition,
and asymmetrically powerful political groups likely yields a group of states akin
to “competitive authoritarian” states. Adding a final parameter, the private value
of government, would clearly allow for an even more specific typology. This dis-
cussion is to note that, despite the unorthodox conception of domestic institutions
presented above, the theory allows for a rich analysis that incorporates more tra-
ditional conceptions of state power.
In the remainder of this section I discuss three effects of domestic institutions
in the model presented above. First, inclusive institutions – in the model, high θ
– lead dominant states to be more reliant on resource transfers. Second, as briefly
mentioned above, holding all else equal inclusive institutions reduce the value that
groups place on holding office. Finally, combining the first two arguments leads to
the following conclusion: the net effect of inclusive institutions on the likelihood
that hierarchy is constructed is mixed.
The first, and most obvious, role that institutions play is that they make hierar-
chy construction cheaper for dominant states to undertake. Recall that aid’s role
in the model is to make A more willing to stay in the opposition. This effect occurs
because A knows – when he is in the opposition – that should he take power he
will lose whatever resource transfer is currently provided. Straightforwardly, the
ability of resource transfers to purchase acquiescence from A is greater when A
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receives more of the resources while in the opposition. In the limit, if A receives
none of the resources – that is, if θ = 0 – the only thing deterring him from seizing
power are the costs of doing so (kA) and the probability that he is able to succeed
(r ). Conversely, when θ is relatively high, A receives a larger share of the resources
provided by F , the dominant state. When this is true, as in states that focus on
providing non-excludable public goods to their citizens, A is more willing to stay
in the opposition for a given level of resource transfer.
By implication, holding all else equal, states with highly inclusive institutions
mean that F can achieve the same effect with a smaller amount of resource trans-
fers. From the perspective of the dominant state, then, the effect of inclusive insti-
tutions is to make the provision of resources to a given state more likely. Inclusive
institutions reduce distributional conflict over hierarchical bargaining by provid-
ing opposition groups access to the goods and resources exchanged for the policy
concessions desired by dominant states. In turn, this acquiescence leads to domes-
tic political security for the dominant state’s preferred leader, B .
As discussed earlier, the second role that institutions play in the theory above is
that they depreciate the value that domestic actors place on holding office relative
to living in the opposition. In the discussion of foreign-induced regime change,
this mechanism provided an explanation for why leadership change is easier to
buy in states with exclusive institutions: the expectation that a leader would be
able to expropriate external resources for herself upon coming to office drove the
107
political competition desired by the external actor. This point is closely linked
to the first. How it works to shape hierarchical relationships therefore depends
largely on the status quo.
In states where a dominant state’s preferred leader currently holds power, in-
clusive institutions make maintaining hierarchy easier. Here, resources can be
transferred and shared with groups out of power, making these groups relatively
willing to stay in the opposition. Therefore, once established, hierarchy is most
likely to “stick” in states with inclusive domestic institutions, likely those that
provide for high levels of public goods spending.
When a dominant state’s preferred leader is currently out of power, the role
of institutions is significantly more nuanced. As discussed above, inclusive insti-
tutions make the maintenance of hierarchy more likely when B – the dominant
state’s preferred leader – holds office. Therefore as institutions provide more re-
sources to opposition groups, B is more likely to receive resource transfers upon
coming to office, and is therefore likely to be more secure in her tenure. How-
ever, the second point from above binds as well. While B is more likely to receive
these resources, she will be able to keep less of them, and is therefore less willing
to challenge for office in the first place. Institutions cut both ways for dominant
states attempting to bring favorable leaders to power in subordinate states: inclu-
sive institutions make hierarchy more likely to stick if it is established, but less
likely to be achieved in the first place. Unfortunately, the very conditions that
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augur for the construction of hierarchy – domestic institutions that are not too
inclusive – can at the margin make hierarchy more difficult to maintain.
On balance this argument implies that we should observe durable hierarchy
most often in states that exhibit recognizably liberal political structures. These
states will likely have low levels of political violence and relatively low private
returns to government. Through the latter half of the twentieth century, the ideal
cases fitting this characterization are found in the close ties between Western Eu-
rope and the United States. Once U.S. hierarchy established a foothold in these
states, Washington’s influence was difficult to dislodge. The ability of economic
ties to lessen domestic distributional struggles induced by the political ties to the
United States.
However, these peaceful relationships are likely to be the minority of hierarchi-
cal cases due to the difficulty that inclusive institutions pose for the establishment
of hierarchy. The majority of hierarchical cases will be contested and fragile. These
states are likely to exhibit moderate levels of political competition, moderate-to-
high private returns to government, and moderately inclusive domestic institu-
tions. Here, the maintenance of hierarchy depends crucially on the deployment
of coercion on the part of the dominant state. Examples from U.S. hierarchical
relationships abound here, from Latin America – which, as outlined in the intro-
duction to this chapter, saw instances of military intervention during the Cold War
– to the Middle East, where many regimes continue to explicitly rest on the threat
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of interstate coercion. The Soviet hierarchy provides an even closer fit for a fragile
network of relationships resting on coercion. This is perhaps best evidenced by the
rapid collapse of communist regimes across Eastern Europe following the obvious
inability of Moscow to uphold its security guarantees to its client regimes.
Conclusion
This chapter began by asking three related questions. First, given the wide range
of options available to powerful states attempting to create international hierar-
chy, why do they choose the ones they do? Second, and more specifically, why is
hierarchical creation sometimes peaceful and sometimes violent? Finally, what are
the implications of hierarchy for politics within subordinate states? Through the
development and analysis of a formal model, in this chapter I argued that great
powers use both coercion and resource transfers to shift the value of holding office
for different leaders and groups within subordinate states.
The model thus indicates that the division between coercive and peaceful in-
fluence is somewhat of an artificial one. Dominant states use coercive threats to
depreciate the value that leaders they prefer to see out of government place on
holding office. When these leaders anticipate having to make political concessions
to a foreign adversary upon coming to office, they are less likely to compete for
control of their government in the first place. Peaceful economic influence oper-
ates through much the same mechanism. Dominant states conditionally provide
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resources to leaders in other states. By conditioning the flow of economic goods
on the character of subordinate-state regimes, dominant states are able to increase
the value that their preferred domestic interlocutors place on holding office and
decrease the value that their domestic opponents place on holding power.
In the following two chapters, I further elaborate several empirical predictions
derived from the theoretical model presented in this chapter. In Chapter 4, I exam-
ine patterns of hierarchical creation. Specifically, I show that leadership turnover
is closely connected to the promise and anticipation of conditionally-provided for-
eign aid. I further link this finding to the argument presented in this chapter by
showing that this effect is conditional on the types of domestic institutions within
subordinate states: in states with exclusive institutions, dominant states are able
to purchase leader turnover. Conversely, in states with inclusive institutions, I find
no similar effect for foreign aid.
Chapter 5 turns from the question of hierarchical creation to hierarchy mainte-
nance. One of the key theoretical findings from the model presented above is the
deterrent effect of international coercion on domestic politics: because some lead-
ers anticipate having to make policy concessions to a dominant state upon coming
to power, they are less likely to compete for power in the first place. In order to
demonstrate this mechanism empirically, I elaborate the link between leadership
tenure and foreign aid provision. I show that the United States systematically pro-
vides less aid to those states over which it has a strong military advantage – but,
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recalling the discussion of the domestic balance of power from above – only when
its preferred leader is domestically insecure.
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Chapter 4
Creating Hierarchy
The previous two chapters made an argument in two parts. First, in Chapter 2, I
argued that a structural change in the organization of international politics occur-
ring around the end of World War II has forced dominant states to concern them-
selves with the character of leadership in subordinates states they seek to control.
The following chapter, Chapter 3, presented a formal argument demonstrating ex-
actly how dominant states can operate to control the character of leadership within
these states. Specifically, I showed that through the provision of resource transfers
and deployment of coercive threats, dominant states can alter the value that differ-
ent leaders place on holding office within subordinate states, thereby shifting the
incentives different groups have for competing for office in the first place.
The theory presented in the previous chapter exploits an important lacuna in
the literature on foreign-imposed regime change, which focuses nearly in its en-
tirety on violent impositions of new regimes. Owen (2010), for instance, argues
that forcible regime promotion – a “use of force for the purpose of altering or
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Table 4.1: Determinants of Leader Exit: Source (Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza 2009)
n of total
Regular exit 10,982 80%
Irregular without foreign support 2,381 17%
Irregular with foreign support 402 3%
total 13,765
preserving a domestic regime” – is a “fairly common practice of statecraft in the
modern international system” (pp. 2, 10). Likewise Kinzer (2007) focuses his book
on the fourteen governments deposed by the United States in the “long century”
running from 1893-2003. But as the theory presented in the previous chapter indi-
cates, a focus on these cases alone dramatically understates the reach of dominant
state influence within subordinate states. Despite their prevalence in popular dis-
course, instances of foreign-imposed regime change in fact constitute a small mi-
nority of leadership turnovers. Table 4.1 presents data from Goemans, Gleditsch
and Chiozza (2009) that categorizes leadership transitions by whether or not they
occur regularly – “in a manner prescribed by either explicit rules or established
conventions” – or irregularly (p. 1). Of those leaders who arrive in office irreg-
ularly, they further code whether or not the leader arrives with the support of a
foreign power. As is clear, explicitly foreign-supported leader removals comprise
only a tiny percentage of total leader removals, less than five percent.
The theory presented in the previous chapter proposed another mechanism by
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which dominant states can exercise influence over the leadership selection pro-
cesses within subordinate states. When dominant states condition the provision
of economic resources on the identity of leaders within subordinate states, the
promise of these resources can incentivize leaders to compete for office, even when
they otherwise would not. Consider several cases from Cold War Latin America. In
Honduras in 1963, Oswaldo López Arellano overthrew the elected Ramón Villeda
Morales in a coup. The following year U.S. aid jumped to nearly $80 million, an
increase of over 400% from the year prior. This pattern is not limited to coups.
The Argentine Liberación Libertadora, which overthrew the leftist administration of
Juan Perón, was met with a nearly 700% increase in aid, from $16 million to over
$100 million. Crucially, these actors anticipated this behavior from the United
States. While President Kennedy paid lip service to the 1961 Foreign Assistance
act, which required the U.S. to suspend foreign aid to any country suffering a mili-
tary coup, Euraque (1996) writes that Arellano’s supporters fully expected the new
law to go unenforced (pp. 113-114).
The goal of this chapter is to substantiate this claim – that dominant states can
“purchase” regime change – empirically. While below I subject my argument to
several systematic empirical tests, Table 4.2 provides a set of baseline statistics
to ground discussion. Using the same dataset of leadership transitions as above,
I split the sample of leadership changes in year t according to whether or not a
country received either economic or military aid from the United States in the
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Table 4.2: The Effect of the Expectation of Aid on Leadership Turnover
Percentage of country-years
with leadership turnover (year t )
Economic aid (t +1)
yes 13.9% (n = 7,170)
no 5.8% (n = 6,307)
t =−13.42, p < 0.001
Military aid (t +1)
yes 14.5% (n = 5,232)
no 7.4% (n = 8,245)
t =−15.73, p < 0.001
following year. As is evident from a comparison of the mean proportions of lead-
ership changes, the expectation of aid in the future appears to play a positive role
in leading to new leaders within recipient countries.
Unlike the direct foreign removal of leaders, the effect of shifts in foreign aid
(and internationally-distributed resources more generally) on domestic bargain-
ing transcends the regular/irregular leadership removal dichotomy. As evidenced
from examples in the previous two chapters, dominant states are able to manipu-
late domestic political bargaining within both democratic and authoritarian insti-
tutional structures. However, as argued in the previous chapter, dominant states’
ability to shape leadership outcomes does depend crucially on how these institu-
tions shape the value that leaders place on holding office.
In this chapter, I argue that conditional resource transfers are an important and
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unappreciated mechanism of influence in international relations. Empirically, my
strategy is to focus on the U.S. case of hierarchy-building, and specifically on the
United States’ strategy of foreign aid provision. I do this for two reasons. First,
data availability makes the other potential candidate – the Soviet hierarchy – un-
tenable as a case. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union has not published
comprehensive databases of its foreign aid activity. Second, U.S. hierarchy has
proved far more durable than has its Soviet counterpart. Consequently, its contin-
ued expansion and maintenance remains of interest for both scholars and policy-
makers.
Foreign aid, as opposed to other sources of interstate economic transfers like
loans, trade agreements, or monetary cooperation provides a clear test of the mech-
anisms at play. Aid is first of all directly controlled by the government, and is thus
more directly subordinated to strategic goals than are trading patterns or private
sector lending. Perhaps more importantly, aid’s relative insignificance provides
for a conservative test of the hypotheses derived in the previous chapter. Of those
states receiving economic aid from the United States from 1946-2012, aid com-
prised an average of 2% of the recipient state’s gross domestic product. If even
this marginal amount of resources can shift political competition within recipient
states, we can be relatively assured of the mapping of the model’s predictions to
the empirical world.
Before turning to an empirical examination of the first mechanism of hierar-
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chy creation from Chapter 2, I review the literature on foreign-imposed regime
change. I argue that this literature has been unduly concerned with violent, inter-
state impositions of regimes, despite these comprising the vast minority of cases.
In addition to discussing the analytical shortcomings of this literature, I argue that
this focus on violent regime imposition has obscured a far more common mecha-
nism of dominant state influence over leadership transitions.
Literature Review
Although the relationship is not often explicitly articulated, a discussion of leadership-
driven conflict is closely related to the question of asymmetric coercion. By one
measure, twenty-one of the twenty-seven instances of foreign-imposed regime change
in the twentieth century were carried out by either the United States, Britain,
France, or the Soviet Union, all states with significant power advantages over
nearly all their rivals (Downes and Monten 2013). To further illustrate the point, I
construct a measure bop which captures the balance of power between a potential
intervener and target country. For a dyad containing states i and j , this measure
is equal to the share of a dyad’s Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC)
score held by a possible intervener i in year t , or bop = cinci ,t
cinci ,t+cinc j ,t . For interven-
ers that are very likely to win a war against a target country j , this measure may
approach 1, while military parity would be reflected by a score close to .5. Using
the Archigos measure of foreign-imposed regime change, which includes not just
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Table 4.3: Difference of Means Test: Demands of Regime Change, Abdication, and War
n Mean BOP Standard Deviation
Demands of regime change 40 .903 .174
No demands of regime change 1,213,238 .500 .367
t =−6.93, p < .0001
uses of force but also coerced regime change, Table 4.3 displays the mean bop for
directed dyads that experience a demand or imposition of regime change versus
those that do not. Clearly, powerful states are more likely to make these demands
(however rarely) than their weaker counterparts.
An explanation for patterns of foreign-imposed regime change must therefore
be closely linked to the interaction between powerful states and their weaker coun-
terparts. Justifications for why adversaries of powerful states would defy military
threats are mixed, often focusing on the unwillingness of powerful states to ex-
pend the resources necessary to prosecute a successful military campaign in a far-
flung theatre, especially as compared to local resistance within target states which
is sure to be fierce (Mack 1975, Sullivan 2007). But effort-based explanations beg
the question of why powerful states, knowing they will be unwilling to expend
the blood and treasure necessary for a successful war, bother to make threats that
embroil them in unwinnable conflicts in the first place.
One possibility is that the advantage to installing new leadership in another
state is great enough that powerful states are willing to try even in the face of
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exceedingly high costs. For example, Wolford (2012) generalizes a “benefits to
replacement” mechanism, suggesting that international conflict can be driven by
the existence of a less politically-sensitive potential replacement who might re-
place the current leader: when a state faces the choice between bargaining with a
hawk or installing a dove, war in the present can pay.
The evidence for whether violent regime replacement is an effective mecha-
nism for installing low-cost bargaining partners is mixed, however. Most studies of
foreign-imposed regime change focus on intervener motives and whether regime
change is a useful mechanism for achieving them. Because the United States and
its Western allies have displayed a consistent commitment to spreading democ-
racy – at least nominally – Meernik (1996) and Pickering and Peceny (2006) ask
whether interventions have successfully increased target state democracy, finding
that in general they have not. More recent studies have found that forcible democ-
ratization is primarily unsuccessful, but can work in target states that are favor-
ably disposed to the implementation of democratic institutions generally (Downes
and Monten 2013). Lo, Hashimoto and Reiter (2008) do find that forcible regime
change helps explains the durability of postwar peace: when belligerents replace
the institutions and leadership of defeated states, they lock-in a favorable distri-
bution of power and interests that leads to a lower likelihood of future conflict.
Finally, while they argue that fully-consolidated externally imposed democracies
can increase regional peace, failure is costly: Enterline and Greig (2005) find that
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weakly democratic imposed governments decrease the likelihood of regional de-
mocratization and undermine regional economic growth. The empirical evidence
suggests that overall, if states are utilizing conflict in order to install preferred
bargaining partners, it does not appear to be paying off, at least according to their
stated goals.
More recently, Sechser (2010) has argued that weak target states may be willing
to fight even very strong adversaries if the two states have divergent beliefs over
the likelihood of future crises between them. According to this logic, not fighting
in one crisis may cause a weak state’s adversary to demand more in future crises.
Consequently, when weak target states believe the likelihood of future interactions
is higher than do powerful challenger states, asymmetric war can occur. Sechser
attributes disagreement over this likelihood to powerful states’ inability to com-
municate their future desire to initiate crises with the target state. But another
way of stating the condition for war in this model is to say that it must be true that
weak target states believe their powerful adversaries place a relatively low value
on the likelihood of future interaction. It is difficult, however, to imagine many
leaders during the Cold War believed that the United States, Soviet Union, or even
other ex-colonial states expected not to interact with them in the future.
In the face of these impediments to direct military coercion, great powers have
often sought out alternative mechanisms of leader replacement in other states. In
particular, states often either sponsor allied opposition groups elsewhere or in-
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tervene (directly or indirectly) in support of these groups’ domestic aims. As in
the case of regime change, however, intervention into civil wars on behalf of an
allied group has an ambiguous rate of success. While Balch-Lindsay and Enterline
(2000) find that third-party military intervention can shorten the length of civil
conflict, interventions on the side of opposition groups in general are recipes for
failure (Regan 1996). At the same time, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce (2008)
find that intervention on the side of opposition groups decreases the time to op-
position victory but increases the time to a negotiated settlement. One problem in
measuring the impact of intervention is that it remains theoretically unclear why
conflict should even occur given the presence of some potential intervener: both
Werner (2000) and Cetinyan (2002) find that strategic governments should be able
to “deter” interventions by conceding enough to an intervener’s domestic client to
make conflict unprofitable.
Non-Violent Mechanisms of Regime Control
The central contention of this chapter is that a focus on the direct use of force is
an unnecessarily limited approach to capturing the power that great powers have
over the composition of government in other states. In the introduction and pre-
vious section I argued that direct impositions of new regimes are both infrequent
and often puzzlingly-theorized. In this section I review the class of non-violent
mechanisms that dominant states use to shape political behavior within subordi-
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nate states. I argue that this class of mechanisms is much broader and potentially
more useful in thinking about the ways dominant states secure favorable leader-
ship outcomes – and by extensions, establish hierarchy – within subordinate states.
Roughly, scholars have broken down the role of external influence over domes-
tic politics along two lines. First, external actors like great powers and interna-
tional organizations (IOs) can affect domestic political actors passively through
socialization processes, which can indirectly shape the distribution of power be-
tween relevant domestic groups (Gleditsch and Ward 2006). In a review article,
Checkel (2005) defines socialization as a process by which actors are inducted
“into the norms and rules of a given community. . . switch[ing] from a logic of
consequences to a logic of appropriateness” (p. 804). Greenhill (2010) finds ro-
bust support for the socialization effect of IOs on states’ human rights processes.
Similarly the European Union (EU) has been effective in convincing many post-
communist countries to adapt to democratic institutions, though this effect is con-
strained to those countries with reasonable prospects of joining the EU (Dimitrova
and Pridham 2004). To characterize socialization as a passive process is therefore
not to deny its power in shaping domestic politics; rather this division differenti-
ates it from more active forms of interference. Socialization operates by example,
not by intervention.
The second way, then, that external actors can shape domestic political out-
comes is by directly involving themselves in the process by which leaders are se-
123
lected. Here, intervention takes the form of active manipulation of the resources
available to different domestic groups, either negatively or positively. Negative
interventions seek to deny groups access to resources they would otherwise have.
For example, international sanctions can operate to destabilize leaders’ support
coalitions in targeted countries (Marinov 2005). On the positive side of the ledger,
scholars have long pointed to foreign aid as a key mechanism of political interven-
tion and influence-building (Baldwin 1969). Elaborating on the general point of
aid as a mechanism of political favor-seeking, Kuziemko and Werker (2006) find
that the United States increases aid to countries by as much as 59% during a given
state’s tenure on the United Nations Security Council. Problematically, while di-
rect intervention in the processes of democracy can be effective under some con-
ditions (Hyde 2007), interveners who take a partisan stance also risk polarizing
democratic outcomes around the fact of their involvement (Corstange and Mari-
nov 2012).
The governments targeted by these processes of international influence retain
only variably effective mechanisms of response. In turn, the success of these re-
sponses are mediated by the institutional makeup of a given country. Returning
to the earlier example of sanctions, Escribà-Folch (2012) finds that single-party
and military regimes respond to sanctions by increasing spending on key support
groups, while personalist dictators tend to repress in response to an increasingly-
tightened budget constraint. Electorally, the proliferation of international ob-
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servers has forced even quasi-authoritarian regimes to invite external actors to
oversee their elections in an effort to signal their quality to the international com-
munity (Hyde 2011). These incentives to open domestic politics to outside ac-
tors poses a challenge to the distributional foundations of political institutions.
Rudra (2005), for example, lays bare the logic constraining authoritarian elites fac-
ing globalization: increased social spending can help to safeguard elite interests,
but the exigencies of fiscal discipline can undermine the sustainability of these
schemes. Overall, a full picture of the effect of outside influence over domestic
politics requires an understanding of how domestic political institutions arise in
the first place.
While the literature covering the development of political institutions is enor-
mous, one commonality lies in the nesting political outcomes within states in a
model of bargaining between economically- or socially-determined groups. In
these models, the government negotiates with an opposition group (or groups)
over the distributional terms of state policies. For example, Boix (2003) and Ace-
moğlu and Robinson (2006) argue that decisions over regime type are mediated by
the ability of poorer groups within a society to commit not to tax societal wealth
too heavily. In this telling, conditions that ameliorate these distributional cleav-
ages push states towards democracy. For Boix as well as Acemoğlu and Robinson,
one such condition is the presence of relative income equality.
Externally-provided resources – but for the remainder of this chapter, foreign
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aid – can also play a role in alleviating conflict over distributional policies. Mor-
rison (2009) argues that aid and oil play a similar role in domestic bargaining, by
substituting the need for governments to tax their subjects. The presence of these
slack resources means that governments are decreasingly reliant on their citizens
to pay their bills. In turn, they are less inclined to provide these citizens access
to power, an exchange that many individuals are willing to make in return for the
lightened yoke of taxation.
While the logic connecting foreign aid to regime stability is well-developed, the
empirical support is mixed. Morrison (2009) finds support for his argument that
aid and oil protect the stability of governments, although this effect appears to be
conditioned by regime type. Kono and Montinola (2009) argue that while long-
term foreign aid protects autocrats because these regimes can stockpile resources
in protection against lean times, current aid tends to help democratic govern-
ments, as the marginal contribution of aid is smaller for autocratic states with large
stockpiles of resources. Savun and Tirone (2012) bolster Kono and Montinola’s ar-
gument by providing evidence that foreign aid does in fact reduce the likelihood
of civil conflict during economic recession. The converse is also true: negative
fluctuations in aid flows can increase the probability of civil war by temporarily re-
ducing the government’s bargaining power relative to opposition groups (Nielsen
et al. 2011).
Likewise, the ability of donors to incentivize democratization through aid re-
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mains unclear. At best, donors appear to be able to marginally influence shifts
towards democratization under some conditions. Bermeo (2011) finds that in gen-
eral democratic donors have some success in fostering democratic improvements
through aid. However, the ability to conclusively infer the effect of aid from this
study is complicated by evidence of non-proportionality. In other words, the re-
cipients of democratic and autocratic aid may differ in fundamental ways aside
from aid reception. Aid may also lead to democratization in cases where autocrats
believe they are likely to be able to win future elections (Wright 2009).
One similarity binding the foregoing arguments is that they all focus on the
effect of current (or past) aid on domestic politics. But just as expectations of
state repression can deter challenges to a government, so may expectations over
the presence (or absence) of aid shape political incentives within recipient states.
On the latter point, Dunning (2004) finds that a lack of enforceable condition-
ality led aid to be ineffective at promoting democracy during the Cold War but
effective after the fall of the Soviet Union. Dunning’s argument is that the United
States would have liked to have conditioned aid – that is, revoke upon recipient
autocratization – but that the geopolitical competition of the Cold War made this
threat infeasible. Correspondingly, recipient governments had no reason to make
progress towards democracy. In other words, an expectation on the part of re-
cipient governments that aid would flow regardless of their behavior led them to
disregard donor exhortations for inclusiveness.
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Scholars are increasingly probing how actors’ anticipation of international pol-
itics shape domestic political negotiations. For example, in the post-Cold War
era, the ability of the international community to pressure states to embrace com-
petitive elections has worked to deter potential coup d’état plotters (Marinov and
Goemans 2014). More generally, threats of international punishment can operate
to convince groups to not compete for office: Hamid (2011) writes that Islamist
groups in North Africa have deliberately restricted the number of parliamentary
seats they run for in order to avoid provoking a negative reaction from the United
States. Conversely, expectations of international support upon coming to office
can encourage opposition activity (Pevehouse 2002), or shape new leaders’ actions
upon their arrival to office. For example, as Marinov and Goemans note, after Ma-
jor Daouda Malam Wanke came to office in Niger following a coup in 1999, his
first order of business was to assure the EU that elections would be quickly held
in order to shore up access to the foreign aid disbursements that comprised nearly
80% of his budget (p. 805).
Foreign Aid and Hierarchy Construction: A Quantitative Test
In the last chapter, I presented an argument establishing that dominant states are
able to purchase new leadership within subordinate states – in effect, engaging in
what I called “foreign-induced regime change.” I demonstrated through the use
of a formal model that dominant states condition the provision of resources like
128
foreign aid or low-interest loans on the identity of a subordinate state’s leadership.
Because some groups within a state anticipate access to new interstate resources
upon coming to office, they are willing to challenge the current government. Cru-
cially, I showed that this result only holds when these groups expect to be able
to retain most of these resources for themselves. In other words, foreign-induced
regime change only occurs in states with relatively exclusive political institutions.
Following from this logic, I test the following two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. Countries that experienced leadership change in the previous year should
be more likely to receive aid than countries that did not, but only if they did not receive
aid in the previous year.
First, one precondition for the logic of foreign-induced regime change is that
dominant states in fact condition the provision of aid on the identity of leadership
within subordinate states. If aid does not change in response to changes in leader-
ship, clearly dominant states could not be creating incentives for political compe-
tition through aid provision. This first hypothesis seeks to determine whether this
relationship actually holds.
Hypothesis 2. Countries that provide few public goods and are likely to receive aid after
a leadership change should be more likely to experience a leadership change.
Second, I test whether or not leaders are incentivized to compete for office by
the provision of external resources. At the beginning of this chapter I presented
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simple descriptive statistics suggesting the plausibility of this relationship. In this
section I subject the proposition to a more formal, systematic test that also incor-
porates the institutional constraint delineated above.
In order to test the argument relating the provision of external resources to
leader competition, I use foreign aid provision as a measure of these resources.
Data on U.S. foreign aid provision across roughly the latter half of the twenti-
eth century (from 1946-2012) are made available from the U.S. State Department
across the latter half of the twentieth century. The key variable I utilize from these
data is whether or not a country received aid from the United States in a given year.
Because the State Department codes the distribution of both economic and mili-
tary aid, I construct two separate variables. The first variable, econaid, is coded as
a 1 if the country received economic aid, and a 0 otherwise. The second variable,
milaid, follows the same pattern but for military aid. The universe of cases for the
analysis is all potential recipients for the time period covered by the data.
To measure leadership turnover, I use Mattes, Leeds and Carroll’s (2014) Change
in Source of Leader Support (CHISOLS) data. These data capture changes in
leadership, but also differentiate leader transitions by whether or not a transi-
tion brings to power a leader supported by a new domestic coalition.1 Since the
theoretical model above suggests that aid and political competition is driven by
1Changes in the source of leader support are thus a proper subset of cases of leadership transition, with
the exception of the imposed polities of Germany and Austria, coded as independent states beginning in
1955 without a leadership change. For clarity, I alternatively refer to this variable as coding both a “change
in the source of leader support” and “leadership transition.”
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domestic cleavages over foreign policy alignment, data that capture transitions
between leaders with different foreign policy orientations are appropriate. For
example, Mexico experienced nine leader transitions between 1946 and 1999, but
zero changes in the source of leader support during this time period, as the Institu-
tional Revolutionary Party (PRI) maintained control of political competition. The
change in the source of leader support variable is coded as a zero for all country-
years that do not experience a change in the source of leadership support, and a
one for all country-years that do.
Hypothesis 1: The Effect of Leadership Turnovers on Aid
For the first hypothesis, the dependent variables are the two aid variables, econaid
and milaid. This hypothesis captures the implication that countries should be
more likely to receive aid following a leadership change. This expectation is con-
ditional on whether or not a country received aid previous to the leader transition.
If it did, aid following the leader transition may be less likely, depending on the
identity of the new leadership. However, for countries that did not receive aid,
a transition in leadership should increase the probability of aid. In order for the
larger argument to hold true, it must be the case that the United States is more
likely to send aid to states that have experienced leadership turnover; if this is not
true, it obviously could not be the case that the availability of aid post-leader tran-
sition is in fact generating incentives for leaders to compete for office in the first
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Table 4.4: The Effect of Leader Turnover on Future Aid
(1) (2)
Economic Aid (t+1) Military Aid (t+1)
Change in Source of Leader Support 0.719∗ 0.501∗
(2.37) (2.22)
Economic Aid (t) 5.336∗∗∗
(41.09)
Change in Source of Leader Support × Economic Aid (t) -1.219∗∗
(-3.08)
GDP per capita -0.0181 -0.0355∗∗
(-1.78) (-3.26)
GDP growth per capita -0.140 0.272
(-0.26) (0.69)
Polity 0.00987 0.0367∗∗∗
(1.15) (4.73)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization 1.412∗∗∗ 0.162
(5.74) (0.79)
Civil War 0.484∗ -0.00159
(2.42) (-0.01)
Democratization (t+1) 1.544∗∗ 0.681
(2.75) (1.59)
Regime Durability -0.0172∗∗∗ -0.0144∗∗∗
(-6.53) (-5.76)
Military Aid (t) 5.323∗∗∗
(47.62)
Change in Source of Leader Support × Military Aid (t) -1.389∗∗∗
(-4.50)
Constant -2.198∗∗∗ -2.006∗∗∗
(-13.61) (-14.45)
Observations 6293 6293
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
place.
To test the first hypothesis, I estimate two logit models, in which the depen-
dent variables are, respectively, whether or not a country received economic and
military aid in a given year t +1 as a function of its aid status at year t as well as
whether or not the country experienced a change in the source of leader support
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(CHISOLS) in year t . These models take the form
Pr (Aidi ,t+1) =β1CHISOLS×Aidi ,t +βXi ,t +εi ,t , (4.1)
whereX is a vector of control variables that includes the main effects from the in-
teraction term as well as countries’ GDP per capita, year-over-year GDP per capita
growth (both from Gleditsch (2002)), Polity score (Marshall and Jaggers 2002),
ethnic fractionalization index (Alesina et al. 2003), and civil war (Gleditsch et al.
2007) and democratization status (shift from a Polity score of < 6 to ≥ 6).2
The full results from the first two models are presented in Table 4.4. The con-
trol variables behave generally as expected, although there are differences in the
determinants of economic and military aid. The probability of receiving military
aid in a given year increases for more democratic countries, but decreases for coun-
tries experiencing GDP growth. Economic aid becomes more likely for countries
that are highly fractionalized or that recently underwent democratization. Eco-
nomic and military aid are both significantly less likely for countries that have
very durable political regimes. The coefficient estimates lend plausibility to the
theoretical story highlighted in the last chapter: the interaction between a change
in the source of leader support and both types of aid in the previous year are
significant and negative. To gain a better understanding of the effect of these in-
teractions, I turn to a graphical representation of the results.
2All variables from Teorell et al. (2013).
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Figure 4.1: Effect of CHISOLS on the Probability of Future Economic Aid
-.05
.05
.1
.15
.2
0
Receiving aid currently?
no yes
Note: Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All variables set at their mean.
Figure 4.2: Effect of CHISOLS on the Probability of Future Military Aid
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Note: Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All variables set at their mean.
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The substantive results from the first two models are presented in Figures 4.1
and 4.2, which plot the marginal effect of a change in leadership on the probability
of aid for countries that did and did not receive economic and military aid in the
previous year. The first hypothesis is generally supported for both types of aid.
For countries that currently receive economic aid, the effect of a change in the
source of leader support in year t has a negative, but not quite significant effect
(p = .11) on the probability of aid in year t +1 (right side of Figure 4.1). However,
for countries that do not currently receive economic aid, the effect of change in
the source of leader support in one year is to increase the probability of economic
aid in the next year by about .11 (p = .041). The increase in the probability of new
military aid following a change in the source of leader support is approximately
.05, though this result just barely misses standard levels of statistical significance
(p = 0.055); those countries who are receiving aid that experience such a change are
at a decreased likelihood of about 0.07 (p = .002) of receiving aid in the subsequent
year.
These results lend credence to one key component of the model, namely that
leadership turnover and the distribution of aid do in fact move together. The next
set of models relates this finding to the main argument of the chapter, which links
the expectation of future aid to leadership turnover.
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Hypothesis 2: Expected Aid and Leadership Turnovers
The second set of models tests the core logic of the argument relating expectations
about future aid to changes in leadership. Recall that the theoretical model pre-
sented in the previous chapter indicates that the availability of future aid should
increase the likelihood of leadership turnover, but only in states that do not pro-
vide many public goods and that do not currently receive aid. In other words,
dominant states are able to purchase favorable leadership transitions, but only in
states where the new leadership is able to expropriate the new aid for their own
use.
In addition to the measures described in the previous test, the current hypoth-
esis requires a measure of how likely the new government will be to capture the
rents from foreign aid. Another way of putting this requirement is to say that the
new regime should focus primarily on providing private goods for regime support-
ers rather than public goods that are enjoyed by the mass of the citizenry. I mea-
sure the institutional propensity to provide public goods with Bueno de Mesquita
et al. (2003)’s winning coalition variable, W. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) ar-
gue that states with large winning coalitions – that is, states in which the pool of
individuals eligible to determine leadership turnover is large – are more likely to
provide public goods. Therefore, I predict that in states with small winning coali-
tions, the availability of future aid increases the likelihood of leadership turnover.
In the models testing Hypothesis 2, in order to capture how expectations about
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Table 4.5: Predicting Future Aid and Leadership Turnover
(1: Economic Aid) (2: Military Aid)
DV: Change in Source of Leader Support DV: Change in Source of Leader Support
Economic Aid (t) 0.893
(0.93)
Economic Aid (t+1) 2.102∗
(2.57)
Economic Aid (t) × Economic Aid (t+1) -1.577
(-1.36)
Economic Aid (t+1) × W -2.138∗
(-1.99)
Economic Aid (t) × Economic Aid (t+1) × W 0.870
(0.60)
Military Aid (t) 1.784∗∗∗
(4.29)
Military Aid (t+1) 0.843
(1.69)
Military Aid (t) × Military Aid (t+1) -2.251∗∗∗
(-3.54)
Military Aid (t) × W -1.734∗∗
(-2.68)
Military Aid (t+1) × W -0.708
(-0.99)
Military Aid (t) × Military Aid (t+1) × W 1.914∗
(2.01)
W -1.461∗ -2.309∗∗∗
(-2.14) (-5.50)
GDP per capita 0.00547 0.000617
(0.43) (0.05)
GDP growth per capita -1.452∗ -1.377∗
(-2.15) (-2.03)
Polity 0.202∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗
(12.36) (12.81)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization -0.0601 -0.0504
(-0.26) (-0.22)
Civil War 0.141 0.147
(1.03) (1.08)
Regime Durability -0.00569∗ -0.00705∗∗
(-2.05) (-2.64)
Democratization 1.890∗∗∗ 1.871∗∗∗
(6.97) (6.90)
Constant -2.365∗∗∗ -1.369∗∗∗
(-4.10) (-4.68)
Observations 5545 5545
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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future aid influence domestic political competition, I use the actual incidence of
future aid. The reason for this is that future aid is strategically linked to the in-
cidence of leader turnover in the previous year. Recall that the theoretical model
indicates – and the first test demonstrated – that for countries currently not receiv-
ing aid, leadership change increases the probability of aid reception. Put another
way, the following test relies on the assumption that opposition leaders can cor-
rectly anticipate how competition for office will affect the probability of receiving
aid in the future. The first test provided evidence that this assumption is, on aver-
age, defensible. I now relate this finding to the likelihood of political competition,
with the more specific prediction that leaders are only willing to challenge for of-
fice when (1) doing so will bring about new aid for the country and (2) when the
winning coalition is small enough that the leader can keep enough of the aid for
him or herself. For this test, the models follow the form
Pr (CHISOLSi ,t ) =β1Wi ,t Aidi ,t Aidi ,t+1 +βXi ,t +εi ,t , (4.2)
where X is a vector of control variables that includes the lower-order interaction
terms and the main effects from the triple interaction. To be explicit, the hypothe-
sis predicts that in small winning coalition states, future economic or military aid
(Aidi ,t+1) has a positive effect on the likelihood of a change in the source of leader
support in year t , but only when there is no aid to country i in year t .3 Three types
3I also ran two less restrictive versions of this model in which I interacted winning coalition size with
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of observations would then count as evidence against my theoretical expectations:
first, countries that experience a change in the source of leader support without a
corresponding change in aid reception; second, states that move from receiving no
aid to receiving aid without a change in the source of leader support; and third,
large-winning coalition states that experience a change in the source of leader sup-
port and receive new aid. The empirical model thus fairly accurately captures the
strategic interaction posited by the theoretical model. As in Models 1 and 2, I in-
clude several control variables that might reasonably work to produce a lower or
higher chance of leader replacement: GDP per capita and year-over-year GDP per
capita growth, Polity regime durability and Polity score, an ethnic fractionaliza-
tion index, a dummy variable capturing whether the country is involved in a civil
war, and whether or not the country underwent a democratization in the current
year.
The empirical results strongly confirm the theoretical models’ expectations.
Due to the difficulty of interpreting triple interaction terms in a logistic model, I
plot the marginal effects of interest in Figures 4.3 and 4.4, although full results are
presented in Table 4.5. I turn first to Figure 4.3, which plots the effect of future
economic aid. As predicted, in small winning coalition states that currently do
not receive aid, the promise of economic aid in year t + 1 leads to an increased
probability of a change in the source of leader support in year t of approximately
a dummy variable that took on a value of one if a country’s year-over-year difference in aid exceeded the
sample mean by 1.5 and 2 standard deviations, respectively. The substantive results were identical to the
ones presented below.
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Figure 4.3: Effect of Future Economic Aid on Change in Source of Leader Support
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Note: Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Aidi ,t = 0. All other variables set to their means.
Figure 4.4: Effect of Future Military Aid on Change in Source of Leader Support
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Note: Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Aidi ,t = 0. All other variables set to their means.
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.27. This effect is decreasing in winning coalition size, to around .1 for winning
coalitions of moderate size (W=.5), before becoming statistically insignificant for
states with larger winning coalitions (W≥ .75). For states that currently receive aid,
the effect of aid in the next year never has a significant effect on the probability of
a change in the source of leader support (results not shown).
The results for military aid, presented in Figure 4.4, are weaker than the results
for economic aid but still in the expected direction. While the marginal effect
never quite reaches statistical significance, the estimated effects are positive and
close to signifiance for winning coalition sizes of W= 0 (p = .101), W= .25 (p = .07),
and W= .5 (p = .08). That military aid is a looser fit to the theoretical model is
in many ways unsurprising. Recall that the expected interaction between aid and
winning coalition size arises because of the effect that public goods have on the
ability of new leaders to expropriate rents from the aid they secure by seizing
office. Military aid may reasonably operate differently from economic aid in this
respect: leaders may not have to share military aid with their opponents regardless
of how intensively they cultivate public goods provision. While military aid could
play a similar role – perhaps by loosening a government’s budget constraint such
that its hand is forced to spend more on the domestic economy – in general one
might expect a government to share less of its military aid than its economic aid.
Therefore I take the fact that the effect of military aid is similar to that of economic
aid to be encouraging with respect to the logic of the theory, even if the former
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Table 4.6: Substantive Effects of Competing Explanations for Leader Security
From To Change in probabilityof change in source of leader support
Civil war 0 1 -0.01
Economic growth -0.05% +0.05%† -0.01∗
Democratization 0 1 +0.23∗
Polity durability 0 44† -0.02∗
Future economic aid (W=0) 0 1 +0.27∗
Future economic aid (W=.25) 0 1 +0.18∗
Note: ∗ Significant at p < .05.
† Shift from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean.
Overdispersion in the durability variable led the “from” value to be set at its sample minimum,
slightly higher than a standard deviation below the mean. All other variables held at their means.
relationship never quite reaches statistical significance.4
The control variables for both models are generally in the expected direction,
although most do not reach statistical significance. Unsurprisingly, in both models
states experiencing robust economic growth are less likely to undergo leadership
turnover, as are states that have high scores on regime durability. Likewise demo-
cratic states are more likely to see turnover in their leadership. Overall, the results
from both models strongly suggest that the theoretical model outlined above is
capturing a key dynamic in leadership transitions.
The effect of future aid on the probability of a change in the source of leader
support is substantively large, as well. Table 4.6 describes changes in the predicted
probability of leadership change as a function of several key variables.5 The effects
4While the results above are robust to a variety of different measurements of “future aid,” they weaken
considerably and indeed become insignificant in the post-Cold War era. There are two possible explana-
tions for this that bear further research. First, it may be that the United States’ strategy of aid provision
was conditioned substantially by its geopolitical competition with the Soviet Union, and that the disap-
pearance of this rival lessened the need for the U.S. to engage in this practice. Second, it may be that new
mechanisms of aid distribution – through multilateral institutions or organizations that bypass recipient
state governments – lessen the ability of the U.S. to engage in these practices, even if it might want to.
5Predictions from Model 1 in Table 4.5.
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of several variables often pointed to as key for leader security – like civil war,
economic growth, and regime durability – are dwarfed by the effect of future aid.
In fact, even the effect of democratization appears to be less than the effect of the
promise of future aid: an autocrat is more likely to be able to democratize and
remain in office than fend off an opposition leader intent on securing external
resources.
Conclusion
Taken together, the empirical models resoundingly confirm the theoretical model
presented in the previous chapter. First, I demonstrated that the United States does
appear to shift its provision of foreign aid in response to changes in the source
of leader support within other countries. For both economic and military aid,
states that experience a turnover in the leader of their country while they are not
aid recipients are more likely to receive aid in the following year. In the case of
economic aid, the increase in the likelihood of aid reception is more than 10%.
Second, I showed that when actors expect to receive aid upon coming to office,
they are substantially more likely to do so, but only when they expect to be able
to keep most of the aid for themselves. The effect of the expectation of aid is quite
large, outpacing the effect of increased economic growth or even civil war. More-
over, the identified effect is likely to be a conservative estimate for the following
reason: the data used only recorded successful attempts to displace a state’s leader-
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ship. The current analysis misses any leader who is unsuccessful in her attempt to
come to office to secure aid. Identifying these cases is likely to be extraordinarily
difficult. Even given a dataset comprehensively recording attempts to remove a
state’s leadership, unsuccessful attempts will not contain the follow-on effect of a
change in aid status. That is to say, if a leader attempts to take office believing that
upon doing so he will be plied with foreign aid, if he is not able to displace his
country’s leadership, his country will never be coded as having received aid. In
the remainder of this chapter, I discuss several implications of the current analysis
for international relations theory.
The theoretical model and subsequent empirical test from this chapter provide
one explanation for the undemocratic nature of hierarchical relations. Friendship
is simply easier to buy in undemocratic, politically-exclusive states. This statement
is not equivalent to saying that friendship is cheaper to buy in these states. As I
show in the next chapter, exclusive political institutions lead to larger levels of aid
disbursements: intuitively, as less aid goes to groups in the political opposition,
they are less willing to accept the status quo in return for these internationally-
provided inducements. While politically-inclusive institutions lead to more durable
hierarchical relations, they are not conducive to their construction. It is no coin-
cidence that the United States’ closest democratic allies throughout the Cold War
were either countries in which domestic foreign policy divisions were relatively
shallow (Great Britain, Canada, etc.), or those that were the result of direct impo-
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sition (West Germany, Japan). Smaller states – Guatemala, Argentina, Iran, Congo
– all experienced foreign-induced regime change. Yet these states were beset by
domestic conflict and suffered many instances of regime reversal at the hands of
the two great powers who were willing to provide resources to their favored group
should the latter successfully attain office. The argument I have outlined and sub-
stantiated in this chapter suggests that the United States propped up dictatorial
regimes not out of a preference for venality but rather because this venality was
necessary to convince these groups to pay the costs of political competition.
This chapter has also demonstrated empirically the role that dominant states
are accorded in the domestic political process within other states. Political com-
petition between groups in a state over the construction of that state’s leadership
is simply not a purely domestic process. Models of political competition that do
not account for the possibility of outside interference risk misunderstanding the
sources of political grievances, groups’ willingness to act on them, and the likely
outcomes of these actions.
Finally, I have demonstrated a potent alternative to violent methods of hierar-
chy construction. As I argued in the beginning of this chapter, instances of foreign-
imposed regime change have taken an outsized role in the study of asymmetric rela-
tionships. Dominant states maintain an ability to shift the parameters of political
competition within other states by asymmetrically providing resources to different
groups. Because these resources – foreign aid, grants, trade agreements, monetary
145
cooperation – are part and parcel of everyday interactions in international politics,
they are easy to miss. But for their banality, they are not less important to under-
standing how dominant states systematically institute political outcomes within
other states, if only because their pervasiveness so outstrips that of war. In the
next chapter, I turn to an empirical analysis of this pervasiveness, showing in the
process how these relationships are maintained over time.
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Chapter 5
Maintaining Hierarchy
In the previous chapter, I showed that the United States has strategically shifted
the allocation of foreign aid to help bring leaders to power within other states.
This finding demonstrates that dominant states can use the strategic provision of
interstate resources to create hierarchy. Chapter 3 provided a theoretical explana-
tion for why this is the case: dominant states use interstate resources like foreign
aid to shape the value that groups within other states place on holding office. In
this chapter I extend this line of argumentation to the maintenance of hierarchy.
The goals of this chapter are two-fold. First, I aim to show that dominant states
do not rely on resource transfers alone in their hierarchical management. To this
end, I demonstrate the linkage between aid provision and coercion. As I showed
in Chapter 3, the provision of resource transfers like foreign aid are not the only
mechanism dominant states have to secure the tenure of their allies within subor-
dinate states. Dominant states also coerce their domestic opponents within sub-
ordinate states. When groups opposed to the political goals of hierarchy expect
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to be forced to give up on their policy goals while in office, they are less willing
to compete for office in the first place. One way that dominant states shape these
groups’ ability to pursue their policy goals is through coercion. I show that as the
United States is more powerful relative to a given state, it provides less aid to that
state, even after controlling for factors shaping the state’s strategic significance.
Second, this chapter demonstrates that the provision of foreign aid does in fact
enhance the security of leaders within other states. While the previous chapter
showed that the strategic provision of foreign aid operates to bring favorable lead-
ers to power within subordinate states, this chapter demonstrates that the same
aid helps to keep them there.
Consider the case of Cold War Latin America, where the United States made
the linkage between aid and coercion explicit. After the fall of Cuba to commu-
nist rule heightened concerns in the United States over the spread of leftism in
the Western hemisphere, the Kennedy administration began preparations to im-
plement the Alliance for Progress initiative – $20 billion in aid intended to boost
free-market economic growth in Latin America. While Kennedy’s successor, Lyn-
don Johnson, sent 40,000 troops to the Dominican Republic in 1966 to restore
favorable leadership, for most countries in Latin America bilateral relations with
the U.S. during the time period were characterized by the receipt of massive fiscal
transfers (Brands 2010, p. 47-49).
Still, some within the administration expressed concern that money on its own
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would be insufficient to underwrite the stability of non-leftist governments. Sec-
retary of State Dean Rusk argued that “[v]itamin tablets will not save a man set
upon by hoodlums in an alley.” In other words, the secretary called for violent
action to be made ready should aid not suffice in keeping communist “hoodlums”
out of power – a proposition ultimately demonstrated by Johnson in 1965. While
this threat was rarely carried out, it hung over Latin American politics and condi-
tioned its character throughout the period. As the Alliance for Progress example
suggests, the logic of foreign aid and military coercion were closely linked in the
minds of policymakers. The first part of this chapter seeks to supplement this
intuition with systematic evidence from the latter half of the twentieth century.
Conceptually, this chapter can be divided along two lines. In the first section,
I provide a test of the behavior outlined in Chapter 3. Here I seek to demonstrate
the theoretical model’s fit to aid allocation decisions by the United States. I show
that aid levels generally conform to the logic advanced in the theoretical chapter.
Specifically, I find that the interstate distribution of power – that is, how militarily
powerful a dominant state is relative to a given subordinate state – has a negative
effect on the level of aid provided by dominant states, or in this test, by the United
States. This effect only obtains, however, when recipient regimes are relatively
unsteady domestically.
The second part of this chapter tests predictions over the effect of the behavior
outlined in the first part. Here I show that aid does in fact increase leader security
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within recipient states. While the first quantitative test provides evidence that
donors behave according to the posited equilibrium behavior, the second shows
that this behavior has the desired effects.
Quantitative Test I: Aid and Coercion
The relative distribution of interstate military power between dominant and sub-
ordinate states reduces the level of aid provided by dominant states because it
reduces the value potential domestic challengers place on attempting to displace
these regimes. Crucially, potential challengers are deterred not because they fear
war upon coming to office: nothing in the model prevents these actors from strik-
ing a peaceful bargain with even very powerful dominant states. Rather they are
deterred from competing for office by the knowledge of just how unfavorable this
policy bargain will have to be in order to avoid war. If these actors must pay the
costs of competing for office only to be forced to give up most of their policy goals
once there, political competition may well not be worth the effort.
One important caveat exists for the relationship between interstate military
power and foreign aid. The relationship between military strength and aid is
closely linked to the distribution of domestic power. Counterintuitively, donor
state military power only exerts a negative effect on aid when the donor’s pre-
ferred domestic leader is relatively unsteady domestically. When a donor’s pre-
ferred leader is quite strong relative to its domestic opponents – that is, if the
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government is very likely to survive a challenge from the opposition – interstate
military power has no effect on aid levels. In these cases, the likelihood of suc-
cess relative to the cost of challenging the government is so great that opposition
parties would never countenance doing so, regardless of the policy they might set
while in office. Here the strength of their friendly domestic leader is sufficient to
ensure a maximally-favorable policy outcome. The conclusion is that donors pro-
vide less aid to friendly regimes as the former become more powerful – but only
when the latter are relatively unsteady domestically.
The relationship between the interstate distribution of power and aid provision
is a nuanced one. When a dominant state is relatively weak, the interstate distribu-
tion of power never has an effect on the level of aid provided. In these cases, policy
is underwritten by aid and the chances that a disfavored leader is able to take of-
fice should he challenge the dominant state’s preferred leader. When the dominant
state becomes strong enough, the anticipation of the bargain a disfavored leader
must accept while in office deters him from rejecting the current leader’s offer and
allows dominant states a savings on aid transfers. This result does not hold, how-
ever, if a dominant state’s preferred leader is independently strong: in these cases,
all offers acceptable to her domestic opponent are automatically acceptable to her
international patron, and interstate coercion again plays no role in aid distribu-
tion. This result implies a very specific empirical prediction which I turn to next:
the distribution of power should have a negative effect on the level of aid provided,
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but only when the leader receiving aid is relatively weak domestically. When the
leader receiving aid is strong relative to her domestic opponent, relative interstate
military power has no effect on the level of aid received.
Because the costs of aid packages determine which countries receive aid, a se-
lection model accounting for this process is appropriate. The most popular of
these models is the Heckman correction procedure, which accounts for the bias
induced by the truncation of the sample by including in the outcome equation the
correlation between the errors of the two stages (ρ), the standard deviation of the
second-stage error, and the estimated likelihood that the observation was in fact
observed. A Heckman model takes explicit account of the effect of the covariates
in the selection stage by using them to predict the probability that a given observa-
tion enters the outcome stage and then adjusting the effect of the same covariates
in the outcome stage by using this estimated probability as an independent vari-
able. In order to maintain as close a match as possible between the theoretical and
empirical components of the theory, I estimate a Heckman model that examines
the effect of the key independent variables on both the probability and level of
aid.
As in the previous chapter, I measure aid distribution using data from the US-
AID Foreign Assistance Database.1 Since I have no theoretical expectation over
different types of aid – such as economic, social, or humanitarian – I construct a
single lump-sum value of aid received by each country from the United States in
1Data available at http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/detailed.html.
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each year. Note that this decision presents a relatively conservative test of the the-
ory proposed here: so long as the humanitarian and strategic motives for aid are
not systematically correlated, if the United States provides aid for humanitarian
reasons in addition to strategic ones, identifying the patterns I derived above in the
empirical data should be more difficult. If a country received any aid in a given
year, it receives a 1 for the dummy variable aid; if a country did not receive aid in
a given year, it receives a 0 for aid. The variable logaid records the logged level of
aid received by country i in year t , according to USAID. I log this variable as it is
highly skewed and the second-stage Heckman errors are otherwise non-normal.
The primary independent variable of interest for this study is the bilateral bal-
ance of power between the United States and a recipient country in a given year
interacted with a measure of recipient regime strength. I construct a variable bop
which captures the distribution of power between the United States and a poten-
tial aid recipient. This variable is equal to the share of a dyad’s Composite Index of
National Capability (CINC) score held by the United States, or bop= cincUS,t
cincUS,t+cinci ,t
(Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972, Singer 1988). This variable takes on higher val-
ues (closer to 1) when the United States controls a greater share of a dyad’s total
capabilities, and lower values (closer to the sample minimum of .417) when the
United States controls a smaller share of a dyad’s total capabilities.
I measure the domestic strength of recipient state regimes in two ways. Recall
that according to the theoretical model, the key dimension this variable should
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of BOP
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capture is the likelihood that the current leader will lose office if he or she is chal-
lenged by a domestic opposition group. First, I use the amount of oil produced by
a state, from Ross (2013). Dunning (2008) and Morrison (2009), among others, ar-
gue that access to non-tax revenue such as oil can increase leader security. Second,
I use year-over-year growth in GDP per capita. I expect that in countries experi-
encing high levels of economic growth, governments are less likely to be displaced
by their domestic challengers.
Hypothesis 3. When (a) GDP growth or (b) oil production is low, BOP has a negative effect
on the level of aid received.
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Hypothesis 4. When (a) GDP growth or (b) oil production is high, BOP has no effect on
the level of aid received.
I also control for several variables previously found to influence aid allocation.
Much of the early research on aid distribution focused on aid’s ostensible goal
in promoting economic development (Burnside and Dollar 2000, Easterly 2003).
To this end, I include both the level of gross domestic product (GDP) in a country
and the year-over-year growth in GDP. These data are from Gleditsch (2002). Since
Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that countries tend to give aid to others who vote
with them in the United Nations, I use Strezhnev and Voeten (2013)’s UN General
Assembly Voting data to control for the possibility that aid is primarily used to
reward political loyalty. For the United States specifically, Gibler (2008) finds that
human rights abusers are less likely to receive aid. To account for the potential
selection effect of human rights concerns, I include the combined Freedom House
index of political and civil liberties in the selection equation. This index runs from
2 (most free) to 14 (least free), and should be negatively signed if the United States
seeks to avoid rewarding human rights abusers. Since Gibler (2008) argues that
respect for human rights affects the decision to give aid but not how much aid a
given country receives, I also use the Freedom House score to fulfill the exclusion
restriction for the Heckman model.
The balance of power variable might also plausibly capture a dimension of
“geopolitical significance” – if more important countries have more military power,
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it would not be surprising to see the United States provide more aid to these coun-
tries, irrespective of the theory constructed above. I attempt to control for this
possibility in three ways. First, I include a measure of trade relations. Specifi-
cally, I include the level of exports from the United States to country i in year t
(Barbieri and Keshk 2012). Second, I also include a dummy variable for whether
the country-year in question is coded as having an alliance relationship with the
United States (Gibler 2009). Finally, I include a variable that captures what region
of the world the recipient state is in (included in Teorell et al. (2013)).
Further, to the extent that wealthy countries are also geopolitically important,
the inclusion of GDP in the model should also allay concerns over what the balance
of power is capturing. I include in the selection equation a lagged version of the
dependent variable, which captures whether a given country received aid from the
United States in the previous year.2 Finally, to account for the non-independence
of panel observations, I cluster standard errors on the recipient states. Table 5.1
presents the results of the empirical model, which bears out the hypotheses de-
rived from the theory above. The balance of power variable is negative and sig-
nificant in both specifications. In the first model, which includes the interaction
between bop and oil production, all three – the interaction and both constituent
effects – are significant. In the second model, which includes the interaction be-
tween the interstate distribution of power and GDP growth per capita, while bop
2Unfortunately, collinearity between the level of aid and its lag prevents an inclusion of the lagged
outcome variable in the second equation. Estimation of aid level using OLS including a lagged dependent
variable leaves the substantive results unchanged.
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Table 5.1: A Selection Model of Bilateral Economic Aid
(1)
Log(Foreign Aid)
Log(Foreign Aid)
GDP growth per capita -0.0288 (0.330)
Log(Oil Production) 0.00425 (0.00407)
U.S. exports (thousands of dollars) 0.0108 (0.00843)
Defensive Alliance 0.160 (0.0997)
GDP per capita -0.180∗∗∗ (0.0150)
Polity IV 0.0663∗∗∗ (0.00956)
Winning Coalition Size -0.501∗ (0.213)
UN Affinity 0.176 (0.234)
Region -0.0425∗ (0.0199)
Constant 17.75∗∗∗ (0.220)
Aid (t)
Change in Source of Leader Support (t −1) 0.100 (0.203)
Aid (t ) 3.074∗∗∗ (0.0824)
Change in Source of Leader Support (t −1) × Aid (t −1) -0.288 (0.256)
GDP per capita -0.0501∗∗∗ (0.00817)
GDP growth per capita -0.483 (0.259)
Polity IV 0.0102 (0.0134)
Winning Coalition Size -0.443 (0.229)
UN Affinity -0.441∗ (0.220)
Human Rights -0.0376 (0.0231)
Constant -0.111 (0.323)
ρ
Constant -0.462∗∗∗ (0.0582)
σ
Constant 0.701∗∗∗ (0.0142)
Observations 3594
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
remains negative and significant, neither GDP per capita nor the interaction reach
statistical significance. However, as I show graphically below, the effects are in fact
substantively significant and in the expected direction for some ranges of GDP
growth. That is to say, while the interaction between bop and GDP growth per
capita is insignificant when GDP growth is high, this interaction produces signifi-
cant differences in aid levels for countries experiencing a slowing of growth.
Interestingly, two of the geopolitical significance controls (trade and alliance
157
status) are insignificant when the regime security and balance of power interac-
tions are included. However, when these interactions are dropped from the model,
both exports and alliance status become significant and positive: net the effect of
the theoretical argument proposed, trade and alliance partners receive more for-
eign aid from the United States, but once the effect of coercion is incorporated into
the model these results appear to no longer be important.
The other controls behave generally as expected, though many are not statisti-
cally significant. Wealthy countries are both less likely to receive aid than poorer
countries and tend to receive less aid on average. The United States appears to
reward democratic countries by giving them more aid, but is not more likely to
provide aid to democratic countries. I find no significant effect for UN affinity for
either aid selection or aid levels. Interestingly, increases in democracy level are
significant for neither aid reception nor aid level.
To ease substantive interpretation of the key results, in Figure 5.2 I plot the
level of aid provided by the United States across a range of both measures of
regime security for two levels of the balance of power.3 On the x-axis of the top
panel, Ross (2013)’s oil value variable measures the amount of oil produced in a
given country-year, in 2009 U.S. dollars. The two levels of bop are set at one stan-
dard deviation below the mean (bop=.9) and at the sample maximum (bop=1).4
3The supplementary materials contain scatterplots of the two variables along with the BOP variable to
assure the reader that outliers do not significantly influence the estimated relationships.
4This variable is highly skewed, but the results are robust to virtually any configuration of “low” and
“high” values.
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Figure 5.2: Coercion, Regime Security, and Aid
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As is clear from the figure, the effect of the distribution of military power on
the level of aid received is as theorized. When recipient regimes are in control
of few oil resources, the United States gives more aid when it is less powerful.
However, for countries that produce high levels of oil, the relative distribution
of interstate military power is insignificant. The theoretical model indicates that
this is because opposition groups are very unlikely to challenge the government
in these states, regardless of international politics. For countries with few natural
resources, opposition groups might like to challenge the government. However,
where the threat of interstate coercion looms large, these groups anticipate being
forced to strike disadvantageous bargains while in office. Correspondingly, when
the U.S. is relatively powerful, it sends less aid than it otherwise would.
The coercive effect on aid is strong and substantively significant. Consider a
state that produces no oil (approximately 25% of the sample). When the U.S. is
maximally powerful (bop=1), it sends approximately $1.8 million in aid. Con-
versely, when bop=.9, the predicted level of aid jumps to $4.8 million. The effect
is similar, but substantively smaller, for states that produce moderate amounts of
oil. For a state that produces approximately $1.6 million of oil per year (roughly
the median state), shifting from bop=.9 to bop=1 reduces the predicted aid level
by only $1 million per year. Finally, for states that produce over $6 million in oil
(in the 99th percentile and above), there is no difference in aid levels as a function
of changes in bop. In these countries, opposition groups are deterred not by the
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expectation of coercion upon coming to office, but by the costs of competing for
office domestically.
The bottom panel of Figure 5.2 considers the interactive effect between the
interstate distribution of power and GDP growth. While the results are not nearly
as strong as the oil measure, they are still significant and in the expected direction.
For states experiencing positive GDP growth, the interstate distribution of power
has no effect on aid levels. However, for states with shrinking per capita GDP,
the United States gives less aid as it is more powerful. For example, in states
where GDP per capita has shrunk by 3% year-over-year, the move from high to
low bop increases aid by nearly $400,000 (from roughly the 33rd percentile to the
median). That these results obtain at relatively similar scores on the balance of
power variable is encouraging for two reasons. First, the key independent variable,
bop, is unsurprisingly highly skewed. The United States is much more powerful
than most states in most years. But absolutely small changes in the distribution
of bilateral military power – that is, from dyads where the U.S. holds virtually
100% of military power to dyads where it holds 90% – imply large changes in the
level of aid provided. Second, the “low” value of military power at which these
predictions hold accord intuitively with cases where actors might reasonably be
deterred from the threat of bargaining with a powerful actor. In other words, the
claim that Chinese or Russian leaders are deterred from competing for office by
the threat of bargaining with the United States has less face validity than does the
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claim that Central American leaders make similar calculations.
Quantitative Test II: Aid and Leader Security
The previous section provided an empirical test of one set of predictions from
the theory presented in Chapter 3. This line of argumentation suggested that as
dominant states are stronger, they must provide less aid to bolster their preferred
regimes within subordinate states. I showed that as the United States is more
powerful relative to recipient states, it provides a lower level of aid, but only to the
extent that recipient state regimes are domestically unsteady. With respect to the
equilibrium aid levels predicted by the formal model, the empirical results appear
to confirm the theoretical expectations.
In the final section of this chapter, I ask whether or not this foreign aid achieves
its goal. In other words, are leaders who receive aid less likely to be removed from
office? The theoretical model presented in Chapter 3 suggested that the presence
of foreign aid should operate to increase recipient leader security. It does so by
shifting the relative valuation leaders place on holding office. In the previous
chapter, I showed that for dominant states’ favored leaders, the expectation of
receiving aid can boost the value they place on holding office such that they will
compete for control of the government. For dominant states’ disfavored leaders,
aid has the opposite effect. These leaders do not receive aid while in office, low-
ering the value they place on doing so. Moreover, while in the opposition, they
162
receive some aid via the domestic sharing mechanism outlined in Chapter 3. Be-
cause aid can pay for public goods from which all groups benefit, this aid increases
the value that disfavored leaders place on remaining in the opposition. On sum,
the aid provision strategy posited in Chapter 3 constrains disfavored leaders’ will-
ingness to compete for office. In order for them to do so, the private valuation they
place on government – from rents or other perquisites – must be incredibly high.
The theory therefore indicates that aid should increase the security of the leaders
that receive it. However, it also suggests an inferential problem that should be
addressed first.
Recall the cross-cutting role of domestic institutions from the theoretical model.
While inclusive institutions make hierarchy more difficult to construct – as demon-
strated empirically in Chapter 4 – they make hierarchy cheaper to maintain. Fa-
vored leaders are less willing to fight for office if they must share their spoils with
the adversaries; but these adversaries are more willing to accept a bargain that
locks them out of office if domestic institutions allocate for them a larger share of
the foreign-provided pie.
Overall, states with inclusive institutions are more likely to receive aid from
dominant states for two reasons. First, even though institutions must be rela-
tively exclusive in order to create hierarchy in states where favorable leadership
is currently out of office, within this group of states those with more inclusive in-
stitutions are more likely to receive aid packages. Second, when a dominant state
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embarks on a strategy of hierarchy construction, some states will already contain
leadership amenable to the dominant state’s goals. Consider the United States af-
ter the second world war: across Western Europe, liberal democratic regimes held
power. The goal of the United States was not to bring new leadership to power,
but to bolster the security of the regimes already in place. Among states that have
favorable leadership at the beginning of a hierarchy, inclusive institutions will in-
crease the likelihood of receiving aid.
The effect of institutional exclusivity on receiving aid is important, because
these domestic institutions interact with the dependent variable of interest in this
section, leadership turnover. Because states with inclusive institutions are more
likely to be democratic, they are more likely to see leadership turnover for rea-
sons that are unrelated to foreign aid. For example, Britain saw many reversals of
party fortune throughout the Cold War, but none truly imperiled London’s rela-
tionship with the United States. Failing to account for this endogeneity problem
risks conflating the effect of aid with that of democratic institutions.
In order to correct for the possibility that democratic states are both more likely
to receive aid and to experience leadership turnover, I estimate an instrumental
variable probit model. This model estimates two stages: first, it estimates the
probability that a state receives aid in a given year as a function of a set of variables
including democracy. Second, it estimates the effect of aid on leadership turnover
using the values of the covariates from the first stage of the model. Crucially, in
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Table 5.2: Two Stage Model of Aid and Leadership Turnover
(1)
Change in Source of Leader Support
Change in Source of Leader Support
Aid (t) -1.344∗ (-2.55)
GDP per capita -0.0305∗ (-2.43)
GDP growth per capita -0.891∗∗ (-3.13)
Polity 0.0564∗∗∗ (8.79)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization 0.497∗∗ (3.21)
Civil War 0.276∗∗∗ (4.28)
Regime Durability -0.0137∗∗∗ (-5.17)
Constant -0.0882 (-0.15)
Aid (t)
GDP per capita -0.0236∗∗∗ (-22.67)
GDP growth per capita -0.0427 (-1.00)
Polity 0.00434∗∗∗ (5.96)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization 0.233∗∗∗ (11.43)
Civil War 0.0793∗∗∗ (5.72)
Regime Durability -0.00578∗∗∗ (-24.26)
UN Affinity -0.170∗∗∗ (-6.53)
Constant 0.949∗∗∗ (40.47)
athrho
Constant 0.606∗ (2.31)
lnsigma
Constant -1.015∗∗∗ (-107.85)
Observations 5649
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
order for the model to recover unbiased estimates of the second-stage coefficients
(ultimately the ones in which we are interested), the first stage of the model must
include a variable that is correlated with the probability of receiving aid but not
the probability that a leader turnover occurs. In this model, the variable I use for
identification is the voting similarity between a given state and the United States
in the United Nations.
The dependent variable in this model is whether or not a country experiences
a change in the source of leadership support in a given year. As in Chapter 4, I use
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Mattes, Leeds and Carroll’s (2014) Change in Source of Leader Support (CHISOLS)
data. These data capture changes in leadership, but also differentiate leader tran-
sitions by whether or not a transition brings to power a leader supported by a new
domestic coalition. The change in the source of leader support variable is coded
as a zero for all country-years that do not experience a change in the source of
leadership support, and a one for all country-years that do.
The key independent variable of interest is whether or not a country receives
aid in a given year or not. In the theoretical model presented in Chapter 3, I
showed that in equilibrium dominant states should either provide “enough” aid
to accomplish their goals within subordinate states, or they should provide no aid.
The tests in the first part of this chapter lend credence to the idea that dominant
states in fact base allocation decisions around the strategic logic presented in the
theoretical model. Consequently, in testing whether aid increases leader security,
I use a binary measure of aid rather than a continuous one. This independent
variable is therefore coded as a 1 if a country receives foreign aid from the United
States in a given year, and a 0 otherwise. The foreign aid data are from the U.S.
State Department, as earlier.
The results for the test of Hypothesis 3 are presented in Table 5.2, and the
marginal effects are plotted in Figure 5.3. In Table 5.2, the top panel presents the
estimates from the second stage (DV: change in source of leader support), while
the bottom panel presents the first stage results (DV: aid to country i in year t ).
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Figure 5.3: Marginal Effects from Instrumental Variable Probit Analysis
Aid (t)
GDP per capita
GDP growth per capita
Polity
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization
Civil War
Regime Durability
-3 -2 -1 0 1
Average Marginal Effects
Determinants of Leader Turnover
As expected, Polity is positively associated both with the probability of receiving
aid and the probability of observing a change in the source of leader support, sug-
gesting that a one-stage model would in fact recover biased estimates of the effect
of aid. A Wald test indicates that the model violates the assumption of exogeneity
(p = 0.021,χ2 = 5.32).
As hypothesized, countries that receive aid are at a significantly lowered risk
of experiencing a leader turnover, as are countries that are experiencing high rates
of economic growth. This latter result provides some evidence that the use of
economic growth as a measure of regime stability in the first part of this chapter
makes sense. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization and participation in a civil war are
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unsurprisingly both associated with a higher risk of leader turnover. As in the
previous chapter, the effect of aid on the dependent variable of interest – here the
probability of a change in the source of leader support – is of much greater magni-
tude than any of the other variables in the model. Only GDP growth approaches
the marginal effect of aid in magnitude. Overall, the empirical data appear to be a
good fit for the theoretical story laid out earlier in the paper.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that dominant states like the United States use the
threat of conditional coercion against leaders within recipient states to reap a sav-
ings on the costs of aid. Moreover, this aid is effective at securing its intended
goal – securing the tenure of preferred leaders within subordinate states. How-
ever, in light of these two results, the anecdote which opened this paper may seem
puzzling: if the United States underwrote policy goals in Latin America with the
threat of coercion, why then did the accomplishment of these goals still require
massive aid transfers?
The conditions under which the threat of coercion is operative point to an un-
derlying selection process. While dominant states provide less aid to unsteady
leaders relative to what they would send if they (the donors) were not powerful,
these leaders are still likely to receive absolutely large amounts of aid precisely be-
cause they (the leaders) are unsteady domestically. To see this, recall from Chapter
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3 that the equilibrium level of aid provided to a leader under the coerced equilib-
rium is a∗c . We can see how this level changes with respect to the probability of
a disfavored leader winning office by taking the first derivative with respect to r ,
which gives
∂a∗c
∂r
= (1−δ)δ[kA +γ(1−p + c)]
θ[1−δ(1− r )]2 > 0. (5.1)
Doing so demonstrates that the level of aid grows with the strength of the oppo-
sition for the entire parameter space. In other words, when dominant states’ pre-
ferred recipients are facing down relatively strong domestic opponents – as when
these opponents have access to their own sources of external funds – dominant
states are forced to provide increasingly large aid packages.
The theory presented here also suggests an endogenous mechanism for the ex-
pansion of foreign policy goals with state strength. While aid flows may increase
with the economic growth often correlated with state power, increasing military
strength allows for a less-costly expansion of aid packages to different countries as
well. By this logic, the expansion of U.S. – and to a similar extent Soviet – influ-
ence throughout the third world was underwritten by coercion as well as resource
transfers. While at times the coercive hand supporting these interstate bargains
was felt relatively acutely, at others it remained unseen. However, as the anec-
dotes from earlier in the dissertation suggested, the actors who were the target of
coercive threats – and recipients of aid – were always aware of the implications
interstate coercion had for their ability to compete for office.
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While the bulk of this chapter has focused on the empirical relationship be-
tween aid and coercion, in closing I suggest one further implication for the empir-
ical study of foreign aid allocation. The model indicates that aid levels should be
unimportant to explaining the effect of aid strategies on political outcomes. This
is for a very intuitive reason: when donors can foresee the problem aid transfers
are meant to solve, they provide either enough aid to secure their goals, or none at
all. In equilibrium, the decision to allocate aid is important for explaining dyadic
political outcomes, but aid levels are not. Certainly this is true only to the extent
that donors are able to correctly foresee the problem aid is meant to solve, but
unless strategic “misallocations” – due to uncertainty or bureaucratic pathologies
– are systematically correlated with outcomes, the general caution in interpreting
the effect of aid levels stands.
Finally, testing hypotheses over the deterrent effect of coercion empirically is
often quite difficult. If the equilibrium outcome of interstate bargaining is “no ac-
tion,” usefully attributing this result to the threat of conflict rather than any num-
ber of other mechanisms often seems impossible. Here I provide one way around
this problem by developing a theoretical model which strategically links coercion
to another observable substitute for the threat of violence – foreign aid. The model
implies a very specific counterfactual that is unlikely to be predicted by another
theory: that very powerful states provide less foreign aid than less powerful states,
but only when their preferred recipients are weak domestically. By finding sup-
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port for this hypothesis in the empirics, this paper sheds light on the process by
which coercion operates in the shadow of distributive political bargaining.
This chapter and the one immediately preceding have elucidated patterns of
hierarchy creation and maintenance using the case of the United States. Overall,
we have seen that the provision of economic resources – specifically, foreign aid
– follow the logic presented in Chapter 3. The implications of this argument are
threefold: first, dominant states can encourage their preferred leaders to compete
for office using the promise of these resources. Second, dominant states can use
the implicit threat of coercion to reduce their reliance on resource transfers alone.
Finally, the provision of these resources in fact increases the domestic security of
dominant states’ preferred leaders.
In the next chapter, I turn the logic of the theory to the end of hierarchy. In do-
ing so I move away from the U.S. case – which has yet to clearly end – and examine
the cases of hierarchical collapse exemplified by the end of European colonial em-
pires and the Soviet Union. If, as demonstrated in this chapter, the presence of
hierarchy generates leader security, the end of hierarchy presents conditions of
leader insecurity. Troublingly, I demonstrate that these conditions augur for a dra-
matic shift away from the stability of hierarchical relations.
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Chapter 6
Eclipsing Hierarchy
By the 1950s London was on the horns of a dilemma. The need to reconcile in-
creased welfare demands at home with recurrent sterling crises meant that empire
was too costly a proposition to maintain. Yet decolonization promised either a det-
onation of British interests throughout the globe, a descent into violence, or more
probably both. As we will see in this chapter, the financial cost of empire inter-
acted with decreased British power projection with deleterious effects on London’s
bottom line. This financial and coercive vice was no less binding on Britain’s Euro-
pean colonial counterparts. The unwinding of international hierarchies through-
out the second half of the twentieth century was to generate incentives for political
conflict across the globe. A description of this pattern, and the logic behind it, is
the topic of this chapter.
This chapter is motivated by two puzzles that interlock with the overarching
question of the project. First, why does the global rate of civil war tend to cluster
over time? As Fearon and Laitin (2003) note, the global average rate of civil war
172
onset was highest in the 1940s (4.6 per 100 country-years) and the 1950s (2.2 per
100 country year). The violence rate of the 1990s closely follows these two decades,
with 2 onsets per 100 country years. The second motivating question is why these
civil war onsets tend to occur primarily in young states. To illustrate this point,
Table 6.1 shows the proportion of years experiencing civil war onset as a function
of state age: as is evident, states are more likely to experience a civil war onset
in their earliest years. As I describe in more detail below, this pattern is not due
solely to the distribution of state age in the international system.
I argue that a common mechanism explains these two patterns. The retrench-
ment of dominant states, as during decolonization after World War II and the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union, unleashes sudden shifts in the distribution of do-
mestic power within former members of an international hierarchy. Regimes that
formerly enjoyed a security guarantee on the part of a powerful patron face a com-
mitment problem: repress their populations, or negotiate in the future from a
weakened position. The sudden loss in power implied by the departure of an in-
ternational guarantor generates incentives for civil war in states where externally-
supported regimes hold power. The retrenchment of powerful states that under-
wrote many of these regimes leads to temporal clustering of civil war onset, and
because this retrenchment is often accompanied by political independence for for-
mer subjugate states, these civil wars tend to occur in new states.
The argument I present in this chapter also provides an explanation for vari-
173
Table 6.1: Civil War Onset by State Age
Proportion of years
with civil war onset
n Std. Deviation
< 5 years after independence 0.015 741 0.121
≥ 5 years after independence 0.006 13,178 0.077
t = 2.97, p = 0.0015
< 10 years after independence 0.011 1,490 0.106
≥ 10 years after independence 0.006 12,429 0.076
t = 2.57, p = 0.005
ation in the severity of waves of civil war onset over time. Just as the collapse
of former dominant states can trigger civil conflict, the emergence of new ones
can lead to its abatement. When a powerful state stands ready to assume control
of newly-independent polities, civil war can be averted. Changes in the global
availability of great powers willing and able to underwrite politics within newly-
independent states therefore explains variation in the severity of the waves of civil
wars.
This chapter proceeds in four parts. In the next section, I review the literature
on the international sources of civil conflict. I argue that scholars have overlooked
how the exit – as opposed to the entry – of international actors can shape the onset
of civil conflict. Then, building from the theoretical model in Chapter 3, I present
a theoretical discussion arguing that the disappearance of dominant states from
subordinate state politics can generate commitment problems and incentives for
civil conflict. Next, I undertake a series of statistical tests which demonstrate the
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relationship between hierarchical collapse and civil violence. These tests focus on
two sets of hierarchies that have clearly ended: European overseas colonial empires
and the Soviet empire of the latter half of the twentieth century. In this sense this
final empirical chapter provides an “out of sample” test of the logic of the theory.
Finally, I discuss how the logic of this chapter might apply to the end of American
hierarchy. To preview this final argument more fully, I argue that the informal
nature of U.S. hierarchical ties indicates that the next hierarchical transition may
be a peaceful one.
The Internationalization of Civil War
Many prominent studies of civil war onset analyze the country-level explanations
for domestic violence.
Scholars increasingly view the onset, conduct, and termination of civil war as
an international process, yet much of this literature casts the international sources
of civil conflict as a narrowly regional phenomenon. Gleditsch (2007) finds that
regional democracy, conflict patterns, and trade ties all operate to determine the
risk of civil conflict within states. Neighboring countries can raise the likelihood
of civil conflict either by acting as a destabilizing source of refugees (Salehyan and
Gleditsch 2006) or by providing a safe haven for rebel groups (Salehyan 2007).
But rather than through an appeal to contagion or uncontrollable cross-border
flows, external participation in civil war can also be understood as a strategic is-
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sue. The threat of intervention can shape the terms over which a civil war is fought
(Werner 2000), the extent of violence permissible in the absence of intervention
(Cetinyan 2002), and patterns of cooperation between potential combatants (Gled-
itsch and Beardsley 2004). The hope of a favorable intervention may actually gen-
erate incentives for some groups to incite conflict when they otherwise would have
no reason to do so (Kuperman 2008), and the realization of this intervention can
prolong the fighting once it has actually begun (Cunningham 2010).
The question of why civil wars tend to cluster in both time and space is un-
settled, though many believe that the answer is linked to a logic of external inter-
vention. Kathman (2010) finds evidence that states intervene in their neighbors’
civil wars in an attempt to prevent the fighting from spilling within their own bor-
ders. By this reckoning, spatial correlation between the incidence of civil conflict
is determined not by common characteristics shared by the states experiencing vi-
olence, but by a strategic calculation that fighting outside one’s borders is prefer-
able to fighting within. Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008) find little support for this
view, however. They argue instead that spatial clustering is driven by support of
co-ethnics across state boundaries rather than an explicit fear of conflict spillover.
Previous research on the international sources of civil conflict primarily fo-
cuses on how third party support shapes the supply side of rebellion. For example,
Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) argue that during the Cold War, superpower support
operated to produce a technology of rebel “insurgency” by supplying material sup-
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port, revolutionary ideology, and operational military doctrine. For Kalyvas and
Balcells, the Cold War shaped not the temporal distribution of civil conflict but
rather the way in which civil conflict was fought over time.
The foregoing studies thus conceive of the effect of external intervention on
civil war as bolstering the fortunes of some party to the conflict, generally as a
detriment to another.1 In other words, the expectation of intervention increases
one actor’s utility for war above what it would otherwise be. But as Werner (2000)
notes, this expectation also shapes the types of deals struck in peacetime. Be-
cause the expectation of external intervention in war helps determine the terms of
peaceful political settlements, the elimination of this expectation implies a renego-
tiation of the prevailing institutional structures within a state. When the promise
of intervention disappears suddenly, the rapidity of institutional change implied
by this shift can generate incentives for conflict. In the following section, I review
commitment problem logic and outline how this mechanism for war explains the
onset of civil war at the end of hierarchical relationships.
Hierarchy and Commitment Problems
As Powell (2006) outlines, a commitment problem arises when an actor expects
his or her adversary to grow much stronger in the near future. Faced with this
1This strictly distributive effect is not necessarily an implication of intervention. Non-biased interven-
ers can seek to impose costs on belligerents in an effort to make peace (Fortna 2004), though the viability
of this strategy is bounded by the congruence of the peace terms with military power (Werner and Yuen
2005).
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dilemma, the actor anticipating an adverse shift in circumstances may wish to
fight a war today rather than bargain in the future from a weakened position.
Given this logic, consider a leader of a regime that has been underwritten by
a friendly great power. This external patron has provided economic and mili-
tary aid, perhaps even directly intervening to bolster its preferred group should
the latter’s hold on office appear tenuous. But due to either war, recession, or
domestic politics, great powers do not extend security guarantees forever. Ap-
proaching the end of these relationships, leaders of externally-supported regimes
face an internationally-induced domestic commitment problem: fight now with
externally-provided resources, or negotiate later without them. Put differently,
the presence or absence of an external power introduces a discontinuity in the
mapping of domestic resources to bargaining power.
The effect of the departure of an international patron does not have to be in-
stantaneous. For example, Kono and Montinola (2009) find that autocrats are able
to stockpile aid over time. This suggests that leaders losing an external patron
may enjoy a brief period following this loss in which they still enjoy a domestic
advantage. Nevertheless, the loss of such a third party is likely one of the largest
exogenous shocks to power a government might suffer. Figure 6.1 sketches the ef-
fect of the departure of an external patron on the power advantage a government
enjoys relative to its domestic opponents.
Temporary shocks to domestic power are an increasingly common mechanism
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Figure 6.1: Effect of External Patron on Domestic Power
Probability government survives
a domestic challenge
Time
Loss of external patron
for explaining civil war onset. Nielsen et al. (2011) argue that the sudden dis-
appearance of foreign aid can cause opposition groups to rise up against a tem-
porarily weakened government. However, well-timed aid can also alleviate other
types of exogenous shocks to a government’s power, thereby reducing the chance
of civil conflict (Savun and Tirone 2012). Governments are often at a loss for how
to resolve such a shock in power peacefully: Dal Bó and Powell (2009) argue that
while a power-sharing arrangement could alleviate conflict in the short-term, be-
cause the opposition cannot promise not to exploit their strengthened position in
the future, the government cannot extend the offer.
Commitment problem logic is acutely binding given the totalistic nature of do-
mestic political institutions. Walter (1997) argues that the reason civil wars so
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rarely end in a negotiated settlement is that actors are afraid to disarm, knowing
that once they do so their opponent has no reason to abide by the terms of the
agreement. In fact, the condition that Walter (1997) locates as critical to solving
this barrier – the presence of a third-party guarantor (p. 336) – is precisely what
is at issue for a government facing the disappearance of its external patron. This
dynamic, Fearon (1998) argues, was at play throughout Eastern Europe following
the end of the Cold War. Here, he notes that the disappearance of Communist
central governments removed a force that had worked to enforce peace between
ethnic groups. In the new domestic milieu, ethnic majorities and minorities –
neither of which had previously held power – were forced to negotiate with each
other over the formation of a new government. In the Eastern European cases,
majority groups could not promise not to repress minority groups following the
institutionalization of democratic politics. Therefore in Eastern Europe, a specific
constellation of forces existed that posed a problem for newly independent domes-
tic polities.
But the generative logic behind the spread of post-hierarchical civil conflict is
much broader than the Eastern European examples suggest. In the cases Fearon
discusses, political grievances broke along ethnic lines that provided groups with
pre-existing loci of organization independent of the previous government. But
these cases beg a prior question. What explains the peacefulness of the commu-
nist exit from power? In no sense was this a preordained outcome. Groups within
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a state who previously enjoyed external support from a patron state – as did Com-
munists within Eastern Europe during the Cold War – face a dilemma as their
patron departs. Should they brave politics without their patron state? Or attempt
to head off their loss in power by suppressing their domestic opponents?
Before turning to a statistical test of the end of hierarchy, it is worth return-
ing to the theoretical logic presented in Chapter 3. Recall that hierarchical ar-
rangements fell roughly into two separate types. In the first, subordinate state
regimes were domestically secure. Here, while dominant states provided interstate
resources to alleviate the distributional consequences of hierarchy within subordi-
nate states, the threat of international coercion did not enter into the equation: fear
of the domestic regime was sufficient to cow opposition groups into acquiescence.
The second type of hierarchy was characterized by weak subordinate state regimes.
In these type of states, regime security was underwritten both by interstate re-
source transfers and by the threat of coercion. Opposition groups knew that by
challenging the domestic authority of the dominant state’s preferred political part-
ner, not only would they lose the benefits of interstate aid, they would also be
forced to abandon key policy goals while in office to avoid war. Crucially, in this
second type of hierarchy, dominant states provide lower levels of resource trans-
fers as they are more powerful – recall the first empirical test from the previous
chapter, which showed that the military strength of the United States leads it to
provide less aid to subordinate states, but only if recipient state regimes are do-
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mestically insecure. The reluctance on the part of opposition groups within subor-
dinate states to challenge for office means fewer resources are needed to buy their
acquiescence.
The disappearance of dominant states provides a shock to subordinate state
politics in both cases. However, this shock is substantially more severe in the lat-
ter case. The reason for this is the relative speed at which coercion and aid are
retracted by dominant states. Interstate resource transfers exist on a continuum.
Within fully imperial relationships, economic interdependence is extremely high.
Yet even as these hierarchical ties weaken, resource transfers continue, if at slower
levels.
The threat of coercion, in contrast to resource transfers, tends to disappear
quickly and irrevocably. Once groups within a subordinate state believe that dom-
inant states will no longer coerce them, domestic agitation increases considerably.
Though Darwin (2009) pushes back against the argument which finds British de-
colonization a direct response to the Suez fiasco, his argument admits the invasion
as a signal “that the age of colonial ‘expeditions’ had passed” (p. 608). That same
year married the reduced British appetite for said expeditions to increasing de-
mands for independence from Northern Nigeria, where London recognized that
“to give independence too soon [would] risk disintegration and a breakdown of
administration” (Darwin 2009, p. 614). The ultimate concession to pressures for
independence bore bitter fruit not a decade later, as Nigeria collapsed into civil
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war.
Not only does the disappearance of an interstate coercive threat increase the
relative power of dissident groups within subordinate states, the previous effect
of coercion on the level of resource transfers exacerbates the crisis for dominant
states. Recall from Chapter 3 that if dominant states employed coercion against
disfavored groups within subordinate states, they were able to send fewer re-
sources transfers than they otherwise would have. Upon the disappearance of this
coercive threat, then, the level of resource transfers to these previously-coerced
states is too low to buy opposition groups’ acquiescence. The interaction of coer-
cion and resources interacts to up the cost of maintaining hierarchy at precisely
the time dominant states are likely to be unable to commit more resources.
Therefore, in order for hierarchy to end in violence, it must be the case that
hierarchies are primarily constructed using groups within subordinate states that
are relatively weak. Indeed this was the case: hierarchical partners were often
minority groups. For example, in Kenya, the British relied on traditional Kikuku
chieftains converted to Christianity, and in the East Indies the Dutch on landed
rajas. In British India, administrative control over the subcontinent was held by
the Indian Civil Service (ICS). While the ICS was originally staffed by British civil
servants, this stranglehold gradually deteriorated. By the time of independence,
the ICS was divided almost evenly between Europeans and native collaborators.
Moreover, as argued in Chapter 2, British collaboration with the Muslim League
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in India – also a minority – ultimately led to the partition of India as a way to avoid
the institutional exclusion of Muslims from the new Indian state. Even this was
not sufficient to avoid conflict.
The end of hierarchy left these contacts in an awkward position, and the conse-
quences within post-hierarchical politics were often severe. French Algerian col-
laborators were forced to emigrate en masse to southern France or risk extermina-
tion (Springhall 2001, p. 214-215). In many cases, these groups – often with the
help of their colonial allies – attempted to make the first move towards eliminating
their domestic opponents. Sir Robert Armitage, the British governor of Nyasaland,
foresaw that a move towards electoral reform would mean the inevitable victory
of the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC) and the collapse of British federation
schemes in southern Africa. To head off this eventuality, Armitage concocted in-
telligence reports implicating the NAC in a plot to murder British colonial officials,
outlawed the NAC, jailed its leaders, and murdered more than fifty activists. Even
Armitage’s liberal-minded replacement, Iain Macleod, came to see that “[t]he co-
ercion needed to reimpose imperial authority increased geometrically with each
increment of self-rule” (Darwin 2009, pp. 620-621).
The fabrication of nativist threats was used time and again to legitimate pre-
ventive action within colonial spheres. Generally the outgoing colonialists did not
make the first explicit step towards violence. Because they retained formal legal
authority, preventive action instead took the form of arbitrary detention and re-
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strictions on free speech. To wit, the Mau Mau Rebellion in British Kenya began
after the colonial government instituted “Operation Jock Scott” following the mur-
der of a Kikuku loyalist. Jock Scott banned public organization (for Africans) and
led to the arrest of 130 Mau Mau leaders. The shift to violence came when the
Mau Mau groups began a campaign of against collaborationalists, including the
Lari settlement massacre (Springhall 2001, pp. 160-163).
Quantitative Test: Hierarchical Collapse and Civil War Onset
In this section I subject the theoretical story presented above to an empirical test.
If the logic of hierarchical collapse is correct, states should be at a dramatically in-
creased chance of experiencing an onset of civil conflict if they are newly-independent
ex-members of a hierarchy. This risk of civil conflict onset should gradually dis-
sipate as these states are further removed from their hierarchical past. If regimes
are able to hang on to power immediately following the removal of their allied
dominant state, the theory here indicates no reason why they should not be able to
continue to do so in the future.
For the time period in which data on civil war and other key explanatory vari-
ables are available, there are several cases of hierarchical collapse. The first wave
encompasses the end of the overseas European colonial empires, stretching from
roughly 1945 through the early 1960s. From 1945 to 1960 (an admittedly arbi-
trary cut-off point), there were 39 states that entered the international system who
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Figure 6.2: Hierarchical Collapse and New State Entry
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were former colonies or dependencies. The next large concentration of such states
occurred in the early 1990s with the end of the Soviet Union. Overall, as Figure ??
shows, the number of new states entering as a result of the end of international hi-
erarchies has two large peaks, in 1960 and 1991. In terms of the theory presented
above, these years and the ones immediately following them should be ripe with
potential for civil conflict.
To measure civil war onset, I use the definition from Fearon and Laitin (2003).
These data indicate that in the period 1945-1999, there were 111 episodes of civil
war onset. Given a total sample of 6,610 country-year observations, this number
of onsets indicates a sample rate of 0.0168 onsets per country-year.
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The key independent variable in the model is an interaction between hierar-
chical status and length of independence. To capture whether or not a state has
ever been a member of an international hierarchy, I use two measures to construct
the variable hierarchy. First, I use ICOW’s variable marking whether or not the
state was a member of an overseas European colonial empire. Second, I include the
constituent states of the Soviet Union that became independent upon the USSR’s
collapse in 1991. If a state was a member of either a European empire or the Soviet
Union, it is marked as belonging to an international hierarchy, and hierarchy= 1.
Otherwise, hierarchy = 0. To measure length of independence, I use the Corre-
lates of War’s data on state entry and construct a variable independence for each
country-year that takes the value of the current year minus the state’s year of entry
into the international system.
To control for other potential explanations, I include a number of control vari-
ables. Perhaps most importantly, I control for whether or not a country’s indepen-
dence was violent. One potential alternative explanation for the identification of
a relationship between hierarchical exit and civil war is that some former colonies
become independent through the process of civil war. The Issue Correlates of
War dataset codes whether or not a country’s independence involved violence.
More specifically, this variable takes on a value of 1 if “if [independence] occurred
through armed revolt by the entity, or if it occurred through armed conflict be-
tween the former ruler and another state.” This variable is coded 0 otherwise.
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The other control variables I include in the statistical model are GDP per capita
and GDP growth, population, level of democracy (from the Polity IV dataset), de-
pendence on oil exports, ethnic fractionalization, a measure of how mountainous
the country is, and a regional dummy variable. This last variable is especially
important here, as it controls for the possibility that regional clustering of civil
conflict is driven by region-specific effects – for example, population spillover –
rather than the hierarchical explanation provided above.
Because the dependent variable in question is dichotomous, the appropriate
estimation method is logistic regression. To be clear, the model I estimate takes
the following form:
Pr(civil war onset)=β0 +β1Hierarchyi ,t × Independencei ,t +βX +εi ,t , (6.1)
where X is a vector which includes the control variables described above and the
main effects from the interaction term. If the theoretical story described above is
correct, the effect of hierarchy should be positive, but only when the independence
variable takes on low values. The results are presented in Table 6.2.
The coefficients presented in Table 6.2 provide initial support for the theoret-
ical expectations. Before turning to an in-depth examination of the effect of hier-
archy, note that most of the control variables behave as expected. State wealth, as
measured through GDP per capita, has a negative effect on the likelihood of civil
war onset, as does GDP growth. As Fearon and Laitin (2003) find, mountainous
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Table 6.2: The End of Hierarchy and Civil War Onset
(1)
Civil War Onset
Years Since Independence 0.00202 (0.00130)
Hierarchy Member 1.085 (0.696)
Hierarchy Member × Years Since Independence -0.00839∗ (0.00351)
Violent Independence 0.191 (0.265)
GDP per capita -0.197∗∗ (0.0721)
Population 1.346∗ (0.627)
GDP growth -2.919∗ (1.146)
Polity IV 0.0303 (0.0186)
Oil Exporter 0.563 (0.300)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.794 (0.410)
% Mountainous 0.277∗∗ (0.0989)
Region 0.136 (0.0762)
Constant -6.289∗∗∗ (0.885)
Observations 5520
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 6.3: The Effect of State Entry on Ex-Hierarchy Members
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The End of Hierarchy and Civil War Onset
countries are more likely to experience civil wars. Notably, neither region nor the
violence of a country’s independence appears to have an effect on the likelihood
that a country experiences civil war.
As predicted by the theory, ex-members of an international hierarchy are at
an increased risk of civil war onset, but only shortly after becoming independent.
In order to provide a more intuitive look at the effect of the end of hierarchy, in
Figure 6.3 I plot the marginal effect of hierarchical status across a range of state
age. As is evident from inspect of the marginal effect of hierarchy status, having
belonged to a hierarchy does in fact increase the risk of civil war onset, but only
when states have recently entered the international system. In fact, the effect of be-
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Table 6.3: Civil War Onsets in Ex-Hierarchical Members Across Time
1945-1953 (6/15) 1960-1967 (8/13) 1990-1992 (7/16)
Philippines (1946) South Vietnam (1960) Afghanistan (1992)
Burma (1948) Laos (1960) Bosnia (1992)
South Korea (1949) Dem. Republic of the Congo (1960) Croatia (1992)
Indonesia (1950, 1953) Algeria (1962) Azerbaijan (1992)
India (1952) Rwanda (1962) Georgia (1992)
Sudan (1963) Tajikistan (1992)
Chad (1965) Moldova (1992)
Nigeria (1967)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are (ex-hierarchical civil war onsets / total civil war onsets in time
period).
ing an ex-member of a hierarchy becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero
after approximately twenty years. While the marginal effect may appear small,
recall from earlier that the sample rate of civil war onset was only 0.0168 – there-
fore the marginal effect of .013 immediately following independence represents
an increase in the likelihood of civil war onset of approximately 80%.
The marginal effect of hierarchical exit charted in Figure 6.3 accounts for the
second empirical pattern identified at the beginning of this chapter. Because the
exit from a hierarchy coincides with state entry into the international system –
and because ex-hierarchical members are at a higher risk of civil war immediately
following independence – younger states are at an increased risk of civil war.
The other empirical puzzle from the beginning of this chapter was why the
global onset of civil war occurred in waves. Specifically, the global rate of civil war
onset is highest in the late-1940s/early-1950s, the 1960s, and the early 1990s. To
help explain this pattern, I identified all the civil war onsets that occurred dur-
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ing these time periods that were in ex-hierarchical states within ten years of their
independence. As Table 6.3 demonstrates, these civil war onsets account for be-
tween a third and a half of the total civil war onsets in each period. The conclusion
from this table is not that the theory proposed here explains all episodes of civil
war onset. Rather, if one were to remove the effect of hierarchical exit from the
international system, these three periods would begin to look much more like the
rest of the post-war era in terms of the number of civil war onsets.
Conclusion
This chapter began by asking two questions. First, what accounts for the spatial-
temporal correlation in the global onset of civil war? Second, why are new states
at a higher risk of civil war than older ones? I argued that the answer to these
both questions can be found in the demise of international hierarchies. When a
dominant state that has underwritten the domestic security of a subordinate state
regime becomes weaker, its allies within the subordinate state are incentivized to
lash out against their domestic allies. The fact that these dominant states sever
many of these relationships at the same time explains the correlation in the global
onset of civil war; and the fact that these states are at a higher risk upon entering
the international system explains why younger states experience civil war onset at
higher rates.
The evidence from this chapter can be combined with the conclusions from
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the previous two to form a cohesive picture of hierarchical relations. As shown
in Chapter 4, dominant states facing a leader they find unpalatable can in many
cases secure a more favorable government by promising resources to groups within
the opposition. Chapter 5 demonstrated that these leaders’ domestic security is
intimately connected not only to these resources that they are promised, but to the
effect that international coercion has on the ability of other groups to pursue their
policy goals. In short, groups within subordinate states whose political incentives
are aligned with those of the dominant state are advantaged in many ways: in the
receipt of resources and in the ability to pursue their political goals outside of the
shadow of interstate coercion.
Following from the evidence in Chapter 5, it is easy to see that the disappear-
ance of a relationship that had previously underwritten political outcomes within
a state can lead to their violent renegotiation. Leaders, facing the loss of a relation-
ship that had guaranteed their security, are incentivized to attempt to eliminate
their domestic opponents before the option is no longer available to them.
Much has been written on the effect that global shifts in the distribution of
power has on the likelihood of conflict between the great powers (Waltz 1979,
Gilpin 1983). Less has been said about the effect that a great power’s decline rela-
tive to non-great powers has on global violence. Yet this chapter suggests that the
effect is non-trivial, and goes a good way to explaining the puzzling variation of
civil conflict across time and space. In the final, concluding chapter, I review the
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argument put forth in this manuscript and explore the larger theoretical implica-
tions it holds for international relations theory.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The opening chapter of this dissertation asked two questions. First, what are the
implications of hierarchical relationships for subordinate states? Second, why do
subordinate states enter into these hierarchical relationships? These answers are,
inevitably, linked. To answer the first, international hierarchies work to structure
the very foundations of domestic political power within subordinate states. With-
out an accounting of hierarchy, understanding patterns of leadership turnover,
policy outcomes, and political violence across the globe is impossible. The an-
swer to the second question is then straightforward: “states” do not enter into
hierarchies. Political groups within states do. They join hierarchies not only to
guarantee security for their homeland against international threats, as so many
others have argued. These groups join hierarchies to bolster themselves domesti-
cally against their opponents. As we have seen in Chapter 4, the promise of the
benefits of hierarchy helps bring them to political power. Chapter 5 demonstrated
that the reception of these benefits helps to keep them there. And as was shown in
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the final empirical chapter, the retraction of the benefits of hierarchy results these
groups’ violent ejection from office.
In answering these two questions, I made one fundamental assumption that
underwrote the larger argument: the political goals of international hierarchy re-
distribute resources within subordinate states. Because of the redistributive na-
ture of hierarchy, viewing its construction, maintenance, and end as a purely in-
ternational process obscures important characteristics of its development. In this
concluding chapter, I briefly review the argument put forth in Chapter 3 before
recapping the empirical findings from the previous three chapters. I conclude by
exploring three implications for international relations research.
The core contention I have advanced here is that dominant states strategically
shape the value that actors within other states place on taking control of the gov-
ernment that rules them. Dominant states accomplish this in two ways. First, they
conditionally provide resources to leaders within other states. By conditioning the
provision of resources like foreign aid, grants, loans, and preferential trade agree-
ments on the character of leadership within subordinate states, dominant states
increase the value their preferred leaders place on holding office, and decrease the
value others place on doing so.
Second, dominant states use coercion to reduce the value leaders they do not
like place on holding office. Leaders within subordinate states care about pass-
ing policy. They might care about policy for intrinsic reasons – for example, a
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Communist leader might want to nationalize industries because she believes it is
the right thing to do – or they might care about policy for instrumental reasons –
without pursuing the goals of their constituents, they will be booted from office.
The key point underlining the coercive mechanism of hierarchical construction is
that dominant states reduce the latitude these leaders have to pursue their policy
goals. If policy strays too far from a dominant state’s preference, it is willing to
deploy interstate violence in order to bring political developments within other
states back in line. Because leaders within subordinate states anticipate this, they
are unwilling to pay the domestic costs of competing for office only to arrive there
and be forced to abdicate their policy goals. The combination of conditional re-
source provision and the threat of coercion operates to advantage dominant states’
preferred leaders within other states.
In Chapter 4, I demonstrated that the expectation of the free resources de-
scribed above can incentivize leaders to compete for office within subordinate
states. If a dominant state’s preferred leader anticipates receiving foreign aid upon
coming to office, (s)he is willing to pay the costs of overthrowing the current lead-
ership. Crucially, I showed that this effect depends on the existence within subor-
dinate states of relatively exclusionary political institutions. If leaders know they
will be forced to share their newly-gotten largesse after securing office, the costs
of getting there may overwhelm their willingness to do so. The implication of this
argument is that the United States relies on autocratic allies not because it prefers
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to, but because these are the only ones it is able to buy friendship from.
The following chapter, Chapter 5, demonstrated two empirical patterns. First,
I showed that the United States is in fact able to rely on interstate coercion to help
underwrite its policy goals. I showed that as disfavored leaders within subordinate
states expect to be forced to abdicate their policy goals while in office – that is, in
states over which the United States maintains an extreme advantage in the inter-
state distribution of power – the United States is able to rely less on the transfer
of foreign aid to secure the tenure of leaders it prefers. This negative relationship
between the interstate distribution of military power and foreign aid provision
only holds, however, if the United States’ preferred leaders are relatively unsteady
domestically. If these leaders are unlikely to be removed by their domestic oppo-
nents, the interstate distribution of power has no effect on foreign aid. The second
important empirical finding from this chapter relates the provision of aid to leader
security. I show that, consistent with theoretical expectations, receiving foreign aid
from the United States does in fact decrease the likelihood that a leader loses of-
fice. While the previous chapter showed that the expectation of foreign resources
can work to bring leaders to office, this chapter showed that the actual distribution
of these resources works to keep them there.
Finally, in the last chapter I outlined the consequences of the end of interna-
tional hierarchy for subordinate states. Because leaders within members of an
international hierarchy rely on dominant states for their security, the severing of
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these external relationships can have severe consequences. I argued that these
leaders face a commitment problem at the end of hierarchy, which generates in-
centives for formerly privileged groups to repress their domestic opponents while
they still can. I demonstrated through an analysis of the latter half of the twen-
tieth century that states are at a dramatically increased risk of civil war immedi-
ately after they exit an international hierarchy. This finding helps to explain two
otherwise-puzzling relationships: first, that the global onset of civil war is corre-
lated across both space and time. And second, that states are at a higher risk of
civil war onset when they are young.
In the rest of this chapter, I explore three main themes. First, what can the
foregoing tell us about international relations (IR) theory? As I argued in Chap-
ter 1, systemic IR scholars have by and large assumed away the influence of do-
mestic politics. The balance of evidence presented here indicates two important
revisions to this work. Second, I elucidate the puzzle of what is often referred to
as the “U.S.-led order,” which many have argued is currently imperiled. I argue
that while these concerns are by-and-large overblown, several developments from
2014 and 2015 present theoretically-unappreciated complications for the particu-
lar character of U.S. hierarchy. Finally, I outline what the argument presented here
implies for the eventual end of U.S. global dominance. Again, here the evidence is
encouraging for global peace, particularly when weighed against other potential
hierarchies.
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A Systemic Challenge
The question of how “the balance of power” shapes world politics has occupied IR
scholars at least since Waltz (1979) provided his systemic theory of international
relations. What exactly the balance of power refers to remains some point of con-
tention (Wagner 1994), and subsequent, clearer theorizing has demonstrated that
many of Waltz’s original conclusions were wrong (Powell 1999). Yet variation in
the relative military capabilities of the major powers in the international system
must clearly maintain some place in any theory of international politics.
Given that the argument presented here has explicitly ignored interactions be-
tween major powers, what might it possibly tell us about systemic IR theory? First,
the distribution of military power matters in more than one way, and the theory in
this dissertation also suggests that its definition may need reworking. In Chapter
3, and again in Chapter 5, I argued that the bilateral distribution of power has
important implications for leadership turnover within subordinate states. Domi-
nant states use the threat of coercion to deter challenges to their favored leaders
within weaker states. Intuitively, this effect is more important as dominant states
are stronger relative to subordinate states.
According to the theory presented here, then, the international distribution of
military power matters not only for relations between great powers. It also helps
determine relations between great powers and smaller ones. The distribution of
military power between great powers may vary with these bilateral distributions
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in non-obvious ways. Indeed the development of the international system over
time demonstrates just this point. The “balanced” Congress of Vienna system con-
structed following the Napoleonic Wars facilitated the development of state power
in Europe that allowed for the direct coercion of groups within peripheral states
(Darwin 2008, chapter 4). Its spectacular collapse in the conflagration of the two
world wars reduced the number of actors routinely able to undertake this type
of bilateral coercion to two. And the Soviet Union’s eventual demise not only re-
shaped the interstate distribution of power (between itself and the United States);
it also saw a rewriting of the power relationships between Moscow and a great
number of client regimes, to the physical detriment of many groups within them,
as we saw in the previous chapter. These dual punctuations in the distribution of
power – among the great powers and between individual great powers and their
client states – are inextricably linked.
Changes in the material capabilities of great powers may thus have two types
of effects. First, growth and decline among great powers may upset the overarch-
ing “great power bargain” that governs the terms of relations in the international
system. Attention to these types of punctuations is probably over-represented in
the historical and political science literature: fear of French dominance in the long
19th century and German dominance in the early 20th mark the quintessential
examples of great power shifts detonating a global peace.
The second type of effect emanating from the rise and fall of great powers is
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less obvious. As great powers wax and wane relative to their global adversaries,
their ability to underwrite politics within weaker states also rises and falls. When
military power is married to resource transfers in an attempt to underwrite pol-
itics elsewhere, the military collapse of great powers can have explosive effects
throughout the global “periphery,” as argued in the previous chapter.
These two effects cannot be studied in isolation. In fact the preservation of
the distribution of power between the great powers often relies explicitly on the
underwriting of politics within subordinate states. The core contention presented
in Darwin (2009) is that British global empire both facilitated (before 1942) and
then explosively drained London’s ability to project power throughout continental
Europe. Analyzing the effect of the European distribution of power is impossible
without accounting for the ability of Europe’s constituent states to coerce political
outcomes outside of Europe. In turn, understanding this latter process relies on
a more expansive conception of how military power is distributed throughout the
international system.
A Territorial Order
The United States is often said to have established an international political “or-
der” following its victory in World War II. And yet precisely what this means is
often unclear. Bull (1977) writes that for international politics to be “ordered” is
simply to say that its constituent parts “are related to one another according to
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some pattern” (p. 3). Ikenberry (2001) takes a more specific approach in defining
what he calls “constitutional order.” For Ikenberry, constitutional order has three
components: first, it must contain shared agreement over its rules and principles.
Second, it must establish rules and institutions that authoritatively limit the exer-
cise of power. Finally, it must be entrenched in the wider political system and so
not easily altered (pp. 30-31).
How does the post-war U.S.-led order stack up? Ikenberry substantiates his
argument with evidence from Western Europe, where he finds the United States
tightly binding itself to its continental partners, delicately balancing their fear of
domination and abandonment. As I argued in Chapter 3, it is probably more ap-
propriate to view U.S. behavior in Western Europe as a function of the specific
political situation existing there immediately following the war, rather than as a
blanket approach to order-building. While the U.S. made concessions to its Eu-
ropean allies in order to secure their participation in the multilateral institutions
it created, these institutions were time and again used to entrench U.S. privilege
both internationally (Stone 2011) and against domestic groups elsewhere (Vree-
land 2003).
The conventional wisdom, following Ikenberry, is to view the U.S. order-building
project as one designed around international institutions and multilateralism. Yet
the theory presented in this dissertation provides a potential corrective to this nar-
rative. In addition to the proliferation of international organizations, one novel
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characteristic of the U.S.-led order has been its focus on total institutionalization,
and by extension its concern with securing leadership changes within other states.
As we saw in Chapter 2, Woodrow Wilson saw a shift away from the selective in-
stitutionalization of empire as a way to push interstate conflict from the core to
the periphery of the international system. Indeed, while the postwar era has seen
numerous interventions to enforce leadership outcomes within peripheral states,
it is notably marked by the absence of great power war.
Overall, it seems unlikely that this territorial order will face large-scale chal-
lenge. The state most fear will overtake the United States in raw material capabil-
ity – China – seems to find political succor in sustaining the inviolability of state
borders while at the same time fostering favorable political development within
them. In its nearest abroad, China has fought tenaciously to deny the interna-
tional community with territorial concessions in Tibet and Taiwan. The United
States and its western allies would likely do well not to upset this delicate balance.
Indeed the two primary challenges to the U.S.-led territorial order have come
from actors who perceive the current order as having locked out their interests.
The first of these challenges is the Russian annexation of Crimea and its contin-
ued arming of rebel groups within eastern Ukraine. The postwar order has thus
far relied on great powers – having failed at securing a favorable leader within
a potential subordinate state – either abandoning their hierarchical goals or di-
rectly intervening to replace the leader of the entire country. Russian ambitions
204
in Ukraine are at once smaller (territorially) and larger (in terms of the challenge
they pose for international order). The potential to continuously divide states into
spheres of influence marks a dramatic shift from the equilibrium the United States
has sought to foster.
The second challenge to the postwar order comes from the development of the
Islamic State (IS). Unlike Russia, which could potentially pose a direct security risk
to the United States, IS will not. Yet its territorial ambitions are perhaps the most
similar to European colonial empires seen since decolonization. The Islamic State
controls pieces of territory – towns, roads, and rivers – and abdicates governance
in strategically unimportant areas. One consequence of this piecemeal strategy
has been its rapid expansion across Iraq and Syria.
How the United States might respond to a long-term, sustained challenge to
its postwar order is unclear. Were the state system to become “deterritorialized” –
that is to say, were competing dominant states increasingly willing to accept flex-
ible rule over partitioned territory rather than total rule over clearly demarcated
states – the chances of great power conflict would likely rise. In the U.S.-led order,
the boundaries of states have served as focal points, containing great power com-
petition within them. To date, this competition has not spilled out into wider war.
Were this norm to fall apart, and states to become more flexible territorial units –
suggestive, rather than declarative – this pattern might well slip away with it.
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A Peaceful End?
On balance, what implications does the theory hold for the end of American power?
There are at least three points to make. First, the hierarchical relationships that the
United States has maintained into the twenty-first century are, for the most part,
with democratic states. As Chapter 3 outlined, while hierarchy is more difficult to
construct in institutionally inclusive states like democracies, it is easier to main-
tain in these states. As a result, the U.S. hierarchy relies heavily on the economic
benefits that leaders within subordinate states glean from their relationship. By
this reckoning, the U.S.’ ability to maintain key trading relationships will be im-
portant in underwriting hierarchy, as will general economic health. Similarly, in an
era of tightening spending, the federal government must seek to protect as much as
possible the foreign aid budget. The role of the dollar as a reserve currency, while
providing important benefits to Washington, is no less important for its ability to
lubricate the global trade flows that benefit friendly leaders within other states.
Second, the military dominance enjoyed by the United States seems likely to
persist. In fact, with respect to U.S. ability to coerce political outcomes within sub-
ordinate states, it may even expand as intelligent warfare makes the continuous
deployment of military operations more financially and politically palatable. The
much-bemoaned “rise of China” may matter less in this respect than many antic-
ipate. As argued above, changes in the global distribution of military power do
not always hold direct implications for the ability of dominant states to maintain
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the tenure of their preferred leaders within other states. What matters for U.S. hi-
erarchy is not whether China also obtains these type of military capabilities, but
whether or not the United States retains its own.
While this project does not explore the implications of having multiple great
powers with hierarchy-building capabilities, future extensions will certainly ex-
plore this possibility. To speculate, the development of competing hierarchies
points to the importance of the territorial order outlined in this dissertation. As
in the Cold War, competition over the leadership of potential subordinate states
may be fierce, but it is unlikely to spill outside the territorial boundaries of these
states. Maintaining the territorial integrity of these units is key to preventing con-
flict from spreading to the great powers. Such a proposition surely cuts no ice for
the populations of subordinate states.
Finally, the two points above suggest that the end of U.S. hierarchy may well
be peaceful and gradual, rather than sudden and violent. In the previous chapter,
the end of Soviet and European colonial empires augured for several global waves
of civil war. The logic required for civil conflict to arise at the end of these hierar-
chies revolved around the suddenness of the hierarchical departure. So long as the
United States remains a large and growing economy – and despite the 2008 finan-
cial crisis, growth has returned to the U.S. – the direct and indirect subsidization of
friendly regimes will remain. Likewise, the United States’ international coercive
capabilities remain unparalleled, and its disadvantage relative to its hierarchical
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partners is unlikely to erode anytime soon.
To those fearing the return of great power war, this project provides caution.
In the past, global warfare has erupted as a function of great power competition
over territorial control, both within and outside of Europe. As noted above, these
conflicts were both caused and made possible by these overseas imperial holdings.
The argument advanced here has demonstrated that the development of the inter-
national state system marked a qualitative change in the management of interna-
tional hierarchies. Systemic incentives, as they currently exist, push great powers
to contain conflict within subordinate states. Convincing China – or in the future,
another potential global power – to abide by the rules of this system will be key to
managing the possibility of future conflict.
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Appendix A
Appendix
Proof. (Selective Aid) This section demonstrates the conditionality of aid on the identity
of the leader in the subordinate state. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that for
some strategy profile, F provides a1 ≥ 0 and a0 = a′. Then when σ= 1, A makes an offer
to B to make her indifferent between accepting and rejecting. This is given by
x +aθ
1−δ ≥−kB +δ
(
qγ[x ′+a′(1−θ)]+ (1−q)(x +aθ)
1−δ
)
x ≥ δqγ[x
′+a′(1−θ)]−kB (1−δ)
1−δ(1−q) −aθ,
which B is sure to accept. Thus F ’s utility for the stage game is given a1 > 0 is uF (a1 >
0) = δqγ[x ′+a′(1−θ)]−kB (1−δ)1−δ(1−q) − aθ− aτ. Because uF (a1 > 0) is strictly decreasing in a1, F
can strictly improve its utility by providing no aid, and so a1 > 0 is never an equilibrium
strategy.
F cannot improve its war payoff either. If F sets some a1 > 0 while A is in office, A
sets x = p − c − a1τ, F ’s reservation value for war, since this is the smallest value of x
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for which F cannot promise to fight. F can directly improve its utility by setting a1 = 0,
saving both the cost −a1τ and raising its reservation value for war. Therefore when A is
in office, F can always profitably deviate to setting a1 = 0.
Proof. (Uncoerced Hierarchy)
sD : if σ= 1, set a1 = 0; if σ= 0, set a0 = a∗u ; ∀σ accept x ≥ p − c.
sA : if σ= 1, set x = x∗1 ; if σ= 0, accept x ≤ x∗0 .
sB : if σ= 1, accept x ≥ x∗1 ; if σ= 0, set x = x∗0 .
Given these strategy profiles, when in the opposition A accepts any x to satisfy
1−x0 +aθ
1−δ ≥−kA +δ
(
rγ(1−x∗1 )+ (1− r )(1−x0 +aθ)
1−δ
)
x0 ≤ 1+aθ+
kA(1−δ)−δrγ(1−x∗1 )
1−δ(1− r ) .
Similarly B accepts
x1
1−δ ≥−kB +δ
(
qγ[x∗0 +a(1−θ)]+ (1−q)x1
1−δ
)
x1 ≥
δqγ[x∗0 +a(1−θ)]−kB (1−δ)
1−δ(1−q) .
Solving by substitution gives
x∗1 ≥
δγ[qkA(1−δ)− r ]+ [1−δ(1− r )]
(
δqγ(1+a)−kB (1−δ)
)
[1−δ(1−q)][1−δ(1− r )]−δrγ and
x∗0 ≤
[1−δ(1−q)]([1−δ(1− r )](1+aθ)+kA(1−δ)−δγr )−δrγkB (1−δ)
[1−δ(1− r )][1−δ(1−q)]−δ2γ2r q[1+a(1−θ)] .
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In order for these offers to exist in equilibrium, the private value of office must not be
too great. Specifically,
x1 ≤ 1 =⇒ γ̂A ≤
[1−δ(1− r )]([1−δ(1−q)]+kB (1−δ))
δq (kA(1−δ)+ (1+a)[1−δ(1− r )])
x0 ≥ 0 =⇒ γ̂B ≤ [1−δ(1−q)] ([1−δ(1− r )](1+aθ)+kA(1−δ))
δr
(
kB (1−δ)+ [1−δ(1−q)]
) .
Therefore when γ < min{γ̂A, γ̂B }, there exists an offer that is acceptable to the leader in
opposition for both states of the game.
It must also be true that F will accept the offer set in equilibrium, which implies that
p ≤ min{x∗1 + c, x∗0 + c}.
From Proposition 1, we know that F never sends aid when σ = 1, so we must solve for
a∗|σ = 0. Note that F ’s utility is strictly increasing in aid for x∗B : the numerator of x∗B
is increasing in a, while the denominator is decreasing. Therefore so long as τ is not
prohibitively large, F provides aid and in fact provides aid such that x∗0 (a) = 1, or
a∗ = max{0, δγr [kB (1−δ)−δγq]− [1−δ(1−q)](kA(1−δ)−δγr )
θ[1−δ(1−q)][1−δ(1− r )]+ (1−θ)δ2γ2r q }.
Note that as outlined in Chapter 3, if kA > k̄A, a0 < 0 and thus F sets a0 = 0.
Proof. (Hierarchy Construction)
sD : if σ= 0 set a0 = a∗; if σ= 1, set a1 = 0.
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sA : if σ= 1, offer any x; if σ= 0, accept x ≤ x∗0 .
sB : if σ= 1, reject; if σ= 0, offer x∗0 .
Recall that B ’s continuation value for a strategy of reject|(a = 0|σ= 1, a = a∗|σ= 0) is
vB = δqγ[x
∗
0 +a∗(1−θ)]−kB (1−δ)
q−δ . Similarly for A, his continuation value for a rejection given
the same set of equilibrium strategies is
v A =−kA +δ
(
r v A + (1− r )(1−x∗0 +aθ)
1−δ
)
=⇒ v A =
δ(1− r )(1−x∗0 +aθ)−kA(1−δ)
1−δ(1+ r ) .
Therefore at σ= 0, A accepts any offer to satisfy
1−x +aθ
1−δ ≥ v A
x∗0 ≤ 1+aθ+
kA(1−δ)2
1−δ(1+ r )−δ(1−δ)(1− r ) .
This maximum offer is strictly greater than one unless r > 1−δ(2−δ)
δ2
(and by extension
since r ≤ 1, it must be true that δ> 12 ). In other words, unless A is quite likely to take of-
fice, he will accept any offer while in the opposition given the posited equilibrium strate-
gies. This constraint is key as it ensures that D will actually provide the aid necessary at
σ= 0 to induce competition on B ’s part when σ= 1. As before, it is straightforward that
when D provides aid, it sets a∗ such that x∗0 = 1.
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Comparing a∗ with ā, we have that aid is sufficient to induce competition when
θ < kA(1−δ)δγq
kA(1−δ)δγq − [1−δ(2−δ(1− r ))][δ(1+kB +γq)−kB −q]
.
Proof. (Hierarchy Maintenance)
sD : if σ= 1, set a = 0; if σ= 0, set a = a∗c ; ∀σ accept x ≥ p − c.
sA : if σ= 1, set x = p − c; if σ= 0, accept x ≤ x∗0 .
sB : if σ= 1, accept x ≥ x∗1 ; if σ= 0, set x = x∗0 .
Now suppose that atσ= 0, x∗1 < p−c. That is, if A offers B ’s reservation value, F prefers to
fight. It is obvious to see that due to the inefficiency of conflict, A prefers to set x = p−c.
γ(1− (p − c))
1−δ ≥
(1−p)γ− c
1−δ
γc >−c
Because by construction of the equilibrium p − c > x∗1 , B is sure to accept.
Given that x∗0 = p − c, consider A’s decision when he is in the opposition. He now
accepts
1−x +aθ
1−δ ≥−kA +δ
(
rγ(1− (p − c))+ (1− r )(1−x +aθ)
1−δ
)
xB ≤ 1+aθ+ kA(1−δ)−δrγ(1− (p − c))
1−δ(1− r ) .
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Again because F ’s utility is strictly increasing in a, it sets a such that x∗0 = 1, or
a∗c = max{0,
δrγ(1−(p−c))−kA(1−δ)
1−δ(1−r )
θ
}.
.
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